



THE RVLE
of Reason, con-
teinyng the Art
of Logike.

Sette forth in Englishe,
and newlie correc-
ted by Thomas
Wilson,

Anno Domini.

1567.

Imprinted at London, by
Jhon Kyngston.

1580.



THE RALE

of the

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
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Printed in London by

John Knapp

1720





To the moste excellent Prince, and
 our moste redoubt: d Soueraigne Lorde Edward the
 sixt, by the grace of God king of Englade, France
 and Irelande, defendor of the faith, and of the Churches of
 Englande and Irelande, in pearch the supreme
 heade: your moste faithfull and obedient sub-
 iect Thomas Wilson, witheth long
 life, with moste prosper-
 ous reigne.



If my power and abilitie wer
 as answerable to my good
 will, moste excellent Prince
 and Soueraigne lord, this
 token of mine humble duetic
 whiche I nowe offer vnto
 your Maiestie, should bee as
 greate and precious, as by
 reason of the contrary it is bale & slender. Where-
 fore I muste humbly beseeche you Maiestie, in no
 worse parte to accepte this little offer then as the
 presente of a true faithfull subiecte, whiche would
 haue brought better if his power had been there-
 after. But following the example of poore men in
 the aunciente histories of Plutarche and other wri-
 ters muche commended: I offer vnto your high-
 nesse, parte of such frutes as haue growne in a
 poore students Garden. This fruite beeyng of a
 strange kinde (suche as no Englishe ground hath
 before this tyme, and in this sorte by any Tillage
 brought forth), maye perhaps in the first tastyng,

The Epistle.

seeme somewhat rough and harsh in the mouth
because of the straungenesse: But after a little vse
and familiar accustomyng therunto: I doubt not
but the same will waite euery one daie more plea-
sant then other. But in simple and plaine wordes
to declare vnto your Maestie, wherein my witte
and earnest endeour hath at this season trauai-
led: I haue assaied through my diligence to make
Logike as familiar to the Englishman, as by diuers
mennes industries, the moste parte of other the li-
berall sciences are. For consideryng the forward-
nesse of this age, wherein the verie multitude are
prompte and ripe in all sciences, that haue by any
mannes diligence been set forth vnto them: wey-
yng also the capacite of my countrie men the En-
glishe nation, is so pregnant and quicke to achieve
any kinde or arte of knowledge, wherunto it maie
attaine, that thei are not inferiour to any other:
and farther, ponderyng that diuers learned men
of other Countries, haue heretofore for their fur-
therance of knowledge, not suffered any of the sci-
ences liberall to be hidden in the Greke or Latine
tonge, but haue with moste earnest trauaile, made
euery of them familiar to their vulgare people: I
thought that *Logike* among all other beyng an art,
as apte for the English wittes, and as profitable
for their knowledge as any other Sciences are,
might with as much grace be set forth in En-
glishe, as the other artes heretofore haue bin. And
therefore, I haue so farre as my slender practise
hath enabled me, enterprised to forne an acquaint-
tance betwene *Logike* and my Countreimen. from
the

The Epistle.

the whiche thei haue been heretofore barred by
tonges vnacquainted. Notwithstanding I must
needes confesse that the Printer herof your ma-
iesties seruant prouoked me first herunto, vnto
whom I haue euen soughte my self greatly behol-
dyng, not onely at my being at Cambryge but al-
so at all tymes els when I moste needed help. But
as touchyng the thing self, though I haue not
doen it with so good perfection, as the worthines
of the arte requireth, or as some other better lea-
ned could doe yet I hope that whereas now it is
dedicated vnto your highnesse, and so made com-
mon to all: my good will shall want no fauourers
in that I haue first laboured, to bring so noble a
Mistresse bothe of Reason and Iudgemente, ac-
quainted with so noble a Countrey, and here to be
maide of a straunger a free Denison. wherein I
take not vpon me so runnyngly, and perfectly to
haue written of the said art, as though none could
doe it better: But because no Englishman vntill
now hath gone through with this enterprise, I
haue thought mete to declare that it maie be doon
And yet herein I professe it to be but a spurre, or a
whetstone to sharpe the penes of some other, that
the maie possiblie and perfectly that I haue rudelic
and grossly entered. And albeit I doe herein take
vpon me no more, but to be as a poore meane man,
or a simple person, whose charge wer to be a lode-
man, to conuey some noble princes into a strange
lande, where she was neuer before leauing the en-
terraining; the enrichyng and deshyng of her to
suche as were of substance, and furniture accord-
A.iii, dyng

The Epistle.

being: Yet if this worke maie not at the first entre-
tance, haue the faulſe conducte and protection of
your moſte noble roiall Maieſtie, I truſte it ſhall
in proceſſe appeare, that I haue not altogether in
vaine taken vpon me this ſtrange labour, but ra-
ther to verie good purpoſe and effecte attempted
theſame. I knowe your grace for your owne ſtu-
die, little needeth any helpe of ſuche an Engliſhe
enterpriſe, beeyng ſo well trauielled bothe in the
Greke and in the Latine for theſame purpoſe, ſho-
rowe the helpe of thoſe worthe men, ſir Iohn Cheke,
and ſir *Anthoine Cooke*, your maieſties teachers and
Schoolemaſters in all good literature. But to
feede and ſatiſſie the thirſt and deſire of ſuche En-
gliſhemen, as for default of the laſt tongues, could
otherwiſe not come to the knowledge of Logike: I
haue iudged it labbar worth, to giue the preceptes
and rules thereof in Engliſhe, that all men accor-
dyng to y^e gift that to euery one is meaſured, maie
bee the more prouoked to follooe the examples of
your Maieſtie, as well in ſtudiousneſſe and deſire
of knowledge, as alſo in the exerciſe of all vertue,
and princely worthineſſe, wherein your grace hath
made a goodly eſtie. In whiche moſte godlie
trade, if your grace ſhall continue together with
the feare of God, and the moſte reuerent obſerua-
tion of his moſte holie Commandementes and
Goſpell (wherin at this date all England, to their
incomparable ioy and comfort, doeth ſee and ſind
your maieſties cheef deſire to be) it caⁿ not be doub-
ted, but that theſame ſhalbe to the wicked a terror,
to the godly a comfort, to this realme of England

The Epistle.

a perpetuall defence and safegard, and to all chri-
 stian kynges either now liuyng, or hereafter to
 come, an example of kyngly worthinesse, and a
 mirrour of princely gouernaunce. And whereas
 to the moste noble kynges of Isracc and Iuda,
 the Lorde for their sonderie vertues, gaue sondrie
 gistes of grace (as to Dauid his dearilyng, puissance
 and might against his enemies: To Salomon wise-
 dome and riches: To Aza innocencie of life, and
 petyenesse of Religion: to Iosaphat prudence of king-
 ly regimēt, to set good ministers and officers vn-
 der hym: To good kyng Iudas, the aduancement
 of Gods true seruice, and the rooting vp of Ido-
 latrie: To Ioachan, a long and a prosperous reigne
 and all good rest and quietnesse:) all these noble
 gistes of Regall excellencie, shall the Lorde your
 guide and gouernour, vouchsafe to poure vpon
 your highnesse to endue you withall, in whom are
 now planted such grasses of his heauently grace,
 as the frutes hereafter is moste like to be incom-
 parable. whiche thyng that is mine O bea, your
 maiestie hath and perpetually shall haue, the daie-
 ly and incessant prayers of all vs your most faith-
 full louing subiectes, for the long and prospe-
 rous reigne of your highnesse, to the
 glory of GOD and the honour

and princelie dignitie of
 your Maestie and
 Dominions
 long to
 dure

GVALTERVS HADDON

nus Cantabrigienfis, Legum

Magister, et Regius in iure

Consiliarius, puerusque

Grammaticae, lingua nos est affata Britannia,

Curaret ne latus lingua Britannia rotis.

Nam Duglas canit, et postea se vocibus affert,

Et ratio nostros possit habere sonos.

Ante peregrina lingua instructa fuisse,

Anglia nunc propria discere voce potes.

Quamvis erit, Loxice nos ratione regens,

Attulit hanc, nostras Thomas Wilson ad aures.

Vixit, et patre si fuit ille, sua

sonus, Lecton. S.D.

fit amor, si tibi cura,

Quae tibi sunt infusa, docere decet.

Instruit ars mentem, vel ipse doceto,

Ut ere quando placet, corrige, quando libet.

The arte of Logike.

I



Logike is a discipline that teacheth man how to use his reason.

Every cause that man doeth handle this one lesson should first be learned. Neuer to enter upon any master, nor yet once to talke without good aduise-ment. Artes therefore were inuented, wisemen are yet for the same end use-ful, and sage counsellours had in muche bondy. In consideration wher-of, *Aristotle*, in whom Nature hath powred her graces plentifully, teacheth preceptes in all our do-nynges to take good aduise. It is alwaies right needefull (saith he) by these fower speciall pointes, to examine every matter, be-fore we take in hande to teache it any other. First, to knowe whe-ther the thyng be or no whereof we entreate. Againe, what it is in substance, and by the owne Nature. Thirdly, what maner of thyng it is. Fourthly, wherefore, or to what end it is. Now in talkyng of *Logike*, I neede not to question whether *Logike* be or no. For he that knoweth reason to be in man, and the same giuen by the greate might of God: must needs confesse, that *Logike* al-fo is in man, and that onely by God. For there is none other diffe-rence betwixte the one and the other, but that *Logike* is a Greeke woorde, and Reason is an Englishe woorde.

And therefore he that speaketh *Logike*, speaketh nothing els but Reason, yea, there be many Greeke wordes made Englishe, whereof all men haue not the meanyng. As for example. A yong man of Cambridge sitting in his chamber, with two or thye of his fellowes, and happening to fall in talke of a woman that late-ly married to a scholer, when every one had saied his phantasie, as well of the man as of the woman, comparng the qualities of the one, with the properties of the other, sayng their pleasure every-ent of them of her beaurie and her bodie, *pro Contra*: this yong man choppyng in with his reason, saied: I can not tell my mat-sters, but surely I for my parte take her for a Catholike woman, let other men thinke what thei list. When his fellowes heard this

fower ques-
tions neces-
sary to bee
made of any
matter be-
fore we de-
spite.

The arte of Logike.

bye reporte, they lauged apace, as knowen by their learning, what this woorde meante. For (Catholike beeyng a Greeke woorde, signifieth nothing in Englishe, but vniuersall or common. And we call in Englishe a common woman, an euill woman of her bodie. Therefore, though termes be darcke, and the meanyng vnknowen to many, yet the truthe enclosed, is alwaies one, and geuen vs of God, by what termes wee like. This then perceiued, that *Logike* is the rule of reason, I thinke it as needlesse, to aske whether it bee, or no; as to aske, whether any manne can speake, or no. Thus yee see wee must trie *Logike* by the seconde question, learning thereby to knowe first of all, what is the substance and nature thereof.

The definition of Logike.

What *Logike* is in substance.

What manner of thing *Logike* is.



Logike is an Art to reason probable on both parties, of all matters that be putte forth, so ferre as the nature of euery thing can beare.

In declaring what manner of thing *Logike* is, we must vnderstande that al things happening, or the whiche doe fall in controuersie, and maie through reason fully be examined, are in this question euermore considered.

It happeneth therefore to *Logike*, and accidentally also belongeth to the same, vpon all thynges to entreate, which commonly by witte are examined, or maie through reason at all be discussed. Neither can we doe any thing, without the helpe of reason, to giue al our actos.

Wherefore, or to what ende *Logike* is.

Nature, by Nature hath a sparke of knowledge, and by the secreet woorkyng of God, iudgeth after a sort, and discerneth good from euill. Before the fall of Adam, this knowledge was perfecte, but through offence, darknesse folowed, and the bright light was taken awaie. Wherfore, therefore, considering the weaknesse of mannes witte, and the blindnesse also, wherein we are bounde inuented this Arte, to helpe vs the rather by a naturall order, to finde out the truthe. For though before Adams fall, knowledge was naturall, and came without labour, yet no one man can now of hymself, attaine the truthe in all thynges, without helpe and diligent learning.

The

The definition of Logike.



This Art diuided in two partes. The firste parte standeth in framing of thinges aptlie together, and knieping wordes for the purpose accordynglie, and in Latine is called *Iudicium*.

Iudicium.

The seconde parte consisteth in findyng out matter, and searchyng after agreeable to the cause, and in Latine is called *Inuentio*.

Inuentio.

For you muste vnderstande, that when one goeth aboute to proue any thyng, he muste firste inuente some what to proue his cause, the whiche wherthe hath dooen: he muste vse iudgemente bothe in framing the same reason is inuented, and also to see whether it serueth for the purpose, or not.

And now some will saye, that I should firste speake of the findyng out of an argumente, before I should teache the waye how to frame an argumente. True it is, that naturallie we finde a reason, or we begimme to fashion the same. And yet notwithstanding, it is more meete that the orderynge of an argumente should be firste handled: so far as muche as it shall no more profite a manne, to finde out his argumente, excepte he firste knowe howe to order the same, and to shape it accordynglie, (whiche he doeth not yet perfectlie knowe) then stones or timber shall profite the Mason, or Carpenter, whiche knoweth not how to worke upon the same. A reason is rather founde, then fashioned, for every man can geue a reason naturallie, and without arte, but howe to fashion and frame the same, accordyng to Arte, many can doe at all, excepte they be leaured. Therefore, because every mannes wit, can geue lightly a reason of diuers thynges, without any learning at all, even by the instigacion of nature, and yet we are able to set the same in order scholelike, and to make it stande as a house: I purpose first to shewe the maner of framing an argumente, as whiche is more needfull, more after that, the maner of knieping of an argumente, and the places where all argumentes doe rest. And laste of all, the waye to deuidyng of arguments, as they be in

the firste
part of the
booke is
the firste
part of the
booke

The arte of Logike.

A breef declaration in Metre of the seven liberall Artes, wherein Logike is comprehended as one of them.



Grammar doeth teache to utter woordes:
To speake bothe apt and plaine.
Logike by Arte setteth forth the truthe,
And doeth tell what is vaine.
Rhetorike at large painteth well the cause,
And make that seeme right gaine,
Whiche Logike spake but at a woorde,

And taught vs by the waie.

Musike with tunes, delites the eare:

And makes vs thinke it heauen:

Arithmetike by number can make

Reckenynges to be euen.

Geometrie thynges thicke and broad,

Measures by line and square:

Astronomie by Starres doeth tell

Of soule and eke of faire.

*The difference betwene Logike
and Sophistrie.*

The difference
betwene Lo-
gike and
Sophistrie.



Logike other wise called *Dialektike* (for thei are bothe one) is an Arte to trie the coine from the chaffe, the truthe from euery fallshood, by defining the nature of any thyng, by diuiding the same, and also by knittynge together true argumentes, and untwinyng all knotte subtilties, that are both false and wyng-
fullie framed together.

Sophistrie is euer occupied, either in prouyng the truthe alwaies to be false, or els that whiche is false to be true, so that euery moze one part of the argument is either false, by vsyng some ambiguous woorde, or by not well applyng it to the purpose, or els not framyng it accordyng to the rules: so that a skillfull artificer maye some put the vaine Sophistrie to silence by openyng the fraude and declaryng the craft of his inuention. Whereas other wise an argumente

The arte of Logike.

5

argumente made by the rules of *Logike* can not bee avoided, but must needs be true whosoever saie naye. And so muche moze is *Logike* to be preferred before *Sophistrie*, as he is the moze to be esteemed that telleth a true tale, then he which telleth a lye. And euen as a Grammarian is better liked, that speaketh true & good Latine, then he y^e speaketh false: Euen so *Logike* of it self is good, when *Sophistrie* on the other side is naught. And well maie we, saie, that *Sophisters* are like those which plaie with false Dice, & woul d make other beleue y^e thei are true o^r els properly to terme them, thei bee like those that goe for honest men, and are none.

¶ *The difference betwene Logike and Rhetorike.*



Of the these Artes are mutche like, sayung that *Logike* is occupied about all matters, and doeth plainly and nakedly sette forth the with apte woordes the somme of thinges, by the waie of argumentation. Again of y^e other side, *Rhetorike* vseth graie painted sentences, and setteth forth those matters with freshe colours and goodly ornaments, and that at large. In so muche that Zeno being asked the difference betwene *Logike* and *Rhetorike*, made answer by demonstration of his hande, declaring that when his hande was closed, it resembled *Logike*, when it was open and stretched out, it was like *Rhetorike*.

¶ *The office of Logike.*



Logike professeth to teache truly, orderly and plainly. And here we maie see how vniuersall this commodity is, and how largely it extendeth, not onely to knowe wo^rldly affaires, but also to knowe God and all his heauenly woordes, so farre as Nature maie comprehend.

¶ There be fouler partes of this office o^r dutie, wherunto *Logike* is bounde. That is: To define the Nature of euery thing, to diuide, to knitte true argumentes, and vnkitte false.

¶ *Of Questions.*



This same maner of knitt yng woordes in due order, becomyng one of the partes of *Logike*, o^r rather *Logike* it self, sheweth the maner of questions, which otherwise are

B. iiij. either

The difference betwene *Logike* and *Rhetorike*.

The office of *Logike*.

The partes of *Logikes* dutie o^r office.

The arte of Logike.

either propositions, or seuerall wordes. A question is either a worde or sentence put forth, as when I aske what suche thyng is, and would knowe an other mannes aduise therein, as thus: What is man? What is truch? What is ambition?

Euery question is either single or double. A single question, resteth in a single worde, as thus. What is friendship? What is Philosophie? A double question standeth not in one worde, but in two seuerall sentences, as thus. Is the studie of Philosophie praise worthe, or is it not?

Like wise a proposition, whiche is a sentence, uttered in plain wordes expresse, signifyng either trithe or falshood, is either single, or double. A single proposition, as thus. Wicked men can not abide to reade the worde of GOD. Of the whiche you maie make a double proposition, by addyng somewhat therevnto, as thus. Wicked menie, not onely can they not abide to reade the worde of God, but also they seeke, by all meanes possible, to ouerthrowe the same.

Of the fine predicables, otherwise called the fine common wordes, whiche are spoken of other.



When we go about to expounde any matter, first we must beginne with the definition, to knowe the verie nature of the thyng, the whiche we can not doe, except we first learne the predicables, for thei shew the largenesse and the narrownesse of wordes, how farre they doe extende, and how much thei comprehend in them. As when I see one a farre of come vnto me, first I knowe that he is a man, then when he cometh nigher, I knowe whether he be of myne acquaintance, or no. Like wise, when I goe aboute to declare what one is, and to open the nature of any thyng, I vse the largest wordes, and so it must needs be, that I beginne with the predicables, because thei shew how much euery worde doth comprehend in it self, and how large, or how narrowe it is. They be called predicables, because some one thyng, is spoken of an other. And thei are (as a man would saie) markes or notes of wordes that are spoken of many, shewyng howe and by what manner the same wordes are attributed to other. And euery as the child beginneth

neeth with his Crosse rowe, and the scholer with his eight partes of speche, so the *Logician* first and foremoste, professeth to knowe wordes, before he purposeth to knytte sentences. Neither is there any one worde, which is not comprehended, vnder one of these five common woordes. And to this ende were those markes limited, that euery thing might be knowen in his kinde. For if euery singular substance, of herbes, of stones, and suche like, should haue a liuerall name, neither the thyng self, nor yet the names could once be comprehended in our memoies. Therefore as euery thing is toigued by nature, one with an other, so thei beyng of one affinitie, are comprehended vnder one of these five common woordes.

<i>Genus.</i>	The generall worde.	
<i>Species.</i>	The kinde, or speciall.	
<i>Differentia.</i>	The difference.	
<i>Proprium.</i>	The proprietie.	(Substance.
<i>Accidens.</i>	The thing chauncing or cleauing to the	



Genus is generall worde, the whiche is spoken of many, that differ in their kinde: as when this question is asked, what it is. As *Animal*, a liuing creature, *Art*, an Arte, *Virtus*, Vertue, *Gemma*, a precious stone. Or els thus: *Genus*, is a generall worde, vnder the whiche, diuerse kindes or sortes of thynges are comprehended, as vnder a liuing creature, are comprehended, men and beastes. Under Arte, are comprehended, *Logike*, Grammar, *Rhetorike*, &c. Euery generall worde hath diuerse kindes, and is spoken euermore of them all. As *Lapis*, a stone, comprehendeth in it self, a Saphire, a Rubbie, a Christall, a Turkas: as thus. *Saphirus est lapis*. A Saphire is a stone, and so of other.

Euery generall worde, is in twoo waies considered, and commonly called the chief generall, in Latine, *Genus summum*, and the middle generall, in Latine, *Genus inter medium*.

The chief generall is so, that where as it is in the hedde of all and aboue all, it can neuer become inferior, to bee of any kinde or soyle in thynges. As the substance, the qualitie, the quantitie, are euery chief generall woordes, and can not be comprehended vnder any

The arte of Logike.

any other. The middle generall is the same, that beeyng comprehended betwixte the cheef generall, and the lowest kinde of sort in thynges, maie bee also some kinde of forme it self, as a bodie, a liuyng creature, a precious stone, the whiche thec beeyng compared with their inferiours are generall wooordes: beeyng referred to their superiours, thei are *Species*. That is to saie, shapes, kindes, or sortes of thynges.

The kinde.

The kinde.

Species seu forma, the kinde, or sort of any thyng (comprehended under a woorde more vniuersall) is the same of whom the generall woorde is spoken, when the question is asked what it is: And when I aske: What is Justice: I aunswere a vertue. Therefore in this Proposition (Justice is a vertue) Justice is the kinde, and vertue is the generall woorde, whiche comprehendeth the saied Justice, and is spoken of the same.

Or thus, *Species* is a common woorde that is spoken of many, whiche differ onely in number, as manne is spoken of *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Aristotle*, and of euery proper name belongyng to any manne. As *Socrates* is a manne, *Plato* is a manne, *Aristotle* is a manne.

Euery *Species* of kinde in thynges, is of twoo sortes. The one is called the lowest kinde, whiche is alwaies spoken of euery proper name, and euer is the kinde, neither can it at any tyme be the generall woorde, although sometyme it beare the name of the generall woorde. The other is called *Species inter media*, that is the kinde placed betwene the highest and the lowest, whiche at diuerse tymes and by diuerse considerations, maie bothe bee the generall woorde and the kinde. For that whiche is under the generall woorde, that same maie bee called *Species*, or kinde, that whiche comprehendeth other, maie bee called the generall woorde.

A Nowne proper.

A Nowne proper, is that whereof the kinde is rehearsed. As *Cato est homo*, *Cato* is a manne: In this Proposition *Cato* is the Nowne proper, whiche belongeth to one manne onely, and man is the kinde whiche is more large, and comprehendeth all men.

This

The arte of Logike.

5

This Table sheweth the order of every substance and kind, as they are appointed by Nature, what the chief generall wordes are, what the middle generall are, what the lowest kindes in every kind are, and what the kindes betwixt bothe are.

			GOD.
{ With bodie.	{ A Sub- stance.	{ Without bodie	{ Angells.
			{ Spirites.
			{ The soule of is mā.
			{ The fower Elements.
			{ Fire.
{ Compounded of diuers Ele- ments.	{ A bodie	{ Without mix- ture.	{ Ayre.
			{ Water.
			{ Earth.
			{ Heauen and all the Planets.
{ Beeyng ali- uynge thyng.	{ A bodie	{ Without life.	{ Stones.
			{ Metals.
			{ Liquors.
{ Having the sense of feeling.	{ A bodie	{ Without sense or feeling at all.	{ A Tree.
			{ A Shrubbe.
			{ An Hearbe.
{ Endued with reason.	{ A living creature.	{ Without the gift of reason.	{ Upon the lands.
			{ In the water.
			{ In the Ayre, or in them bothe.
			{ Some thing.
			{ Scipio.
			{ Socrates.
			{ Alexander, and euen severall o- thers.
			{ Iohn.



Difference is the same that is spoken of many, what be differ in forme and knowe when the question is asked, what manner of thing it is, as will be said. Quæstio quid sit hominē, quæstio quid sit animal, quæstio quid sit corpus, quæstio quid sit ens.

The differ-
ence.

Es.

answers

The arte of Logike. T

answere: he is indued with reason: If the question be asked what man is: we must answer by his *genus* or generall woide, he is a liuyng creature. If the question be asked what maner of thyng a beast is: Wee maie saie: he is without the gifte of reason. Euery difference that is mooste proper to euery thyng, is naturally and substantially ioynd to the kinde, whiche is comprehended vnder the generall woide.

**The pro-
perties.**

Propertie is a naturall pronenesse and maner of doing, which agreeth to one kinde, and to the same onely, and that euermore. And also maie be spoken of the same kinde, and by conuersion the same kinde maie bee spoken of hym also. As to speake, and to haue power to laugh, doeth not onely agree to manne, and to no other creature yearily. And as I haue saie: whosoever is a man hath power giuen hym of Nature to speake: So maie I also saie by conuersion backward, whosoever hath power giuen hym of Nature to speake, that same bodie is a man. To barke is proper to a dogge, and onely proper, and euermore proper. Ergo, whosoever hath power, or rather an inclination giuen of Nature to barke, that same is a dogge. And again: whatsoeuer creature is a dogge, that same hath power, or rather an inclination to barke. To goe vpright is proper to a man, and onely to a man, and to no other liuyng creature. Notwithstandyng ye must marke one thing, that although many men doe goe crooked, and some also cannot speake: yet bothe to goe vpright and to speake, are properly to all menne generally, and therefore this rule serueth to auoid such objections. *Verbum definitionis non posita, non ad rem, sed potestatem significat.* Whiche is almoste to saie: that wordes vied in definitions, dooe not signifie the very acte in deede, but the power, the aptnesse, or the inclinations of Nature therunto: as when I saie, it is proper to euery man to speake: I meane to bee able, or to bee apte by Nature to speake, is proper to euery man.

Note further, that the properties are not alwaies taken after one sort, but it is some waies considered.

First, the property is that whiche agreeth to some kinde onely, although not to euery person comprehended vnder the same kinde. And it is proper to a manne onely to be a doct, as in the

habitation, and yet not proper to every man.

Secondly, the proprietie is that whiche agreeth to every singular person, and yet not onely to man. As to haue twoo feete, agreeth to every singular person, and yet not a man onely.

Thirdlie, the proprietie is that whiche agreeth to every man, and to woman onely, and yet not alwaies, nor for euermore. As to haue hoare heares in the old age, agreeth to manne onely, and yet not alwaies, but for the moste parte men haue hoare heares in their old age.

Fourthlie, the proprietie is that whiche in deepe is moste aptly and chiefly called *Proprium*, when any thyng dooeth agree to every man, to man onely, and alwaies to man. As to bee able to speake, to laugh, to goe vpright, agreeth to every man, to man onely, and alwaies to man.

This diuersitie maye haue made betwixte the difference and the proprietie, that the difference is one part of mannes substance, and is the parte that maketh vp man. As to haue the gifte of reason doeth signifie the minde, whiche is one parte of man, for man himselfe is compoate of bodie and minde.

A proprietie dooeth signifie a certaine thyng, whiche is attributed to man when he is made, and as a man would saie, dooeth come after, when man is whole made, as to bee able to speake, to laugh, to goe vpright.

Accidente (that is to saie, a thyng cleauing, or chauncing, or conuincing to a substance) is that, whiche doeth not stand by himselfe, neither is the parte of a substance, but rather is after such sort in the substance, that it maie both be alwaies, and be there, sometymes more, and sometymes lesse, without destruction or losse of the subiecte or substance, as withe, for to see, to runne, to sitte, to bee well coloured, all these maie bee a while, and yet the men maie be on liue, in whom they were before. So that the lacke of them in their quantitie or greatnesse, is not the losse of the substance. And although no substance at any tyme doeth altogether forsake his accidentes. Yet this we see, that one and the same substance, doeth somtymes alter his Accidentes, forsaking some and taking other. As water being sette on the fire, altereth the

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coloure,

The difference betwixt the proprietie and the difference.

The accident.

The arte of Logike.

The diuision of accidentes.

coldnesse, and taketh heate, so that wee maie iudge by this, that coldnesse in the water is not a substance, but an accident.

An accident is twoo waies considered, for either it maie be separated, or it maie not, some maie bee separated from their subiecte, as colde maie bee taken from water, and knowledge from the minde. Other are inseparable, because thei can not bee taken a waie altogether, as stature or broadnesse can not be taken from manne. Hente can not bee taken from fire, nor moisture from Water, the whiche notwithstanding, thei are not separate from their substance, if the quantitie or greatnesse is changeable in euery one of them, for sometime it is more, and sometime it is lesse. And we see heate in other thynges, to bee separate from the subiecte. Whereupon wee iudge that the heate is an other thyng, then the verie substance of fire. Therefore this is worthy to bee knowne, that the substance is one thyng, and the accidentes an other thyng, and meete it is to make a difference betwixt them, as thus: The soule is one thyng, the feare of God is an other thyng. Manne maie be without the feare of God (as many one is at this daie the more pittie) therefore the feare of God is an accident, the soule is a substance.

The use of the accident.

None man could bee knowne from an other, neither yet any other thyng, if it were not for the accidentes whiche happen vnto them. As when I would knowe an herbe, a stone, a beast, a manne, I must giue the proper accidentes, declaring the same to be of this or that colour, separatyng all such by description from all other, as well of that kinde, as of any other sort els.

The use and commoditie whiche we haue by these five common wordes, called on the wise Predicables.

The first vse.

Here be foure especiall commodities. First thei shew the largenesse, and the narrownesse of the moste generall wordes, called other wise Predicamentes, whiche hereafter followe: so that hereby ye maie perceiue how muche euery word comprehendeth in it self, and how

farre

saire to bee applied. The seconde prouides, that euery thing is defined by these five common wordes, soe as muche as all things, the more narrowe thei bee, are alwaies defined by wordes that are more large. As by the generall wordes, by the kinde, by the difference, and the proprietie.

The seconde
ble.

This ble, thei are good to iudge the knitting of wordes, and to see what thing may truly bee sayed of other, for there is no proposition, or yet sayyng together of any sentence (according to the common order of Nature) but thei alwaies agree to these about rehearsed Pretrables: So that either the kinde is spoken of the singular or proper name, whiche is euer some one persone, as thus: *Cicero est homo*, Cicero is a manne. Or els the generall wordes, the difference, the proprietie, or the accidents are all spoken either of the kinde, or of some one persone. As thus: *Homo, vel Cicero, est animal ratione preditum, loquendi facultatem habens*, *Album, longum, satum*. A man or Cicero, is a liuyng creature endued with reason, hauyng aptnesse by Nature to speake, being white, long, and stout. So that no proposition can bee, but the partes of the same are comprehended within these five common wordes.

The third
ble,

Fourthly, the generall wordes, the kinde, the difference and proprietie are sayned together necessarily, so that when you name one, all the other followe. Therefore when a proposition is made from the kinde to the generall, to his difference or proprietie: it is euermore an vndoubted true proposition, as this: *Homo est animal ratione preditum, loquendi facultatem habens*. A man is a liuyng creature endued with reason, hauyng aptnesse by Nature to speake. A man can not be, except he be a liuyng creature endued with reason, and hauyng aptnesse of Nature to speake. The accident notwithstanding is not necessarily spoken of the subject, but is there casually, and maye be changed as this: *Homo est albus*. Some man is white. This proposition maye be after ward false, for he maye be blacke, or after his complexion some other waie, so that the accident is often altered, and an other succeedeth in his counte.

The fourth
ble.

Therefore it is good to be knowe when you make a proposition, whether it bee vndoubted true for euermore, or els maye bee false.

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false

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faile at any time. And all Schoiers ought as diligently to knowe these five common wordes in all their dooings, as those that learne to write, should diligently marke their letters. By this trade vnder is better had, when euery cause is brought to these five common wordes: the generall wordes firste considered, nexte after, the kindes following vpon the same well obserued, and sett as though they were in arate, after that the differences, the properties, yea, and the accidentes also placed accordingly. As *Tullie* in his Offices shewyng what that thyng is, whiche were call honestie: firste speakyng generally, nexte after he setteth forth the elie sortes and kindes of honestie, parting them into foure beade vertues, wherupon he declareth the difference and the propertie of euery one; and lastely he toucheth thynges that belong vnto euery vertue, and sheweth thynges that happen in this life.

Of the Predicamentes, called in Englishe

the moſte generall wordes.



A Predicament is an order of single wordes, wherin thynges of one kynde are couched and comprehended vnder one worde, whiche is moſte general.

A Predicament is nothyng els in Engliſhe, but a ſhe wyng or rehearſyng, what wordes maie be truly ioyned together, or els a ſettyng for the of the Nature of euery thyng, and alſo ſhe wyng what maie be truly ſpoken, and what not. And for this cauſe Artes were invented, that the truth mighte bee knowne, and euery thyng ordered with his proper wordes. For when I ſaie, A manne is a creature, I knowe this Proposition hath his proper wordes, and that like as manne is a ſubſtance, ſo in the Creature, whiche is the generall worde vnto hym, whiche bothe are in the Predicament, and the order in this Proposition is obserued according to Art: for wee muſt alwaies beginne at the loweſt and goe by ſteps, whiche order agreeth alſo to Nature, when thynges leſſe knowne are declared by thynges that are more knowne, as ſhall more plainly here after appeare.

Diuiſion of
predicament
es.

The Predicamentes are diuided into the ſubſtance, and the
Accident.

The

The firste is substance called the substance, and is a substance in deede. The other are accidents, as not being of the substance, but declaring thereunto.

The commoditie of these predicaments are greete. Firste, where as they bee divided into the substance and accident, it is a good lesson to knowe euermore the substance, from the thyng whiche is accidentall. And againe of these moſte generall wordes ariseth this profite, that if you will define any thyng, or shewe the Nature thereof, you maie knowe in whiche of all these houses the woorde resteth, whiche would expresse the Nature of an other.

Thirdlie, if one will bestowe a little diligence herein, learning where euery woorde is setted, and knowing to whiche of all these moſte generall wordes he maie best referre it: he shall faithfully knowe the Nature of all thynges, no man better, then the whiche, nothing is more necessarie, and this difference is betwixte the due common wordes, other wise called *predicables*, and these moſte generall wordes called *Predicaments*, that the *Predicables* sette forth the largenesse of wordes, the *Predicaments* doe name the very Nature of thynges, declaring (as that substantially) what they are in very deede.

Difference
of Predicables
and
Predicaments.

For a note of certayne thynges, diligently to be observed, before he hath said all that is to be said of moſte generall wordes.



Discovering ambiguitie breedeth errorre, and the wantrenesse ought to bee used, then the doubtfullnesse of no one may be deceiue the heare. The cause of all controuersie, is rather the not well vnderstanding, as els the wyllyng of wordes, that in sense haue double meaning. As for this chief Schoole master to all Scholars, giueth good warning to all men, hee right wyllyng in any wise, to haue the right vnderstanding of euery severall woode.

There be wordes that haue one and the same title, comprehende the Nature of many thynges, as these wordes followyng.

And so forth
in the same

A Crowne. A crowne signifieth
A Noble. the crowne of a man-
Espe. nes hedde, and also
Sage. signifieth a Crowne
 of gold, whiche as is current, or els suche as Kinges weare at the
 Sale of their Coronation: A yewen boye seeping of late daies a
 yewen clerke shewen in the crowne, at what time French crow-
 nes do deare an high price here in Englands, saied to the Prieste
 full unhappely in this wise: I praye you Passer Parson (q he)
 how gooch crownes now with you, wherof the Prieste was aba-
 shed, and would rather haue losse a crowne in dede, then that his
 crowne should haue been so vntuly, and in suche wise counted.
 In **Sage** is signified not onely the secretes of a realme, but also the
 are the good prouide Nobles in a mannes purse: A Priest had a
 Noble for preaching a funerall sermon, vpon the death of a wor-
 thie man, the Priest purposing to gratifie the dedde, and with
 due praise to commend his liberallitie, but churcell he was a good
 man, a deuotion man, yea he was a noble gentillman. I thinke if it
 had been his happes had he had a rotall, he had called hym a rotall
 gentillman too.

Time noteth bothe the space of howe, daie, and yere, and also
 we call an heerde by that name, whiche groweth in Cardines.

Sage also becometh an herbe, and yet we call wise men, sage
 men: so that euery one of these wordes haue a double meaning,
 and wordes which together by fellowship of name: by nature and in
 very deede doe very muche dissent. Therefore it is ought euermore
 to be marked, that all wordes be well noted according to their na-
 ture, that the rather we shall escape errour. Those are onely to be
 receiued, and used to the maintenance of all cause, whose name
 and nature is one, of the whiche are euermore to be taken and
 handled in one and the same way. As for example, a man, signifieth none other
 thing then a man, nor a signifieth none other thing in all the world
 but a tree onely, and so of other. If any worde be used that hath a
 double meaning, lett it be the largesse thereof, and declare how
 you will haue it taken, by the name wherof the sense shall
 be auoided.

Woods
 allowable.

Woods
 allowable.

of The

The predicamentes are in number .x.

i. <i>Substantia.</i>	The substance.
ii. <i>Quantitas.</i>	The quantitie.
iii. <i>Qualitas.</i>	The qualitie.
iiii. <i>Relativa.</i>	The relation.
v. <i>Actio.</i>	The manner of doynge.
vi. <i>Passio.</i>	The sufferynge.
vii. <i>Quando.</i>	When.
viii. <i>Ubi.</i>	Where.
ix. <i>Situs.</i>	The setting.
x. <i>Habitus.</i>	The apparelling.

Substance or beynge, whiche Cicero calleth *Entiteo*, is a thyng whiche standeth by it self, and needeth no helpe of an other, but hath his proper beynge and substance naturally. Or thus:

The substance is a thyng whiche hath his proper beynge of hymself, and containeth accidents whiche happen thereunto.

The division of the substance.

Substance is diuided into the first and second. The first substance is called every singular persone, or proper name, as *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Virgil*, *Homer*.

The seconde substance comprehendeth bothe the generall worde, and also the kinde of every singular persone. As thus, *Tullius*, *Caesar*, *Hanniball*, with other. Likewise this worde (a living creature) beynge a substance and generall worde of every proper name, containeth all thynges particularly that haue life.

It is profitable to make the order of substance, set forth in a Table a little before, for we maie by the same diuide singularly every substance of all thynges in this worlde, the whiche when we knowe, and remember in our mindes, we perceiue euidently the difference betwene God and his Creatures, and seeing the thyng created of God, and the properties therewithall, we rest vpon the same, and learne the vse and proper commoditie of many thynges here in yearth. We maie define many thynges by the

D. J. same

The arte of Logike.

same Table, and we may define God, Manne, Heauen, yearth, Beaste, Stone, and any thyng els that is a substance.

¶ The properties of a substance.

1 The substance receiveth by alteration of it self, and at sonderie tymes diuers and contrary accidentes, and yet the substance is not contrary of the diuine nature.

2 No substance can be either greater or lesser then it is by nature, although according to the breadth by largenesse, it appeare to be otherwise.

3 No substance can be seen with our eyes, but onely the outward accidentes, whereby wee indge and knowe euery seuerall creature.

¶ Of quantitie.
Quantitie is the greatnesse of a thyng, or the number, and proper it is to this moste generall word, to be diuided, as greatnesse is diuided into seuerall partes, and numbers into euery seuerall number.

¶ Quantitie is two waies considered.

The one is called *continua quantitas*, that is when the question is asked how greete or howe any thyng is. And therefore the length, the latitude, and the deprenesse of booke's artificiall are herein obserued: the vse whereof is moste seen in *Geometrie*.

The other is called *discreta quantitas*, when the question is asked how many thyngs there be, and it is occupied altogether in numbering. The vse of this is perceined in *Arithmetike*.

¶ The properties of quantitie.

1 The quantitie hath nothing to be contrary vnto hym, for greate and little are not contraries according to their quantitie, but they are relatives compared the one with the other.

2 The quantitie doeth receiue of the diuine nature any thyng, either greater or lesser, for it is alwaies one, and although it happeneth that one life be longer then an other, yet according to the quantitie, a short life is as muche a life as a longer life is.

3 By quantitie also, one thyng is compared either equally, or is vnequall vnto an other thyng.

¶ Of qualitie.

Qualitie.

Quantitie
hath no con-
trarie.

Quantitie
neither en-
creaseth, ne
diminisheth.

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Qualitie is a forme or shape of the body or minde, where
of some name is deriued: As of Wisedome, men are cal-
led wise: of Justice, men are called iuste.

There be thre manner of qualities, whereof the first doeth con-
tain the habite, otherwile called the perfect hauiing of any thing.

The other is a forewardnesse in any thing, gotten by labour
and trauaile, not giuen by Natures goodnesse, or else we maie cal-
l it the halfe attaining of that which we goe about to haue, want-
ing perfection, for lacke of full tyme, and is called in Latine *dispositio*. As to haue meane knowledge, and not to be fully instruc-
ted in the practice of Justice, is a *dispositio*.

Againe to be fully leamed, to haue accomplished all thinges
due to rightiuousnesse and iustice, is called in Latine *Habitus*. As
who should see, the absolute attaining and strong hold of the same.
The pith of this worde *Habitus*, can hardly be differed with one
worde in this our tongue, notwithstanding it maie in mo wor-
des bee opened, for the better vnderstanding of it. For euen as
ware chased with the hammers is made softer, euen so some partes
of man are made by use, more apt to compass any thing.

He that vseth oft to speake Frenche, shall by continuance
obtaine perfection, He that vseth muche to write, at length shall
haue a readie hand, and this is called *Habitus*. So that no man
hath knowledge, or perfect skill in any thing, except he get it by
labour, and acquaintance: Nature with trauaile. Forwithstanding,
I must needs confesse, that all Natures bee not like apte to re-
ceiue knowledge. Some are giuen to one thing, and some to an-
other. Therefore, they which by Nature haue a promptnesse,
shall sooner attaine perfection then any other can doe, if by labour
and earnest trauaile, they will stretch to attaine that whereunto
they are apte, and with good endeavour filly Nature forge forward.
God giueth some one manner a passing gifts, to searche the in-
fluence of the Starres, to another he graunteth a naturall incli-
nation to Spelike and all beuently Harmonies. So that if either
of the se tynon would stretch to followe their Naturall aptnesse, it
were moost like they should succell. Other that haue not such Na-
ture so fauourable, can neuer come to suche perfection.

an hab of
about nature
not nature
habitus

The habite
in a thing.

The fore-
wardnesse in
any thing.

The full at-
taining of
any thing.

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The full at-
taining twoo
waies con-
sidered.

The full attaining of any thing by long time, is twoo waies considered: for either it is of the bodie, or els of the mynde.

Perfection gotten by helpe of the bodie, is, when men can by muche vse, leape, wrestle, or cast the barre better then any other, or els doe excell in any handie crafte aboute the common sort.

The habite of the mynde, that is to saie, that constant hold of any thing whiche is in the mynde, either consisteth in knowledge, or els in practise. In knowledge are comprehended all Artes, as Grammer, Logike, Astronomie, &c. and all other learning wherunto witte can attaine. That habite of the mynde whiche is in practise, and by good aduise is chosen, standeth in the will of manne. As all vertue and all vice dooth. Of vertues thes be in mannes will, luste of aspyng euermore, manhood in suffering all harmes stoutly for honesties sake, and temperaunce of life, in forbearng luste and filchie gluttonie. These vertues though their offspryng be from God, yet tyme maketh them perfect in the eyes of man. Other vertues are giuen of God wholie and altogether, without mannes labour to attaine them. As Faith, Hope, Charitie, and all other like giftes of the holie Ghost.

The seconde forme is called the power, strength, or promesse of Nature, in Latine *Naturalis vis*. And the contrarie hereunto is called the weakenesse of Nature, when the hath denied her power to any one thyng, in Latine is called *Imbecillitas naturalis*.

Naturall strength is an aptnesse of Nature, giuen eicher to the bodie or to the mynde. To the mynde as aptnesse to learne, promptnesse of memoie: to the bodie in man is aptnesse by Nature to wrestle: for a horse to be quicke and stirryng: for a birde to be apt to flye: for fishe to liue in the water, the whiche man cannot doe: for an Asse to bee slowe: for a stone to bee hard &c. Naturall weakenesse, is when Nature diminisheth her gifte, as when she denieth aptnesse to learning, as we se many dull wittes for learning, and muche busie that wale. Nature hath denied some men health of bodie, that thei are neuer well at ease: some women are so sicke in their braine, that thei are neuer well. Some are Capons by kinde, and so blunne by Nature, that no arte at all can whette them. An Asse will neuer be swift, a Oxne will neuer be bold of

Nature.

The natur-
all strength.

Nature. All qualities be instruments of Nature, whereby the wooperh, as heat is the instrument of fire. Heat and cold in the iuce of hearbes are instruments, whereby men either are healed, or els paste healing for this worlde.

The third kind comprehendeth the passions of man, called in Latine *Perturbationes*, and also those qualities whiche tary a good while, and moue man either this wale or that wale. Passion.

A perturbation or els affection, is a sodaine change of the mynde, and also of the bodie.

There bee foure stirrings principall, whiche are in all the mynde, whereof all other haue their stirring.

<p><i>Libido seu cupiditas.</i> <i>Laetitia.</i> <i>Egritudo.</i> <i>Morbus.</i></p>	}	<p>Lustre, or desire. Witche. Greef. Feare.</p>
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The which are stirred by by some motion of the minde, either desiring any thing earnestly, or abhorring the same.

There bee five qualities of the bodie whiche moue the senses, and are called thynges offered to the senses, as colours, either whitenesse, blacknesse, or any like moue the eyes. All soundes and noises that be made moue the hearing, as coughing, speaking, braying of a Derr, loquing of a Cowe, or neighing of a Horse. Sauors moue the smelling, as perfumes, swete odors, the strong smell of ordure, or of suche filth. Smiles moue the taste, as bitterness, tartnesse, sourenesse. Suche qualities as are touched moue the sense of touching, as hardnesse, softnesse, roughnesse, plainnesse.

Affections permanent called *Pasibiles qualitates*. The qualities that tary a good while, differ from sodaine passions, for as muche as these tary not long, but sodainly come and sodainly go, as blushing in a mannes face, sodaine feare, sodainly to change colour and waxe pale. The other tary longer, as Enue, Ambition, Loue, continuall feare, greedinesse with suche other.

The fourth comprehendeth the figure and forme of any thing. The figure comprehendeth the shape of thinges that haue no life, as the fashion of the elements, of Trees, of houses, of an house, a shewe, a coate and such the like.

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The

The arte of Logike. T

The foure containeth the portraiture of all liuyng thynges, as the very lively Image of *Man*, of an *hoyse*, of a *lion*, as wee call a man well fauoured, or hard fauoured.

The proprietie or qualitie.

- 1 There is somewhat contrary vnto qualitie, as *Vertue* is contrary vnto vice, *wisdom* vnto folie, *manhode* vnto cowardise.
- 2 The thyng containing or receiuing any qualitie, may be saied to receiue either more or lesse. As one man is thought to bee wiser then an other, not that wisdom it self is either greater or lesse, but that it maye be in some man more, and in some man lesse.
- 3 By qualitie thynges are compared, either like to unlike. Those are like whiche are of like qualitie, and haue properties bothe accordyngly.

The table of the qualities.

<p>Of the mynde. Gotten by studie.</p>	<p>The Qualitie Of the mynde.</p>	<p>Of the bodie.</p>
<p>Taryng still with a manne, and hardly goeing awaie.</p>	<p>Gotten by studie.</p>	<p>Given by nature, as the natural inclinacion to any thyng. Goeing soone awaie as the affections.</p>
<p>As knowlege which either consisteth by practised skill.</p>	<p>Or els by practised skill.</p>	<p>Speculation, and by the vny obseruatiō of thynges naturall.</p>
<p>Ende of verine.</p>	<p>Of verine.</p>	<p>Or els of vice.</p>
<p>As iustice.</p>	<p>Temperance.</p>	<p>Fortitude.</p>
<p>Temperance, or iust dealing of every singular persons.</p>	<p>As a Case.</p>	<p>Sacrifice.</p>

Of Relatiues.

Relatiues are those which are comprehended with other, or the whiche are named one with an other, and as a man would saie, haue a mutual respect one to an other.

The other Predicamentes before rehearsed, were absolutely spoken, so that we maie vnderstande by one and the same woorde what it meaneth. As we maie perceiue what a man is, although we loyne nothing to hym. Wee knowe what iustice is, although we compare hym with none other thyng. But these relatiues can not be so well vnderstanden, except we loyne some thing to them. As when I saie father, I can not call hym excepte I vnderstande a sonne that he hath. So that euery bodie is called a father, in respect that he hath a sonne, or els not. Againe, no bodie can bee called a schoolemaster, excepte he haue Scholers. There is no housebande except he haue a wife.

Therefore we maie see, that relatiues are referred euermore to an other, neither can they be taken absolutely, without hauing respect to some other woorde. There is no woorde but wee maie consider the same to bee a Relatiue, if we referre it to some other thyng, and therefore we maie goe throughout all the predicamentes with this one place, and finde relation of euery one of them. Those that are referred to some thyng, are of two sortes.

First they are properly so called, as the father and the sonne, the maister and his seruante, neither can they be considered, except they be compared by some other: for when one is called father, he is properly so called, because he hath a sonne, and therefore hath he his proper being. Again, relatiues improperly so called, are those severall wordes whiche are knowne and haue their being, euen whyle they stande alone, and yet considered with other, they haue diuers respects, as loue is the loue of the thing loued: or thus. Loue beholdeth the thyng loued. Faith beholdeth the thyng wherevnto it leaueth. And therefore whereas Paule saith, wee being iustified by faith, haue peace before God, it is as muche to saie, that we are not reiectured for the worthinesse of the qualitie, but for his sake that is the sonne of God: for I praise you wherevnto leaueth faith, or what thing doeth it els behold. Saying onely our lord

Jesus

Relation
maie be in
all wordes.

Relatiues
properly so
called.

Relatiues
improperly
so called.

The arte of Logike.

Jesus that died feely once for all. Or els thus. Relatiues are so called (and yet vnproperly) whiche are not according to their proper beeyng, but accordyng as they are so named, whereof the sixe predicamentes that followe beare the name. As he that doeth any thyng, is referred to a thyng doen, wherein the twoo places that followe are declared, whiche signifie to doe and to suffer.

By the place *Ubi*: where, one neighbour is compared with his next neighbour.

By the place *Quando*: when, a child of sixe yere old, is compared with a child of the same yeres.

By the place *Secundum esse*: That is to bee settled, or to lye any maner of waie. He that lieth bynight, is compared with hym that lieth doune grouelnyng. In all these the proper beeyng is not declared, for a child maie bee sixe yeres of age, although he bee not compared with an other, and therefore it is called *Relatio secundum dici improprie*. But a man can neuer be a father, sayyng onely in consideration of his sonne. And yet note this one thyng, it is proper to all Relatiues alwaies to bee true, euen by conuersion. As thus: whosoever is a father, the same hath a sonne, whosoever is a sonne, the same hath a father. Whosoever hath faith, the same man leaneeth to Christe onely. Whosoever leaneeth to Christ onely, that same man hath faith. Here are twoo thynges to be marked in Relation. The ground of euery thyng, and the ende wherunto it hath respecte or consideration. As a father is the ground, in that he doeth beget, and hath respecte to his sonne, in that he is begotten. The sonne is the ground, in that he is begotten, and hath respecte to his father whiche did beget hym.

And thus likewise in all other.

The properties of Relatiues.

1 Relatiues receiue contraries, as vertues are contrary to vices not that is referred to vice, as yet they twoo are contrary.

2 Relatiues properly so called, accordyng to their naturall beeyng, are euer bothe at one and the same tyme: and also lose their names, bothe at one and the same tyme: as a man is so long called a father, as he hath a sonne, but so soone as the childe dieth, he is no more called a father to that child.

Relatiues
are alwaies
true by con-
uersion,

In relation
twoo thyng-
es are to
be marked.

¶ The Table of the Relatiues.

<p>Relatiues are compared one with another.</p>	<p>{ By Nature.</p>	<p>{ As by the cause and the effecte, the Father and the Sonne are considered.</p>
		<p>{ The Magistrate, and the Mace, the Kyng and his swords caried before hym are compared together.</p>
	<p>{ By some maner or waie vsed.</p>	<p>{ The lord and his seruant the Advocate & his client</p>
		<p>{ By degrees in calling.</p>
	<p>{ By kindred.</p>	<p>{ The brother and sister, The Soonne in Lawe, the Moiher in Lawe.</p>
		<p>{ By Marriage.</p>
	<p>{ By couenaunt.</p>	<p>{ The graunter of a Lease, and the Tenaunte.</p>
		<p>{ By accident all happenyng.</p>
	<p>{ A Poet to be a liar, a Phi- sition to bee a manqueller, or a Lawier to bee a theef.</p>	<p>{ By natural kind</p>
		<p>{ A man, woman.</p>
	<p>{ By yeres.</p>	<p>{ A yong man, an old man.</p>
		<p>{ By condition of life.</p>
	<p>{ A poore man, a rich man, a free man, a bande man.</p>	<p>{ A poore man, a rich man, a free man, a bande man.</p>

¶ The maner of doying, in Latine called Actio.



Gere, seu facere, is when we are saied to be occupied in a matter that is before vs, or when our labour is extended vpon a weake or lesse thynge: and in this place are conteined all Clerkes actiues, as to write, to dispute, to banquet, to beggette, to encrease, to diminish, or to chaunge, and to speake at a woosde, all thole are conteined in this place whiche aunswere to this question, what doeth he, or what doeth it: Excepted alwaies Clerkes pertainyng to the senses or affection, as to heare, to taste to see, to enuie, all whiche haue the passiue signification.

Euery action is either Naturall, or voluntarie, That is cal-

E.i.

led

The maner
of doying.

The arte of Logike.

Every action
either *statu-*
rall, or *bo-*
luntarie.

led naturall whiche is doen by the might of nature, as to beget, or to bring forth, to encrease, or decrease, to alter by qualitie, as to be moiste, drie, cold, or hot, to moue frō place to place. That is called volutarie, whiche doth betoken any thing doen freely, as to teach to write, to read, to plaie the merchant man, or to do any other action. And herevnto maie be referred every mans duetie liuyng.

¶ Perpassio, called in Englishe a suffering.

A suffering.

W *Atq; fieri, seu accipere*, to suffer to be doen, or to take is the effect of the action, and to make it plain, it is a verbe passiuē, euen the same whiche the Grammarians vse, as to be taught, to be encreased, to be diminished, all these are passiuēs, and are referred to this predicament.

¶ Ubi, where.

Where.

V *Ubi* is an order of *Predicamentē*, whiche comprehendeth the description of places, wherein some thing is reported, either to be doen, to haue been doen, or els hereafter to be doen. As to be at London, to be at Cambridge, to be at home, to be in a chamber, to be aboue, beneth, on the right hande, lefte hande, before, or behinde, and what soeuer is answered to this question, whe I aske where any thing is, or where any thing is doen. This place serueth for coniectures, either in praisiug, or dispraisiug.

¶ Quando? When?

This *Predicamentē quando*, containeth the difference and diuersitie of tymes, as *nunc*, now, *heri*, yesterdaie, *noctū*, in the night tyme, *interdiū*, in the daie tyme. This place also giueth light to confirme causes. As to proue that one is painefull, I maie saie suche a one studieth daie and night, so muche as Nature can beare: therefore he is a painfull man.

¶ Situm esse, to be settled.

S *itum esse*, is then considered, when a mannes bodie is in any wise placed, as to lye a slee, to stande by night, to sit, to lyeane to lye goodlyng, to lye wide open.

¶ Habitus, the araiing or clothiug.



One call this *Predicamentē, habitus integumentum*, that is a conueryng or apparelliug of any bodie, as to haue a coate, to weare a gowne, to be harnessed, to haue

The arte of Logike. 14

a Tacke, a shurte of Haile, a coate Armour. Also to goe gorge-
oullie: as to weare chaines of golde, to haue bracelettes, rpyges,
Duches, and Stones, to haue a Scepter or Pace in his hande.
Thirde, to possesse Golde, Siluer, Lande, wife, Children, or to
containe any thyng, as the Hoggeshedde doeth holde Tlline, the
Barne holdeth Cozne. &c.

Of the vse and commoditie of these predicamentes.

If you will define any woorde, and knowe the pro-
per nature of the same, ye must needs knowe these
ten Predicamentes. As for an example, if ye will
knowe what a man is, ye muste haue recourse to
the place of *Substantia*, and there ye shall learne
by the same place, that man is a liuyng creature endued with rea-
son. If ye will knowe what vertue is, ye muste goe to the Predi-
cament *Qualitas*, and there ye shall see that vertue is a constante
habite of the mynde, makyng them praise worthy in whom it is.
If ye will define the Nature of a Father, seeke for *Relativa*, and
there ye shall learne that he is a Father, that hath a Sonne, he is
a Maister that hath a seruaint, and so forth of the reste. There-
fore ye muste needs haue these Predicamentes ready, that when
soeuer ye will define any worde, or giue a naturall name vnto it,
ye maye come to this store house, and take stufte at will.

Of a definition.

There is nothing in all this whole Arte of Logike
more necessarie for man to knowe, then to learne
diligently the definition and diuision of euery mat-
ter, that by reason maye be comprehended. For he
that firste vnderstandeth what he doeth goe about
(knowyng fullie the Nature of euery cause propounded) shall lesse
erre in the whole discourse followyng, and easie shall it be for him
to anioide false argumentes, if he can learne firste to see the verie
Nature, and Substantiall proprietie of euery thyng.

A definition is twoo waies considered, for either it is a defini-
tion of a worde, or of a substance. A definition of a worde, is any
manner of declaration of a worde, as a Realme is so called, because
it is by a Kyng ruled, and merely to saie it. A woman hath her

E.ij.

name

A definition.

*A definition
of a worde.*

The arte of Logike.

name so giuen her, because she byyngeth woe vnto man.

Rules to bee
observed in a
definition.

A definition of the substance, is a speeche whiche sheweth the very Nature of the thyng, and euery perfecte definition is made perfecte by the generall woorde, and his difference ioyned together. So that whatsoever is defined, it is alwaies the kynde or sort of some one thing, as thus. Man is a liuyng creature endued with reason: Man is the thyng defined, and the other (that is, a liuyng creature endued with reason) is the definition. There be foure rules to be obserued in euery perfect definitiō. First, that the definition containe no moze then the thyng defined, no; yet that the thyng defined containe any moze then the definition doeth. Again we must take heede, that the definition expresse the very Nature and substance of the thyng defined, or els it is no good definition. Thirdly, we must see that the definition be plaine and open without ambiguitie, not hauyng any obscure or farre fetched wordes.

Plato.

Diogenes
Cocke.

When Plato had defined a manne to be a liuyng creature, hauyng twoo feete, and without feathers. Diogenes that scoffyng Dogge, whiche lound to take aduantage bypon small occasion, seyng Plato vpon a tyme moste earnest in teachyng his Schollers, sodainly chopt into the Schoole, and setting a Cocke in the midst of them, whiche had all his feathers plucked of, behold q he, here is Plato his man, whom he hath painted out so Clerkely vnto you. Because this definition was not plaine and open, Diogenes thus iested as ye haue heard. Not withstanding Plato his sayng was true enough, and good enough also, if it had pleased hym so to vnderstande it. For Plato his meanyng was of a creature, that by Nature lacketh feathers, not of one that had his feathers plucked of, and so the definition is without fault.

Fourthly, whosoever purposeth either to teache or to learne, to perswade vehemently, or plainly to expounde, it is for him right necessarie, alwaies to binde hymself to a certain appointed order, and particularly to gather that thyng, the whiche he myndeth at large to expresse. For so shall he see what he doeth, and not swaue as some doe, but keepe his matter as he ought to doe. Whereby bothe he shall teache better, and other shall learne the sooner.

What a definition is.



Diuision is, a diuidyng of that whiche is more common, into those v hiche are lesse common. As a definition therefore doeth declare what a thyng is, so the diuision sheweth how many thynges are contained in the same. A diuision is either the diuidyng of a woorde, or of a thing. A diuision first of a woorde, is, when any woorde that signifyng diuers thynges, is diuided into euery severall signification that he hath: as I would diuide this woorde *Canis* into a Dogge, a Fishe in the Sea, and a Starre in the Elemente, thus might I saie, *Canis* is either a Dogge that liueth vppon the Pearth, or a Fishe, or els a Starre in the Elemente.

A diuision of the thyng is three waies considered, for either it is when the generall is diuided into the kinde, the whole into his partes, or els when the substance is diuided into the accidentes. The generall is diuided into his kinde, thus, as an Elemente is diuided into the Fire, the Ayre, the Water, and the Pearth. A commonweale is diuided into the state of the people, which beare rule, and also into that power, where the beste and wisest haue their gouernance: and thirdly into ones hande whiche alone beareth the stroke, and is cheef Magistrate.

The whole is diuided into his partes, as thus. The bodie is diuided into the hedde, beallie, handes and feete. A manne is diuided into bodie and soule, and this kinde of diuidyng is proprietie called a partition. And the very difference betwene a diuision and a partition is, that in a diuision where the generall and the kinde are, the generall woorde is spoken of the kinde it self, as *Iusticia est virtus*, Iustice is a vertue, where as it can not be so, when the whole is diuided into his partes, that the whole should be spoken of his part, as I can not saie, *caput est homo*, the hedde is the man. For the hedde is not manne, nor yet the beallie neither, although thei bothe be partes of manne. We haue euermore neede of this partition in all matters. The lawe of Moses is diuided into three partes, for either it is Morall, Iudiciall, or Ceremoniall, neither is this partition necessarie for Moses commonweale onely, but for all other regiments that be. The Morall Lawe standeth for euer, and is not altered at any tyme, but is receiued from time to

E.ij,

tyme

A diuision.

A diuision
of a woorde.A diuision
of a thyng.A common
weale diuided
three
waies.A partition.
The Morall
Lawe.

The arte of Logike.

The Iudiciall Lawe.

tyme, euen as Moses receiued the same of God in stonie Tables, The Iudiciall lawe is next, the whiche although we be not bound to obserue as the Israelites were, yet muste there bee actes of Parliament made, for the reformation of thynges that be amisse, and Magistrates appointed to punish the suche as breake the tenne Commandementes, called the Mozall Lawe, and euen so maie we iudge of the Ceremoniall Lawe, that although it appertaine nothyng to vs to keepe sutch Ceremonis, as Moses and Aaron haue enacted, yet it is needefull that there bee an order in all our doynges, and that wee resorte together to the temple reuerently, and that the parentes appointe their chyldren a tyme to learne at schoole, and for their seruauntes a tyme to doe their true seruice.

The Ceremoniall lawe.

Substance
diuided into
his accidentes.

Accidentis
diuided into
substances.
Accidentis
diuided into
accidentis.

The substance is diuided into his accidentes, as thus, of men some are free, some are bonde,

An other maner of diuiding there is contrary to this, as whē the accidentes are diuided into their substances, as thus. Of good thynges some are of the mynde, some of the bodie, and some of fortune. Also there is a diuision when accidentes are diuided into accidentes, as of good thynges, some are honest, some profitable, and some pleasaunt.

It is an olde sayng, and worthy remembraunce, beeyng as true, as it is aunciente. *Qui bene distinguit, bene docet*, He that dooeth diuide well, dooeth teache well. And Socrates in *Phedra* Platons, praisyng muche the maner of diuidyng, saith at length that if he knewe a manne whiche could well diuide, and seuerally sett every thyng in his place, he would followe hym as though he should followe God hymself. In whiche miserable blindnesse were we, if we knewe not the difference betwixt the lawe and the Gospell, the whiche onely we dooe knowe by the benefite of diuision. There bee many sonde people whiche muche dyspaised all temporall lawes and ciuill lawes, thinkyng it meete that all common weales should onely haue the Gospell, and none other lawe at all. This mate seeme to some a gaye sayng, where as in deede it is bothe foolish and wicked. For there is a difference betwene politike Lawes and the Gospell: for the politike lawe doeth cause an outward discipline to bee obserued, euen of the wicked; so that thei

The politike lawe.

thei dare not offende outwardly; for feare of corporall punishment. The Magistrate whiche hath this charge, is ordeined of God: and first his charge is, to see for the the tenne Commandementes, given to Moses in stonie Tables, and to cause the same to bee observed vniuersally, punishing the offendours for their euill deedes corporally. After this, he must enact other particular Lawes as occasion shall serue, whiche doe not dissent from these tenne, considering these Lawes are generall, and therefore particular thynges maye be drawen out of them. As where it is said, Thou shalt doe no thefte, the Magistrate seeing falsshoode in bargaynyng, and muche deceipt vnto fraude one an other, straightly causeth it to be proclaimed, that all suche as be deceipt in bargaynyng commit thefte, and thus he attainted thereupon as felon; the whiche manne in so doyng, hath fulfilled Gods Commandement. Now againe as for preaching of the Gospell, it is an other manner of thyng, for thereby synnes are forgiven, the inheritance of life euerlastyng life graunted, and an euer lasting Church of mankinde, gathered to bee Gods chosen people, and also he true knowledge of God, perfect righteouslyesse, and the life euerlastyng, is kindled in the hartes of all goodle through the power of Gods holy ghooste. But there be fewe that will obeye willingly, and withall the hartes the wordes of the Gospell in suche wise. Neither can any Lawe bee able, violently to force the inward thought of man. Therefore the outward Magistrate, though he can not binde mens consciences from the thing that is euill, yet maye he labour to withprauie them from doyng euill, and in dede if Lawes were not, men could not liue. Therefore the polliciteall regiment and the Gospell, are two diuers thynges. This short distinction giueth light to many weightie matters, the whiche thyng when men knowe not, they wander in greates darkness, and so, lacke of light, fall into error.

THE Rules necessarie to be observed in the study of Logike.
 First, it must be prouided that the diuinitie, as muche as maye be, so it can not alwayes be so taught to be made with two contrary differences, fully containing all them in, the whole compasse of wisdom lie in the general

The lawe of
the Gospell.

Rules necessarie
full for a dis
cussion.

The arte of Logike.

nerall worde, or that whiche is diuided: for it is a faulte to forget any thyng, or let slip any parte.

Againe, the difference whiche diuide the generall woorde, being ioyned bothe together, must bee equall to the said generall woorde, and the partes coupled together, must bee as muche as the whole, or els the diuision is not good. A liuing creature is diuided into his twoo differences, as into a thyng hauing reason, and a thyng that hath no reason. Now what soeuer is a liuing Creature, thesame is a thyng that either hath reason, or els that lacketh reason. And againe, euery thyng that is endued with reason, and without reason, that same is a liuing creature. So that in euery diuision, the members or partes that dooe diuide by conuersion, are couered with the thyng diuided, and euen likewise it is with partition, as I haue spoken before of diuision. Where as Logike hath twoo partes, Iudgemente, and finding out of thynges; euen as I saie, Logike is nothing els but Iudgement, and finding out of thynges, so of the other side, Iudgemente and finding out of thynges, is nothing els but Logike it self. Where by appeareth a plaine conuersion, that whatsoeuer the one is, the same is the thyng, whiche must diligently bee obserued in euery diuision. For if the members that diuide bee either more or lesse, then the thyng diuided: straight waie the diuision is not good, for accordyng to a precepte that we haue in Latine. *Membra diuidenda in semper cum diuisio conuerti debent.* The partes that dooe diuide, must alwaie bee equall with the thyng diuided, and couered by conuersion with thesame, or els the diuision is not lawfull.

Fault in
diuision.

The manner of handling of a single question, and the readie waie how to teache and set forth any thyng plainly, and in order as it should be, in Latin *Methodus.*



In handling of any single question, the preceptes and rules given before in the common woordes, in the mooste generall woordes, in the definition and diuision dooe verie good seruite, and helpe towards the ordering of euery such matter. The whole manner of suche questions are thoroughly leant by doing

Methodus

of this order. Every single questiō is eight waies examined, first to aske whether the thing be or no, as thus. Is there any one man that maie be called wise? Is there any lawe? Is there any frendship vpon pearch? This question is often proued, either by experience, or els by auctoritie of the wise. Therefore in questionyng what the thing is, we must declare the verie nature, as if I shall speake of freendship, I will first bee at a point of what freendship I must speake. For freendship is of twoo sortes. The one is true and perfitte freendship, whiche commeth from the harte for vertues sake, and is onely among good men: the other is feigned fauour, when one for lucre beareth a faire face outwardly, and feedeth inwardly a malicious stomacke. And this is the common freendship, whereof the wicked onely are partakers. The second question is, to aske what a thing is. And this commeth from the definition whiche is of twoo sortes, either of the substance of any thing, or els of the name. Of the name: as thus. A Realme is that Countrie whiche is ruled by a kyng. Of the substance thus. A realme is a gathering of people together, being able to liue and withstande other, for preservation of them selves abiding seuerall. The lawe is an ordinance whiche commaundeth thynges in order to bee doen, and forbiddeth the contrary. The third question is when the partes and euery seuerall kinde is considered, and for this question the diuision and partition dooe muche good. As the lawe of the Gospell, and the politicall lawe. The fowerth questiō is, to aske what are the causes, and especially what is the efficiente cause, and what is the final cause, or the ende of any thyng. The efficient cause of all good lawes is, God and his minister. The final cause or the ende is, to liue vprightly in the feare of God, and to walke all the daies of our life, in the obseruation of his holie will. The fift question is, when the effecte, the office, or proper woorkyng is examined. As the effecte of the Lawe is, to conserue the state of manne, to continue peace vniuersally, to increase wealth, and to make loue betwixt all. The sixte question is, when thinges be asked that happen after, or the whiche haue greate affinitie or likelihood together. As if lawes bee kepte and followed, we see our chyldrens chyldren waxe to wealth. We see

Whether whi-
ther it bee or
no.

What a
thing is, and
how it maye
be called.

How many
fold a thing
is diuided.

What bee
the causes.

What are
the effectes
or proper
woorkyng.

The arte of Logike.

What happen
thereupon.
What are
disagreeing.

What exam-
ples.

much neighbourhoode, and good will to helpe the needie, and so
forthe. The seventh is, to aske what are disagreeing. And from
the Lawe dissenteth rebellion, stubbornesse, pride, with other.
The eight question is to byp in witnesse, and to shew by whose
authoritie the Lawe taketh place. The Scripture teacheth, that
God gave the Lawe to Moyses, and Paule with Peter also: and
Christe him self commaunded euery manne, to obeye the higher
power in all thynges, that are not directly repugnante from the
will of God. Thus the question is right maies examined, and the
maner taught thereby to frame it in due order, so that he whiche
keepeth well this trade, can not faile in any cause that he taketh in
hande. And because they maie the rather bee remembered, I will
set them altogether.

1. Whether it be or no.
2. What it is.
3. What the partes are.
4. What the causes are.
- As touchyng the Lawe.
5. What are the effects & proper working.
6. What are next aduising, what are like,
what happen thereby.
7. What doe disagree, or what contrarie.
8. What example there is, or authoritie to
warrant it.

Order to bee
observed.

And this lesson ought diligently to bee learned of all, that
euermore they begin from the generall, and come to eu-
ery seuerall parte. As in declaring what vertue is, first to
tell the Nature of it generally, and after to handle euery vertue
by it self. And this order bothe *Thom* hath followen in his booke
De Officijs, and also *Aristotle* in his *Ethica* hath doen the like,
to the greate admiration of all those that be learned.

¶ Of a Proposition.



Then the verie order of Nature requireth, that first
of all we should speake of seuerall wordes, and as
a man would saie, teache one his letters, and shew
hym the maner of speeking be fore we teach hym
to reade: and after ward to yne sentences together,
and

and frame Propositions by knittynge severall wordes in order: for it is the vertue office of the minde, firste to knowe, and then to knitte, neither can any childe vnder a sentence, before he learne to speake a word. Again, when Nature hath taughte severall wordes, then the minde ioynd together diuidereth, and afterwarde giueth a iudgement whether they be well or no. For a man were little better then a brute beaste, if he could but onely apprehende severall wordes, hauing no gift or aptnesse to ioyne them in order, and so iudge how thynges are ioynd together. But seeing God hath kindled his light in manne, that he can bothe ioyne and iudge, we will now speake of the knittynge together, and ioyning of wordes in a Proposition.

What a Proposition is.



Proposition is, a perfecte sentence spoken by the Indicative mode, signifying either a true thyng, or a false, without all ambiguitie or doubtfulnesse, as thus. Every man is a lyer.

There be two partes in a Proposition, the one is called *Subiectum*, that is to say, that wherof some what is spoken: the other is *Predicatum*, commonly called *Predicatum*, that is to say, that whiche is spoken of any thyng, as in the aboue rehearsed Proposition. Every man is a lyer. Man is that wherof of this saying to be a lyer is spoken, and this same saying (to be a lyer) is that whiche is spoken of man.

Every Proposition is two waies diuided, either it is a single sentence standing of one perfecte sentence: as, Justice is vertue: or els it is a double sentence hauing two Propositions in it, as thus. If Justice be a vertue, it is a good thyng, waighty word.

That Proposition is called false, the whiche either Naturall reason proueth either to bee plain false, or the experience of man declareth to bee vntreue, as thus. A stone doth feele. The soule of man is mortall. Experience sheweth, or at the least, scripture affirmeth the soule to be immortall, and Nature teacheth vs, that no stone hath the sense of feeling.

The seconde diuision of a Proposition.

According to the quantitie.

Proposition

Two partes in a proposition.

Proposition two waies diuided according to the substance

Again

The arte of Logike.

A proposition
divided ac-
cording to
the qualitie.



Again, Propositions doe either affirme or deny, as this Proposition: Pleasure is a good thing, dooeth affirme that pleasure is good. Again, Pleasure is not a good thing, doeth deny that pleasure is good. That Proposition doeth affirme, when any thing is reported to bee in any thing. That Proposition dooeth deny, when any thing is denied to be in any thing.

The third division of a Proposition
according to the quantitie.

A proposition
divided ac-
cording to
quantitie.



Proposition
universall.

Generall
signes.

Particular
propositions.

Particular
signes.

Propositions
indefinite.

Viridie, all Propositions are either generall, particular, indefinite, or singular. Those Propositions are called generall or universall, the which have a generall signe ioyned to the first part of the proposition, as thus. Every covetous man is poore. No man bothe loveth and is wise, no not one. No man is evermore happie. Generall signes are these: *Omnis, Nullus, Quilibet, Nemo*. Every bodie, No bodie, All the woorde, Not one in all the woorde. Particular Propositions are these, where a particular signe is addeed to the former parte of the proposition which doeth not containe all, but parte, or a fewe. As thus: Some men feare God. Some men are to muche desirous of glorie. The particular signes be these: *Quidam, Aliquis, Plerique, Plerumque*. A certain man. Some bodie. All men for the moste part. Oftentimes.

The Propositions are called indefinite (that is to saie, uncertaine) where the former parte is the Proposition, is a generall woorde without a signe, as thus: The soule is immortall. Spandode is a vertue. Young men are riotous. Old men are covetous. And note this diligentlie, that those Indefinite Propositions (whose laste rehearsed parte is necessarie, and is so spoken of the former parte, that it doeth alwaie agree to the same, and to the whole nature of the same) doe import asmuche as a generall proposition, as in the above rehearsed proposition. The soule is immortall. This woorde (to bee immortall) which is spoken of the soule, agreeth not to one man, or to certaine, but to every man living. When the accidentes are spoken of the former part, it importeth as muche as a particular Proposition doeth. As *Homo ho-*

mini prestat, ingenio, virtute doctrina. (Man is better one then an other in witte, learning, and vertue) is no more to saie, then *Quidam homo homini prestat*, Some one man is better then an other. A singular Proposition is, when a proper name of a man is contained in a proposition, and is the former parte of the same, as *Cicero* is an Orator, *Alexander* is a warrior.

The use of a Proposition.



When men by occasion of talke fall at variance, and can not agree vpon the matter, being bothe earnest to knowe the truche, it is good to bying the whole matter to some issue, and there resting vpon a point, to debate that parte onely before thei goe any further, the whiche is called of the Logicians a Proposition, of the Rhetoricians the state of the cause, whiche is as much to saie as the point whereupon thei shall stande, or rest to trie their matter. Now because euery Proposition is three waies diuided, accordyng to the substance, the qualitie, and also the quantitie, good reason it were to trie euery cause by these three partes also.

By the first we knowe, whether it bee a single proposition, or a double.

By the seconde wee perceiue, whether it doe affirme or deny.

And by the third also we see, how largely it doeth extende, the whiche three pointes are right needefull to be marked.

The repugnancie of Propositions.



Repugnancie is, the diuersitie of two propositions, whiche haue bothe one *Subiectum* (called the former parte) and one *attributum*, whiche is the rehearsed parte, and in sense spoken of the former.

There bee foure in number, called in Latine:

Contraria, Subcontraria, Contradictoria, Subalterne.

Generall contrary Propositions are those, whereof the one doeth generally affirme, and the other doeth generally deny. As thus: *Omnes homines gloria ducuntur*, All men are moued with glorie. *Nulli homines gloria ducuntur*, No menne are moued with glorie.

Particular contraries are two particulars, whereof the one

is, is,

doeth

is thing most
necessary.

The repug-
nancie of
propositions.

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doeth deny, *Aliqui homines gloria ducuntur*: Some menne are moued with glorie. *Aliqui homines gloria non ducuntur*: Some men are not moued with glorie.

Contradictorie Propositions, are when the one is vniuersall affirmatiue, and the other particular negatiue, or els when the one is vniuersall negatiue, and the other particular affirmatiue, as thus: *Omnes homines gloria ducuntur*: All menne are moued with glorie. *Aliqui homines gloria non ducuntur*: Some men are not moued with glorie, and like wise backward.

Subalterna, are those whiche be either vniuersall affirmatiue, and particular affirmatiue, or els vniuersall negatiue, and particular negatiue.

The nature of a proposition three waies diuided.

Propositio Categoricalis (other wise called a single Proposition) is diuided into true and false Propositions.

True propositions.

They are true propositions whiche agree to the matter, and are either necessarie, or els suche as maie bee either true or false, called in Latine *fortite*, or *contingentes*.

Necessarie propositions what they be. And whiche they be.

Necessarie Propositions are assuredly true, and knowne to be either by Nature, or els by experience.

Of those that necessarily be knit together are these: The proper name, the kinde, the generall woorde, the difference, the propertie, the definition, the causes, the proper worke of causes, and some accidentes that euer tary. As thus: *Cicero est homo*: Cicero is a man. *Homo est animal rationale primum aptum ad risum*: A manne is a liuyng creature endued with reason, apte to laugh. *Dies est necessarius quoniam Sol exortus est*: It must needs be daie, because the Sunne is vp, *Ignis calidus est*: Fire is hotte.

Changeable propositions.

Those Propositions are changeable whiche maie be true, or chaunge to be so, as: Fewe Preachers are ambitious. Fewe Kinges heate the truth. And when soeuer the accident is spoken of that whiche conteineth in, every suche Proposition is called changeable, or that whiche maie bee true, as: Water is made hotte here we see that it chaunceth to water (contrarie to her nature) to bee warme, and therefore it is called changeable, as the whiche maie chaunge, or be chaunged.

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The Table of repugnaunt Propositions.

All men are
moued with
gloie.

Generall
contrarie.

No manne is
moued with
gloie.

Generall and par-
ticuler affirmatiue.

Generall and par-
ticuler negatiue.

Some men
are moued
with gloie.

Particular
contrarie.

Some menne
are not moued
with gloie.



Ere wee must bee diligent, that in all suche repu-
gnancie of Propositions, there bee no doubtful-
nesse in any worde, and that alwayes there be one
maner of woordes that goe before, and also one
maner of woordes that ende the sentence plainly,
and without double vnderstandpng. For if I saie thus: Paine
doeth synne. Paine doeth not synne. Herein is no repugnancie:
for the man of God, whose synnes are redeemed through Chri-
stes death, by the vertue of his faith, the same manne doeth not
synne, accordyng to saint Ihon. He that is of God synneth not:
but that manne whiche foloweth the fleshe, and hath giuen ouer
himself to the luste of this worlde, doeth synne dradly. Therefore
the

No doubt
fulnesse in
the speeche.

The arte of Logike.

the part must not alter the nature of either proposition, the tyme also must be all one, the manner of saying of one sort, and the place likewise must be like.

The use.

This diuersitie of propositions is verie necessarie to discerne the truth from that which is false, for when wee ioine two Propositions that are dissonante, wee shall easily trie the Chasse from the Coyne, the which when we haue doen, we maie the better sticke to the truth with full assente, the contrary being once disclosed and reiected.

De conuersione, of the turning of Propositions.

Conuersion.



Conuersion is the chaunging, or altering of two, des in a Proposition, when the former part (where of any thing is rehearsed) & the hinder part (which is rehearsed of the former) are chaunged, the one in to the others place. There be three maner of Conuersions, *Simplex, per Accidens, per Contrapositionem.*

Plaine conuersion.

A plaine Conuersion is, when bothe the Propositions are like in all thynges, bothe in signes and also in affirmation, or negation, sayng onely that of the laste rehearsed, is made the former parte of the sentence, and the former parte is made the laste rehearsed parte.

Suche Conuersion is made, when bothe the Propositions be either vniuersall negatives, or els particular affirmatiues, for the firste thus. *Nemo timens Deum, contaminat se adulterio, Ergo nemo contaminans se adulterio timet Deum.* No manne that feareth God defleth hymself with adulterie, therefore no man that defleth hymself with adulterie feareth God. Here we maie se the conuersion plaine, as the rule aboue rehearsed teacheth. For two particular affirmatiues, this shalbe an example. *Quidam Aulici boni sunt. Ergo, quidam boni, Aulici sunt.* Some Courtiers are honest. Ergo, some honest men are Courtiers.

Conuersion by accidente.

A Conuersion by accidente is, when the former parte of the sentence is made the laste rehearsed parte: and the laste rehearsed parte made for the former parte, bothe the Propositions affirming

myng, or denyng, sayng onely that the signes be chaunged, that is the one beynge vniuersall, the seconde beynge particular. First, a conuersion is made of two affirmatiues, thus, *Omnis virtus est laudanda. Ergo laudandum aliquid, est virtus.* All vertue is to be praised, therefore, some thynge to bee praised, is a vertue. A conuersion of two negatives, thus, *Nemo malus felix felix igitur (sapiens cum sit) non est malus.* No euill man is absolutelie happye. Therefore, an absolute happye man (sayng he is Godly wise) can not bee euill. This kinde of conuersion, is very profitable for hym that will dispute. For, where as wee reason often from the generall woorde, to the kinde, we must needes vse this maner of conuersion, as thus, If all exercise be good, then this kinde of exercise is good, and so of other.

A conuersion by contraposition is, when the former parte of the sentence, is tourned into the last rehearsed parte, and the last rehearsed parte, tourned into the former part of the sentence, both the propositions beynge vniuersall, and affirmatiue, sayng that in the seconde Proposition, there bee certaine Negatiues interlaced. As thus,

Omnis homo auct aliquid videre, auct scire.

Ergo quod non auct aliquid videre, auct scire, non est homo.

Every man desireth to see, to heare, or to knowe some what: therefore, what soeuer he is that desireth not to see, to heare, or to knowe somewhat, the same body is not a man: this conuersion is profitable, and serueth well to reason by: thus reasoneth Ihu by his conuersion against the Iewes in the 8. Chap. of Ihon. *Qui ex Deo est, verba Dei audit: vos igitur cum non audiat, ex deo non estis.* He that is of God, heareth the worde of God. You therefore, because you heare not, bee not of God. This conuersion confuteth the Iewes plainly, and moueth that they are not of God. If we will reason from the generall woorde to the kinde, or from the kinde to the letter, wee must vse this conuersion very well, *Omnis homo est animal. Ergo quodcumque non est animal, id nec Homo est.* Every man is a liuing creature, therefore, whatsoeuer thynge is not a liuing creature, that same is not a man. Take away the generall woorde, and there can no kinde remaine againe.

G. J.

From

A conuersion
by contraposi-
tion.

Reasoning
by the con-
uersion.

ergo auct
non auct

ergo auct
auct auct
non auct

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From the vniuersall
superiour, to
the inferiour

From the superiour vniuersall to the inferiour, thus wee make reason. All pure golde loketh yallowe, therefore, whatsoeuer loketh not yallowe, that same is not pure golde. This conuersion serueth well to make an argument in the second figure, as I will declare hereafter, the which ought diligently to be obserued.

A lesson to be obserued.



*S*ingular wordes, which are proper names of thinges, or els determinatly doe betoken some one certaine thyng, no conuersion is made, because no argumente is made of particulare wordes or sentences, whereunto to whole nature of conuersion serueth onely, therefore, if one should saie vnto me, ponder is a Holsmill, the conuersion were amysse to saie, ponder is a Millhorse, for what idiothe knoweth not, except he had a Horse hedde, that here the sence is altered, and that it is twoo thynges to saie, a Holsmill, and a Milhorse. So that of singular Propositions, declaring the nature of one seuerall thyng, no true conuersion can be made, bothe in worde and sentence.

The use.



*I*nst, conuersion profiteth, for the euident opening of Propositions, as if I should saie: there is nothing profitable, but the same is honeste, and how then canst thou make a diuysement, betwixte honestie and profite, as though the one could bee without the other. Againe, it serueth well to make thoyse argumentes, as thus. No Christian is an vsurer. Ergo no Usurer is a Christian. Some Bishoppes are good: Ergo some good men are Bishops. Thirdly, it sheweth how to reduce the seconde and the thirde figure, beyng bothe vnperfect, to the Modes of the first figure, as I will shewe more at large hereafter.

Propositio Hyperbetica. That is to saie a double Proposition.

A double proposition.

*P*ropositio Hypoethetica, is a sentence which is made of twoo single Propositions, knitte together alwaies with some coniunction. As this. *Si Iustitia est virtus, est laudabilis.* If Iustice bee a vertue, it is praiseworthy.

There be three manner of double Propositions.

The partes
of a double
proposition.

A Double Proposition standeth of three partes, whereof the one is a conditionall Proposition, affirming a thyng to be either

ther true, or false, with an (if) as thus: if saith bee vpon the yearth
 some men feare God. If the worlde continueth still as it doeth,
 wallowing in moste abominable sinne, God will at length pu-
 nish the offendours very sore. All whiche Propositions are euer
 true, when the partes are so knitted together: that the latter parte
 must needs followe vpon that, whiche goeth before. The seconde
 parte is, when a Proposition hath a disunctiue, whiche knitteth
 the Sentence vp, as thus. Either it is Daie, or els it is Night.
 Suche Propositions are true, when both the partes are true, and
 the same also are false, when either of the partes are false. The
 thirde parte is, when coniuunctions that doe denie, are assigned to-
 gether, as thus. Battaille being not lawfull, is not to be desired.
 By all whiche double Propositions, we maie reason formally in
 diuers causes, as thus by the firste. If saith be vpon the yearth,
 some men feare God, but no man feareth God. Therefore, saith
 is not vpon the yearth. Againe, if we feare God, we are in chari-
 tie, but wee are not in charitie, therefore, wee feare not God. By
 the seconde thus. Courteous men either be the seruantes of God
 or els of the Deuill, but thei are not the seruantes of God: Ergo
 they are seruantes of the Deuill. By the thirde thus. Battaille
 being not Lawfull, is not to bee vsed, but Battaille is Lawfull,
 therefore, it is to be vsed.

*¶ The vse of all those things, that haue
 been spoken of a Proposition.*

I Will vse this Proposition for an example. All truche
 purchaseth hatred. It is a single Proposition, by sub-
 stance, and affirmatiue by qualitie, and an vniuersall
 by quantitie: the contradiatorie is, no truche purchaseth
 hatred, the which is false. Therefore, this is true, some truche pur-
 chaseth hatred: the connection by the accident. The truche purcha-
 seth hatred. Ergo some thyng that purchaseth hatred is truche.

¶ Of making an argument.

I haue rehearsed hether to, all single wordes what the na-
 ture is of euery one, and in what generall woorde, they
 maie be found. I haue les souch the nature of a disinction,
 and a diuision. I haue taught also, to ioigne these seuerall wordes

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into a proposition, and make the same a perfect sentence. Nowe thereby Gods grace, I will shewe the matter, how to ioine sentences together, and to proue a matter, by knittynge propositions handsonely in an argument, or by placing the propositions accordingly. Therefore, there ought good diligence to be vsed in this behalfe, forasmuche, as it is the clarkeldest part of all, and the hardest peece of woork, to frame an argument aptly, and to knowe the verie reason, why thynges are so knitte together.

¶ What an argument is.



An argumente is a waie to proue, how one thyng is gathered by another: and to shewe that thyng, which is doubtfull by that, whittie is not doubtfull.

¶ To finde out the reason that shall proue (in Latine) called Medium in (Englishe) the double repeat.

The finding
out of an ar-
gument.



After this sorte wee maye finde the reason, whereby to proue our matter: when wee haue a question or sentence, that we should either confirme, or confute, as ke the cause of our self, why, and wherefore that thyng, whiche is spoken of the former parte in any sentence, shoud be so applied to the same. And to make the matter moze plaine, I will make this question. *Est ne auarus pauper?* Is a couetous manne pooze, or not? I maye thus reason with me self, why should a couetous manne be called pooze? What affinitie is betwixt them two? Parie in this point the boche agree, that like as the pooze man, euer lacketh and desireth to haue, so the couetous man euer lacketh, wantynge the vse of that whiche he hath, and desireth still to haue, beyng neuer content, though God giurth enough. Then seeing it is enen so, that bothe doe lacke, and bothe doe desire to haue, this same reason is the onely cause whereby myne argument is made perfect. For, thus I maye frame myne argument aptly.

The fra-
ming of an
argument.

Whoso euer lacketh, and desireth euermoze to haue, that saye manne is pooze.

A couetous man lacketh, and desireth euermoze to haue.

Therefore, a couetous man is pooze.

Thus this argument is made perfect, by aspyng this question,

frion, wherefore, a couetous manne is poorer. As hereafter I will shewe it more at large, by an other example, to make the thing more plaine.

There be fouer kinde of argumentes.

- 1. A perfecte argument.
- 2. An imperfecte argument.
- 3. An induction.
- 4. An example.

A perfecte argument, is an absolute gathering, or reasoning, whereby the last sentence which we would proue, is confirmed by other propositions and sentences more vniuersal, and better known then the thing which is proued, conceiuing in themselves the reason, why the last sentence is true, and why they are applied to the same. This kinde of argument, is from the generall woorde to the kinde, as thus. If I will proue these worthy of punishment. I must firste aske the question, why? And that thing that cometh to my minde more vniuersal, then these, comprehending the offense of these in it, may serue to make the argument. As I make this reason, that these should be punished, because it is a vice, or a mischuiuous deede, and then thus I knette by mine argument.

- Every vice, or mischuiuous deede, is to be punished.
- This is a vice, or a mischuiuous deede.
- Therefore, this is to be punished.

Ere we see the proposition, or sentences wherof the first is called *Maior*, that is to saie, the Proposition at large. The second is called *Minor*, that is to saie, the first, or generall proposition. The thirde is called *Conclusio*, that is the tapping up of all. And here we must note, that like as there be three propositions, such is there be three diuers endinges, called in Latine *Termini*. Of the which, the one is called the terme at large, in the first proposition onely, and afterwarde is referred, to the former parte of the conclusion, called *Subiectum* & *conclusio*. The seconde terme is called the selfe, or seuerally, which is in the seconde Proposition, and

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The thirde.

Examples of
the 3. termes.

Double re-
peate.

this is the woꝛde whereof the question is made; and is spoken of in the conclusion. The thirde is called the double repeate; whiche is twice rehearsed before the conclusion, and therefore it is twice rehearsed, because it is the knittynge together of the two Propositions, and is the cause also, why the former part of the Proposition whereof a thing is said, and the last rehearsed parte, being attributed to the parte going before, are ioined together in the conclusion. As to make the thing plaine by the former argument, I will proue this conclusion. Theft is to be punished. Theft is called the former parte whereof this woꝛde (punished) is spoken, and this woꝛde (punished) therefore is called the last rehearsed part, because it is spoken of theft, whiche went before. Now, to make myne argumente, and to proue this sentence true, muste seeke a woꝛde, whiche is more generall then that, whiche is proved. And that woꝛde that cometh to my minde, and is pertainyng to the cause, being more vniuersall: (for euery thing that is proued is proued by a thing more knowen) that same woꝛde, or reason, is called the double repeate, whose proper tie is wise to be rehearsed in an argument, and that is the first and seconde Proposition, neuer entering into the conclusion. As thus. Every vice is to be punished, vice is the double repeate, whiche must be rehearsed in the seconde Proposition, for I said before, it must twice be rehearsed, because it maie be euident, that the former part of the conclusion, is in very deepe comprehended vnder the former part of the first Proposition. And then the argument is made as followeth.

Every vice is to be punished.

Theste is a vice.

Ergo theste is to be punished.



Terme at
large, being
seuerall.

Now we see the double repeate, which proueth the matter is twice rehearsed in the first and seconde Proposition, and entereth not into the conclusion. The terme is at large in the first Proposition, and the terme is eueryall, is in the seconde Proposition, and enter bothe into the conclusion. So that wee maie see that whiche proueth the thing, doeth not enter into the conclusion, but it is twice rehearsed in the two Propositions, and so the conclu-

sion

tion followeth, by reason that these two wordes, vice and these, agree in a third altogether, and whatsoever is said of the one, is said of the other, and nothing can bee comprehended under the general: but all the kindes haue the same contained in them, which in this Proposition are referred to the generall. All vice is to be punished) into vice is referred this woorde punished. Therefore, whatsoever is comprehended under this woode vice, as theft, adulterie, wrong dealing, murder: this woode punished, is rehearsed of them all: because it agreeth to the generall, and is rehearsed of the same. As I made reason thus.

All vice is to be punished.

Therefore { Adulterie. }
 { Wrong dealing. } Are to be punished.
 { Murder. }



Now if that which is generall, is to be punished, then the kindes and sortes in thinges, are also to be punished, according to this saying. Whatsoever is truly and altogether rehearsed of the generall, that same is also rehearsed of the kinde, whiche is concluded into the generall, of *Seneca* especially to be observed for the making of a perfect argument, called *Sillogismus*.

Rule.



First, that in every perfect argument called *Sillogismus*, the first Proposition be vniuersall, I call that Proposition vniuersall, when there is *Omnis*, that is to saie, al: or els *Nullus*, that is to saie, none: in the Proposition. As for example. Every vice is to be punished, this Proposition is vniuersall, because it hath *Omnis* in it, whiche signifieth all, or every one. Likewise I call it particulare when the Proposition hath *Quidam*, or *Aliquis*, that is to saie, certain or some body. *Quidam autem sunt homines, quorum conuersus est honestus.*

Rules for an argument.



If one of the Propositions be particular, or negative, the conclusion is particular, or negative. I call that Proposition negative. When *Nullus*, or *Nemo*, that is to saie, none, or no body, is in the Proposition. As *Nullus Christianus est fanaticus* Pro Christian is an *Idiot*.

The

In a perfecte arguments, bothe the Propositions, can be neither Negatives, nor Particulars together, for enen as two Negatives, there followeth no thyng, so of two Particulars, there followeth nothyng. Therefore when any such argument is made, we maie boldly saye, it is not lawfull, because it is in no forme, as it is very plaine to see, in making of this argument following.

Some Courtiers are riche.

Yonder fellowe will be a Courtier.

Therefore he shall be riche.

Some Bishops are good.

Thus such an one is a Bishop.

Therefore, he is a good Bishop.

This argument is not lawfull, first, because of my rule I am taught that of pure particulars, nothyng doeth followe, as *Quilam* (some) is a particular. *Ego* I is a singular word, or signifyinge as muche as a proper name, and againe it is in no figure, as hereafter I shall shewe. Thirdly it is meete that the seconde Proposition should be included in the first parte of the seconde Proposition, whereof somewhat is rehearsed, or els it is no good argument, in the first figure.

Some kynges be righteous.

Nero is a kyng.

Therefore Nero is righteous.

This is no good argument, because that *Nero*, whiche is the first word in the seconde Proposition, of whom somewhat is rehearsed, is not comprehended under the former part of the first Proposition, whiche is some kynges, for this former part, some kynges doeth not include of *Nero*, nor comprehend such as he is, but honest and Godly disposed gouernours. And yet in weightie causes such arguments haue been used, euen of those that would haue drawn vs from the obedience of Gods holy wordes, and perswaded vs that we were free from the obseruatio of any mans saying, comprehended in *Pollos* lawe. As thus,

The

The lawe of Moyses is abolished from the Gentiles.
 The lawe of the tenne Commandementes, is the
 lawe of Moyses.
 Ergo the lawe of the tenne Commandementes, is
 abolished from the Gentiles.

Whereas this first Proposition, comprehendeth not all the
 Lawes of Moyses, but the Lawes Ceremoniall whiche were as
 figures ordeined, in declaration of Christes coming, and there-
 fore the scripture saith untill Iohn, the Lawe was and the Pro-
 phetes, signifying that Iohns tyme he was come, in whom the
 old Ceremoniall Lawes were fully bereft and fulfilled, whiche
 at his coming began to cease, seeing in hymself was the fulfil-
 ling of the Lawe, not that we should not obserue the Moysall La-
 wes of the heauenly preceptes commaunded by God, for Christ
 hymself repeateth the obseruation of them, yea, he bindeth vs to a
 more straightnesse, that not onely we should doe no euill, but that
 also we should consent to none euill: therefore this first Proposition
 is not generall, but particular, and so though the Ceremoniall
 Lawe bee gone, yet the Moysall Lawe carieth still, accordyng to
 Christes holie will.

Ceremoniall
 lawes abro-
 gated.

Moysall La-
 wes must be
 obserued of
 all.

Medius terminus, called the double reapeate (whiche is a word
 rehearsed in bothe Propositions) must not enter into the conclu-
 sion, because the other two partes called *Termini*, bee proued by
 this, and brought to the conclusion, by reason thei agree with this
 third, the whiche twoo otherwise could not enter into the conclu-
 sion, if this double reapeate were not mentioned in bothe Proposi-
 tions, and kepte out it self from the conclusion, as is evidently to
 see by an argumentation.

The double
 reapeate.

In a perfecte argumente called *Syllogismus*, there ought not
 to bee mo wordes in the conclusion then was before rehearsed.
 For mo thynges to be in the conclusion, this example shall serue,
 whiche *Antonius* maketh in the first booke of *Tullius de oratore*.

Impossibile est philosophare.
 In philosophia non est possibile philosophare.
 Ergo philosophia non est possibile philosophare.

D. J.

This

The arte of Logike.

This argument is to bee denied, because there is more in the conclusion, then was rehearsed in the two first Propositions. For this should haue been the conclusion. Some unprofitable thynges whiche be in Philosophie are not to bee learned, not that Philosophie it self is to bee reiected, for els wee might make this argument like wise.

Drunkenesse is not to be allowed.

In drincking is oftentimes drunkenesse.

Therefore drincking at any time is not to be allowed.

Therefore we must frame our argument so, that nothyng be more in the conclusion, then was in the other propositions: as thus.

Drunkenesse is not to be allowed.

In some drincking is oftentimes drunkenesse.

Therefore some drincking is not to be allowed.

The sixth Rule.

But these
terms in an
argument.

There ought not to be more termes in an argumentation then three, for otherwise there is no good argument.

Every politicall Magistrate ought to keepe vnder disobedient persones, with corporall punishment.

Peter is an Apostle.

Therefore Peter should punish the disobedient.

In this argument is no ioyning together of the first Proposition, and the seconde: for the politicall Magistrate and an Apostle, are two manner of thynges. Therefore it hangeth together as Germaines shippes, as we vse to saie.

The seventh Rule.

Why the
double reparate
ought to be
no doubtfull
woorde.
In baptis-
mes reason.

The double reparate whiche is twise mentioned in bothe Propositions, ought to be no doubtfull worde, for doubtfull wordes make sower seuerall termes whiche should not be, as thus.

No bondman is free.

All that beleeue the Gospell truly are free.

Ergo none that beleeue the Gospell truly are bondmen.

Freedom
two waies
taken.

This argument is false, and must bee denied at the first, because there be sower termes: for in the first Proposition, freedom is taken for such a libertie, as men due in common weales, to make seruantes and apprentices free: In the seconde Propo-

sition,

tion, freedome is taken for deliuering the soule from the bondage of Sinne, from Synne, and from death and last pyn, as wee reade in the Scripture. Whom the Sonne hath made free, they are free in verie deede; not that this freedome taketh awaie all orders in the commonweale, that no man shall haue an appentice, or a bondman. For although the father in heauen through Iesus Christe, hath made them free from synne, and that once for euer, yet are they still appentices, and bounde by a politicall Lawe, therefore we maie see, that there bee foure partes or termes, considering he speaketh of one libertie in the first Proposition, and of an other in the second, so that the argument is not good. I like argument there is, whiche one maie call *Diogenes*.

Sophists reason to Diogenes

What whiche I am, thou art not.

I am a man.

Ergo thou art none.

Here is an ambiguity in this Verbe (*I am*) for it wee vnderstande in the first Proposition, that this woorde (*I am*) is not considered according to the generall substance, but according to the qualitie, or rather proper being, speaking of the diuersitie of men, as when I liue, I haue myne owne bodie, my flesh, and myne owne voyces, thou hast thyne owne proper vnto thee, and not that I am thou; nor yet thou art I. When it is well said, that whiche I am, thou art not. But if I vnderstande this woorde (*I am*) in the first Proposition, as a substance vnderfall, or rather generall copulative to bee rehearsed of the inferiours, then it is good. For as I maie saie, *Diogenes* is a manne, *Aristotle* is a man, so I maie saie of all men, and therefore though this Verbe (*I am*) belong not to all: for their generall properties, or rather mannes being, yet it agreeth to the generall name, whiche is to be called a man. Whereby wee maie see here two partes, or termes, and then the argument shall be denied at the first grouping this reason that I haue the word before.

Notwithstanding, *Diogenes* answered this *Sophist* other, while hee was in the street, and chafed in at the first. For whereas he propounded the same Antithesis, and thought hee shoulde haue giuen

The arte of Logike.

Diogenes
answered.

hym a foile, *Diogenes* streight vpon rehearfall of this saide argument, tolde hym thus: Thyne argument is true enough fellowe, if I should rehearse it vnto thee my self, and needed then no solution at all, for thy maners be yng naught, makes thee to bee no manure.

Settlyng or placynge of an argument.

Settlyng or
placynge of an
argument.



Now that I haue sette forth the preceptes, whiche are to bee obserued in an argument, I will declare how to settle and place an argumente, that any bodie maie giue a reason, where euery worde is sette in an argument, in this or that place. Firste therefore we must consider there be three figures, whiche serue for the makynge of an argument, and modes also whiche teache the orderynge of Propositions, whether they shalbe vniuersall, particular, affirmatiue, or negatiue: I will define them bothe after this sort.

3 figure.

The firste
figure.

A figure is a lawfull placynge of the double repeate, in the two Propositions, and euen as a double repeate is placed, so we maie iudge with ease in what figure the argumente is. The figure is fytche an order of Propositions in an argumente, that the double repeate must be the former parte in the first Proposition, and the laste rehearsed parte in the seconde Proposition, wherevpon the conclusion doeth followe. And the reason that it must be so, is, because that whereas in this figure, the argumente is euermore made from the generall, to the kinde vniuersallie (for the firste Proposition euermore in these twoo figures, must be vniuersall, either affirmatiue, or negatiue) and by reason of the generall, there is somewhat rehearsed of the kinde: one of the Propositions must be so placed, that it maie evidently appeare, that this kinde is included in the generall. And therefore the generall is spoken in the seconde Proposition of the kinde.

A Mode is a lawfull placynge of Propositions, in their due qualitie or quantitie. I call that in the Proposition a qualitie, when it doeth affirme or deny. I call it a quantitie, when it is either vniuersall, or particular. Vnto the firste figure belong foure Modes, whiche maie be perceiued by these foure wordes.

Barbara.

{ Barbara.
Celarent.
Darii.
Ferio. }



These fower woordes signifie nothing, but ser-
uynge for notes onely and markes, where by eue-
ry Proposition is knowne, either to be vniuersall
or particular, affirmatiue, or negatiue, must not
be forgotten if we will make an argument true-
ly, in the first figure for euery argument that is
made in this figure, is one of these fower Modes, or els it is no
argument of the first figure. If the double repeate bee the former
parte in the first Proposition, and the last rehearsed parte in the
seconde Proposition, it is in the first figure, notwithstanding,
except it be in Mode also, it is no argument. Therefore we must
learne to place an argumente in Mode also. And for the better
knowledge of this thyng, note that in those Modes, there bee fo-
wer vowels to be considered and marked. That is to saie *A. E. I. & O.* And the rather to helpe memorie, I haue framed a rule
for these fower vowels, in these two verses.

A doeth affirme: *E* doeth deny, which are bothe vniuersall:

I doeth affirme, *O* doeth deny, which be perticular call.

For where we se *A* in *Barbara* thysse, we must consider that
these *A. A. A.* in this one worde, declare vnto vs three vniuersall
Propositions affirmatiue. *E* declareth a Proposition negatiue v-
niuersall, as in *Celarent* we see twise *E*, whereby wee are taught
that the argument (if we make it in this Mode) must haue two
vniuersall negatiues, and one vniuersall affirmatiue, by reason of
A, which is in the middle of *Celarent*. *I* doeth signifie a parti-
cular affirmatiue. *O*, doeth signifie a particular negatiue, as in
Ferio, the first must be a negatiue vniuersall, the seconde an affir-
matiue particular. Again the consonantes as firste Capitall let-
ters, placed in the begynnyng of euery Mode. As *B. C. D. F.* and
also the small consonant letters which are included, and be with-
in the woordes in euery Mode, bothe of the seconde and thirde fi-
gure, as *C. M. P. S.* euery one of these haue their proper meanyn-

Q. iii.

ges

The arte of Logike.

ges. As *B*. in any Mode of the seconde and third figure, declareth that the argument of that Mode, being not plaine for vnderstandyng, or not true in sense, or perhaps, not apt to proue a presente cause, the same maie be reduced to the Mode *Barbara* of the first figure, whiche shall make the argument appeare moze plaine: *C*. sheweth the right pache to *Calarent*: *D*. openeth the gate to *Dargy*: *E*. maketh faire passage to *Fero*: *C*. that is not in the beginning of any the Modes of the seconde and third figure, but placed within the woordes, declareth that the contradictorie of the conclusion, must be taken (if ye will reduce the argument to the first figure) ioyning therewith, and vsing as a thyng graunted one of the Propositions with the conclusion, altering the other Proposition that remaineth by contradiction also: and beside setting one of the two Propositions in the other place.

P. sheweth that the Proposition must be altered by conversion of the accident. *S*. telleth that the Proposition must be chaunged by plaine conversion.

What is a reduction.



What is a reduction. Reduction is a right framing of an argument, and (as a man would saie) a new probation by an other Mode and figure of that thyng, whiche was proued before, bothe by the second and third figure: as thus. To make a thyng other wise then it was before, to reduce it, or to bring it to moze plaine vnderstandyng in the shape and forme of the first figure, is called reduction.

The distinction of a reduction.



The distinction of a reduction.

Reduction is of two sortes. The one is a demonstration, which sheweth the argument moze plainly, that before was touched barckly, the other is a reduction to that, whiche is impossible, commonly so termed, because in any suche alteration, the contradictorie is used in the other argument, when any suche reduction is made from the seconde and third figure to the first figure. And this rule is for ever true. That two contradictories can neuer bee bothe true. The first called a demonstration, or the wyng reduction

Whose true.
Demonstration
true reduction.

reduction

reduction, is made by conuersion of the Propositions, and by displacing the same, setting one in an others steede, sauyng onely the conclusion is alwaies one, and keepeth his place still. The other crooked waie (called of the Logicians *Reductio ad impossibile*) is a reduction to that whiche is impossible; when the contradictorie of the Propositions is vsed, and brought to the first figure. So that these twoo argumentes after the reduction is made, can neuer bee bothe true, considering the contradictorie. As for example, in the Mode *Baroco*, and the seconde figure.

Reduction to impossible.

Ba. All true christians refuse to get goods vngodly.
ra. Some Parchauntes refuse not to gett gooddes vngodlie.
co. Therefore some Parchauntes are no true christians.

Here if myne aduersarie shall saie, that the conclusion followeth not well, and that though the other bee true, yet the consequent is false, I maie force hym by reduction to graunte it to bee true. And therefore takinge the contradictorie of the conclusion, and placing the same in the second Proposition, and altering the seconde Proposition by contradiction also, making it the conclusion: I shall force hym to graunte my first argument to bee true. As for example, I will take the contradictorie of the conclusion, whiche is: Every Parchaunte man is a true Christian, and likewise the contradictorie of the seconde Proposition; putting the one in the others place, and thus I will reason: If my first argument bee false, then this argument is true, because it is the contradiction of my first.

All true Christians refuse to get gooddes vngodlie.
 All Parchauntes are true Christians.
 Therefore all Parchauntes refuse to gett gooddes vngodlie.

Every one seeth that this argument is false, beeing the contradiction of the other: Ergo the first reason is true. And this is the vse of Reduction by a contradiction: violently to force the graunt of our sayng. For if this reason bee false, the other muste be true, but this is false: Ergo the other is true.

That

The arte of Logike.

That these thynges maie bee moze euident to make an argumente, bothe in the figure and Mode, and so to reduce the same, and bying it to the argumentes of the firste figure. I will firste giue examples for euery Mode of this firste figure, that one maie plainly see the whole matter, as though it were in a Glasse, remembering alwaies, that these Modes serue for this figure, whiche figure is knowne (as I saied before) when the double repeat is the former parte of the first Proposition, and the laste rehearsed parte of the second Proposition. And whereas I saied before, that certaine argumentes were in no Mode, although they were in the first figure, and therefore not good, because they were not in one Mode and figure, these shalbe to vnderstande, they were not in one Mode, because the first Proposition must be vniuersall euer, or els it is not good. Now therefore, here followe examples of the first figure, and of the Modes thereof.

The firste figure.

The first example is a perfecte argument, being vniuersall, and also affirmatiue.

The firste figure.

Bar. All honest thynges are to be embraced.

ba. All Christian Lawes made by a Christian Magistrate are honest.

ra. Therefore all Christian Lawes made by a Christian Magistrate are to be embraced.

A perfecte argument vniuersall negative.

Co. No contemner of the magistrate in a christiā.

la. All Anabaptistes are contemnners of the magistrate.

ra. Therefore no Anabaptist is a Christian.

A perfecte argument particular affirmatiue.

Da. Whatsoever apprehendeth the fauour and grace of God, the same onely doeth iustitie.

ra. Faith onely apprehendeth the fauour and grace of God.

i. Ergo faith onely iustitie.

A perfecte argument particular negative.

Expositioner.

Ex Extortioner. } *Ca.* No extortioner is Godly.
ri. Some riche man is an extortioner.
o. Ergo some riche man is not Godly.

The firste figure helpeth moste of all, in teachyng of setting
 for the thinges at large, whiche we would haue knowen. All artes
 haue their generall preceptes, and therefore, the vse of theim is
 practised in this figure. The Philosopher saith. Every good thing
 the more common it is, the better it is. The *Logician* saith: all
 thinges are made for some ende. Scripture sheweth, that every
 manne is bounde to loue his neighbour as hymself. Every one of
 these generall lessons serue well for this figure, and maie with
 ease bee framed for prooofe of our matter. Also if we mynde either
 to confute or confirme any cause, it serueth verie well. Neither can
 any cause be mentioned, but the same maie in this figure be facio-
 ned, consideryng every question hath here an apt frame, bee it ei-
 ther vniuersall, or particular, affirmatiue, or negatiue.

The seconde figure is, where the double repeate is the last re-
 hearded part in bothe Propositions, after this sort followyng: and
 there bee fower Modes belongyng to the same figure, as it shall
 appeare, whiche all thei haue these fower vowels in them, *A. E. I. O.* so that thei make the Proposition to be vniuersall, or particu-
 lar, affirmatiue, or negatiue, as it was before. Note that the con-
 clusion is alwaies negatiue, soasmuche as the firste and the se-
 conde are alwaies repugnant, neither doe thei agree in the dou-
 ble repeate called *Medius terminus*. And therefore the conclusion
 is negatiue by contraposition, whereof I spake before, when I
 intreated of the conuersion, or tournyng of Propositions.

The seconde figure.

*An argument vniuersall negatiue reduced to the first fi-
 gure by plaine connexion of the former Proposition.*

Ca. No iuste man before God hath an vniquiet,
 and doubtfull conscience.

Unquiet } *sa.* All thei that truste to bee iustified by their
conscience. } woorkes, haue vniquiet consciences.

re. Therefore none trustyng to his woorkes,
 is iuste before God.

The seconde
 figure.

The arte of Logike.

I An argument vniuersall negative, reduced to the first figure, making the seconde Proposition altered by plaine conuersion to be the former and first Proposition, and the first Proposition to be the seconde: and the conclusion also to bee altered by plaine conuersion.

Ca- The Christian rightconnesse, is the purenesse of the mynde.
me- To weare a tippet, a coule, a shauen croune is not the purenesse of the mynde.
Pres. Therefore the outwarde attire is not the Christian rightconnesse.

I A particular argument reduced to the first figure, altering onely the first Proposition by plain conuersion.

Contenmed Philosophie.
Fe- No true Diuine contemmeth Philosophie.
fi- Some Englishe preachers contemne Philosophie.
no, Ergo some Englishe Preachers are not true Diuines.

I This argument is reduced to Barbara, onely taking the contradictorie of the seconde Proposition, and the conclusion, and setting these two the one in others place.

To get good des vngodlie.
Ba- All Christians refuse to get goods vngodly
ro- Some Marchauntes refuse not to get good des vngodlie.
co. Therefore some Marchauntes are no Christians.

I The vse of the seconde figure.

In debating matters whiche stande in controuersie, we make gette muche helpe by this seconde figure for euer more, when we dissent from other in opinion, this figure helpeth muche for laying vp of our argument. As if one should saye. All woorkes are allowed before God that are dooen of a good intent, I might answer thus, no hypocriticall woorkes, no Hypocriticall Passyng, no meritorious prayng, although thei be dooen for a good intent, are yet to bee allowed before God. And so I might replye and frame myne argument in this figure against the aboue rehearsed sentence. The third figure is, where the double repeate is the former

framing of
the third
figure.

mer

nier parte in bothe Propositions. And there be five Modes of the same figure. Note also that the conclusion must needs be particular in this figure, where the former parte in bothe Propositions is the double repeate, for like as we reason in the first figure from the generall worde to the kinde, that is from the vniuersall to the particular, so in this figure we reason from the kinde (whiche is lesse) to the generall worde whiche is more vniuersall, but so notwithstanding that the conclusion be particular, and therefore this kinde of argument is verie good. For the Species or kinde beyng once put, the generall must needs followe.

¶ The third figure.

¶ This argument is reduced to Darij, the seconde Proposition beyng altered by conuersion of the accident.

Common
weale.

Da. Every commonweale is Gods ordinaunce. *The third figure.*
ap. Every commonweale hath neede of lawes
and armour.

ti. Therefore some Lawes and Arminge are
Gods ordinaunce.

¶ This argument is reduced to Ferio, the seconde Proposition beyng altered onely to conuersion of accident.

Virtue.

Fe. No vertue should be eschued.

ap. All vertue hath her woe with her.

ti. Therefore some woe should not be eschued.

¶ This argument is reduced to Darij, the seconde Proposition nothing altered, but onely set in the first place, and the first set in the second place beyng altered by plaine conuersion, and the conclusion in like maner.

Di. Mercie onely forgiveth synnes.

sa. All mercie is purchased by faith. *(ned.)*

ti. Therefore by faith onely forgiveness is obteined.

¶ This argument is reduced to Darij, the seconde Proposition altered by plaine conuersion.

Hypocrites.

Da. All hypocrites coulde will worke his holynesse.

ti. Some hypocrites have been Bishoppes.

sa. Therefore some Bishoppes haue counted
will worke his holynesse.

The arte of Logike.

This argument following is reduced to Barbara, the conclusion first being altered by contradiction, and made the first Proposition, the second standeth as it doeth, and keeping the owne place still: the Proposition at large, which was before the first, now altered and made the conclusion by contradiction.

Battaill. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Bo- Some battaill is not to be eschued.} \\ \text{car- Every battaill is full of muche miserie.} \\ \text{do. Ergo some miserie is not to be eschued.} \end{array} \right.$

This argument following is reduced to Ferio, the second Proposition being altered onely by plaine conversion.

Malicious man. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Fe- No malicious man is of God.} \\ \text{ri- Some malicious man is a preacher.} \\ \text{son. Therefore some preacher is not of God.} \end{array} \right.$

The use of the third figure.

This figure profiteth muche in prouoking particular things and gathering of coniectures in causes that are doubtfull, when probabilitie onely and no assured knowledge, bouldeth out the truthe of a matter. And because seuerall thynghes come sonest to our senses, we vse suche gathering moste commonly, and by triall of particular causes, assure our selues of the truthe generally.

Three figures necessary

It is verie necessarie that there should bee three figures, as I haue shewed already. For in every argument that hath the shap of a *Syllogismus* (for the induction and the example haue it not, neither be thei in Mode and figure) euermore we reason from the generall to the kinde vniuersall, making the conclusion vniuersall: or els we reason from the kinde to the generall, making the conclusion particular: or els there is a repugnancie of the terme at large, and the seuerall when thei doe not agree with the double repente: or laste of all wee ioyne many causes and many effectes together, whereof is made an argument called *serites*, or *concrematio*, that is to saie, a heappynge together of thynghes.

First figure.

When we make an argument, and procede from the generall word to the kinde, it is in the first figure, and euen by our reason we learne this, that if the greater bee not, the lesse can not bee. As thus, if one bee not a liuyng creature, how can he bee a man, if he be

be a liuing creature, he must either be a man, or a brute bodie.

When wee proceede from the kinde to the generall, makyng the conclusiō particular, the argument is in the third figure. And this is for euer true, that when the kinde is rehearsed, the generall must needs followe.

But when there is a repugnancie in an argumente of the terme of large and the seuerall, so that they agree not with a third woorde, it is euer in the seconde figure. And this is plaine to see, that suche an argument must needs be well concluded, when we goe about to confute any thyng, seeyng that twoo kindes whiche are repugnaunt must needs be disseuered, and so the conclusion to be made vpon the same. As it is easie to see in the argumentes of the seconde figure. Therefore it is good reason that bothe there should bee three figures, and al^s that the argumente doeth well proceede, beyng made in any of them.

Sometymes an argument is made, when wee couple many causes together, and the verie effect of the same, as thus.

Overmuch gourmandise hindereth digestion in the stomacke.

By euill digestion in the stomacke, corrupte blood is engendred in the Liuer.

When euill blood is bred in the Liuer, euill humors are spred throughout all the bodie.

Euill humors spred throughout the bodie, cause a distemperature in the body, & after that bying the dyspsie.

Therefore ouermuch gourmandise causeth dyspsie.

Gourmandise causeth dyspsie.

Of an vnperfecte argument called Enthymema.

An vnperfect argument, is an argument wantyng some one part, the whiche is, when one Proposition is rehearsed, and the conclusion strait brought in therevpon, as thus. That is not good whiche byingeth a man to mischance. Therefore money is not good. The Bible teacheth a man his duetie towards God and his neighbor. Ergo it is necessarie to be knowne and read of euery bodie. Pleasure byingeth endlesse paine after it. Ergo pleasure is to be eschued. These argumentes be vnperfecte argumentes, wantyng one Proposition euermore, the whiche is

An vnperfect argument.

A.ij.

we

The arte of Logike.

we adde, a perfect argumentation followeth there upon, as thus,

Whatsoever bringeth endlesse pain after it, that
same is to be eschued.

Pleasure bringeth endlesse paine after it.

Ergo pleasure is to be eschued.

These vnperfecte argumentes called *Enthymemata*, consist
partly of likelihoodes, and partly of infallible reasons.

Likelihoodes

Likelihoodes are those that often hitte the truthe, and yet are
not alwaies so, as thus,

Suche a pong man talketh often, and that alone
also, with suche a pong maide.

Ergo he is in loue with her.

This maie bee true, and this maie bee false, for although the
coniecture haue some probabilitie with it, yet is it not for ever
true. The other called infallible reasons, or rather necessarie ar-
gumentes, must by all reason be euermore true, as thus,

Infallible
reasons.

Suche a woman is brought in bedde,

Ergo, she hath had the companie of man.

¶ Another.

The Sunne is risen.

Ergo, it is daie.

Therefore in all communication good hede ought to be taken,
that likelihoodes of thynges, be not vsed for necessarie reasons.

¶ Of an argument called *Syllogismus expositiuus*.

An argument
made by a
Roune pro-
per.



This kinde of argument hath euermore a Roune proper,
to bee as a double repeate in bothe Propositions: contra-
rie to the maner of all other argumentes, and it maie be
referred to the third figure.

Paule doth alledge godly sayngs of the Ethnikes
Paule was a Preacher.

Ergo, a Preacher maie alledge godlie saynges
of the Ethnikes.

For whatsoeuer is truely gathered of particular thynges,
the same also is proper to the thynges generall, and whatsoeuer
agreeth to the kinde, agreeth also to the difference, or proprietie of
the said Roune proper.

Inductio

Inductio.



An induction is a kinde of argumente, when wee gather sufficiently a number of proper names, and thereupon make the conclusion vniuersall, as thus.

Abraham was iustified by his faith. Likewise Isaac, Likewise Jacob. Likewise Gedon. Likewise Dauid. And all the holie men besides, without exception. Ergo all that be iustified before God, are iustified by their faith.

An other example.

Dathan for disobedience against the superiour power, ended his life wretchedly. Likewise Abiron. Likewise Chozan. Likewise Semet.

Neither is there any example to the contrarie.

Therefore all Rebelles and Traitors to their Prince and King, shall dye wretchedly.

An other example.

Rehoboath although he was a soyle Hunter, yet he liued like a wretch in greate miserie.

Laban also liued wretchedly.

Pharao was sore plagued.

Amalech, Hadian, Abimalech.

Herode, with other were scourged greivouslie for their wickednesse, neither is there any example to the contrarie.

Therefore the ende of wicked men is wretched.

This kinde of argumente is called *Inductio*, because that the wyng diuerse proper names, it endureth at lengthe, and moueth the mynde to make a generall conclusion. Therefore necessarie it is, that in suche argumentes all the examples whiche are induced be like, if any be founde contrary, the argument is of no force, as thus.

Athanasius liued vnnaried.

Ambrosius liued vnnaried.

Basilus had no wife, and a greate many mo.

Ergo all Bishops heretofore were vnnaried.

The argumente is not lawfull, forasmuche as diuerse haue been married in the Primatiue Church, as *Spiridon, Hermes, Hilarus*

In inductio.

Rebelles dye wretchedly.

The ende of the wicked is wicked.

Bishops married in the Primatiue Church.

The arte of Logike.

The Apo-
stles had
wiues.

Socrates
induction.

Hilarius, Polycrates, Tertulian, and diuers other. For it was the maner of the Primatiue Churche, that honest married men were chosen to be Bishops, and had the charge of Chrestes flocke. The Apostles also (as *Egnacius* witnesseth) had wiues, as well as other men, and as I thinke vsed them as other men doe their wiues, or els asked their leaue and consent to forbeare them.

Socrates vsed a kind of induction by asking many questions, the whiche all when they were graunted, he brought thereupon his confirmation concerning the presente controuersie, whiche kinde of argumente hath his name of *Socrates* hymself, called by the learned *Socrates* Induction, as if I might reason thus, lamenting the miserie of mankind, wherein so fewe are good, and so many euill. Alas in what state be we mortall men, seying in all ages there hath none been almoste good. I praie you how many good folke were there when all the worlde was vnioued: Surely not passe eight in all. How many were founde good in the citie of the *Sodomites*, when the whole was burnte for abhominable synne with fire and Brimstone? Not tenne, no not eight, no not sixe could bee founde, as it appeareth plaine in the viij. and xij. Chapter of *Genesis*. How many in the lande of promise, when sixe hundred thousande fighting men went out of *Egypte*? Alas but two onely. How many did swarue fro God euertwining, and bowed to an Idoll in the tyme of *Helias*? Forsoke all the people sauyng *Helias*, and seuen thousande. How many tribes of the *Israelites* followed God? Two onely, where as the other tenne clerely forsooke hym. How many did the Lorde count to be his in the lande of *Syria*? None at all, sauyng *Rahab* the officer, and the widowe of *Serepta*. How many feared God when *Tobias* was persecuted? *Tobias* onely. How many founde Christ, when he was here hymself vpon earth? But xij. that he chose as faithful, and yet one was a traitour after ward. Therefore, thus maie I conclude, the goodlie peoples in all ages are small in number.

Fewe good
in all ages.

Thewe.



E profite muche by this kinde of argumente: for hereby we haue the assured knowledge of those goodnes which Nature hath grafted in vs. And where Nature telleth

vs

ys, that the whole is greater then the partes, we ca not other wise knowe it, but by shewing it to be true in this substance, and that substance, and so in all other, wherbyon we conclude that this generall saying is true. *Aristotle* saith, this argument serueth well to perswade the multitude, when we gather many like thynges, and at last after suche heauiyng cōclude, that our argument is generall, true. As I heard once a doctor of Diuinitie, whiche was not so great in knowledge, as he was in title, a little before the banishment of the Masse, earnestly defendyng his cause with examples of suche and suche worshipfull as dwelt there in the countrie Doeth not suche a man (¶ he) veroully heare Masse: Doeth not suche a knight, suche a layde, suche a ladie, and suche a gentleman, full reuerently come to the blessed masse: Then neighbors (¶ he) if all these doe so, and none but the heretikes folowe the contrary, why should not you followe the best, and forsake the worst. Which that the people hearinge suche a patched reason, were wonderfullp perswadede to be as he saied, and if neede had been, readye to haue dyed (but not with hym, for he would none of that himself, deyng come home since gaily with) but alone, and together themselves, if suche extremitie had been offered. Againe this kinde of argumentation profiteth muche to dilate a matter at large, that thereby the trueth maie the rather bee allowed, when it is founde true in every singular thyng.

I doctours in induction in behoue of the Masse.

Argued as



An example is a manner of argumentation, whete one thyng is proued by an other, for the likenesse that is founde to bee in them bothe, as thus. If *Marcus Regulus* had rather lose his life, then make promise with his enemye, then should every man beyng taken prisoner, kepe promise with his enemye. If Cities haue been destroyed for breaking of wordes, then adulterers must needs bee punished. If *Alexander* punished a weake Soldiour when he was almoste treshen for robb, and did set hym in his owne chaire against the fire: then should all Capitaines and men of warre, be kinder over their poore warriours and base Soldiours.

An argument called an example. Marcus Regulus.

Alexander.

R.s.

Essemore

The arte of Logike.

Euermore take heed that this kind of argument, the cause be like of both sides, or els the argument proueth not. As thus.

¶ Peter kill'd Ananias, taken with an open lye.

¶ Therefore spirituall Ministers must punish open offenders with temporall swordes.

The examples are not like, Peter did kill Ananias with the worde, and power of the holie ghoſte: therefore preachers must not kill the bodie, but onely excommunicate men, accounting them unworthy to bee in the congregation. The sword is lawfull for the temporall Magistrate onely, and for none other.

How Peter
killed Ana-
nias.

¶ That hath store of examples, is well able to perswade the willing hearer, and shall much delight even the vauitie eared also, that must needs beare alwaies fine matters, and strange examples to please his fantasie withall.

¶ *Sorites, an heaping argument.*

In heaping
argument.



Orbes valconematio, is a heaping together of causes one vpon another. A kinde of argumentes when the laste rehearsed worde of the first Proposition, is repeated in the firste parte of the seconde Proposition, necessarily agreeing thereunto, and so goinge still forth in like manner, till at the length the laste rehearsed worde bee added vnto the firste worde, or former parte of the first Proposition. And it is a kinde of argument muche vsed, when we ascende upward from the lowest to the highest. Or els when we goe from the cause of the nexte thyngs doorn, vnto the thyngs doorn, are the occasion of other thyngs doorn, as thus.

A man is a liuing creature.

A liuing creature is a liuely bodie.

A liuely bodie is a substance.

Ergo, a man is a substance.

¶ Where the same is, there is transgression.

¶ Where there is transgression, there is feare.

¶ Where there is feare, there is remouall of conscience.

¶ Therefore where the same is, there is remouall of conscience.

¶ *Another.*

Justification

Therefore, justification is not without a repentant heart.

The Gospel is not the Law.

The Laborer reacheth us the feast of God.

Therefore the Gospel is worthy not.

Christe the Sonne, is not in person God the Father.
God the Father is curr laying.



★ **Fleece is meant.**

Therefore, there is none.

And the reason is, no argument can be made in general, by the kind of fallacy that neither is the consequent proof, when more does than little not necessarily are to meet together.

Dollar money are made good paper.

Good Lawyers are things too thin to be printed.

Changes worthy praise, are to be desired.

5. **THESE** (The) **THESE**, with manners are too delicate.

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...are not the occasion of good & evil; but the good & evil of

...the

the male or female, but rather the "Gentleman and his Gentlewoman" and the "Ladies and their Gentleman."

... ..

ter Suche ganz und gar ungenügend, als ob die Welt ein

De condeventen

การดำเนินงานตามแผนปฏิบัติการ

de preceptis et de officiis ministrorum, de sacramento orationis, de sacramento

...and the ...

[illegible]

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K.J. Parks

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- រាជធានីភ្នំពេញ
- ខណ្ឌដូនពេញ

55.19.

Sparks

The arte of Logike.

Marke the proceeding, and ye shall easily auoide the rrrour, for although in sleape wee spurre not, yet by drynking wee cause spurre, and although we slepe soundlie after, yet no one manne at one tyme bothe drynketh and slepeth, therefore though in slepyng he offendeth not, yet in drynking he passeth measure, and therefore the knyttynge is nothing wrothe.

¶ An horned argument.



Item, otherwile complexio, vel corruptus Syllogismus, called a horned argument, is when the reason consisteth of repugnant members, so that what soeuer you graunt, you fall into the snare, and take the snare. As if I should aske, whether it were better to marrie a faire woman, or a foule. If you saie a faire. Then aunswere I, that is not good, for they commonly saie He will bee common, and then I maie saie, ye are touched with the horned argument, if that sayng be true. If you saie it were good to marrie a harn fauoured woman, then I answere, she will be loathsome and so ye fall into an inconuenience, bothe waies. For with standing, if either of the parties maie be tourned into the aduersaries necke againe, in bothe of them, it is a faultie argument. And you maie confute the same by inuersion, that is to saie, tournyng his taile cleane contrarie, as thus. If I shall marrie a faire woman, I shall haue greete pleasure and comfote in her. If I marrie a hounse woman, she shall not be comyn to other, for weemen will looke after her. Therefore I shall haue comfote bothe waies.

Christen answered byng broken on the cheeke.

Christ himselfe as thou knowest in the 18. Chap. after the same kinde of argument against the ministers whiche stood by, and since then on the face, saying: answeredst thou the big priest in. Jesus answered him. If I haue euill spoken, heare witness of the childen. If I haue well spoken, why smitest thou mee?

¶ De consequentiis.

Of direct arguments.



I consisteth not a little after the reason of the such arguments, to declare the nature of the knyttynge of Propositions, and to declare the nature of a shotte argument, which is drawn from the Propositions, whiche are said to stand upon the antecedent and the consequent.

consequent, as the *Logicians* vse to terme them.

The first rule. From the vniuersall gathering to the particular, the argu-

ment goeth well, as thus.

All officers doe their buetie.

Ergo this officer doeth his buetie.

But not contrarie.

This officer doeth his buetie.

Ergo all officers doe their buetie.

The seconde rule. From that whiche by Nature is in any thing, to that whiche

happeneth casually, or cometh by some misse euill, the reason is not good. As thus.

Sober diet is good.

A feuer causeth sober diet.

Ergo a feuer is good.

An other argument vled by the Romaine Bishop.

Spinne doeth not beget man.

The worke of lust begetteth man.

Therefore luste, other wise called *Concupiscen-*

cia, is no spinne.

The seconde Proposition is not true, for wicked concupi-
fence came in by mannes follie, and hath muche defaced that,
whiche Nature first ordeined. Therefore Nature it self through
God giueth increase, whiche is muche contrarie to the wicked
luste of concupiscence.

The third rule. Things disagreeing are not considered bothe one waie, and

with one respect.

The Gospell willet vs to make no difference of

the Physicians appoits vs a diet, and forbid vs

this and that.

Ergo the Gospell and the Physicians teache this.

These doe not disagree, considering their ends are diuersal

K.iii. The

Nature
through God
giueth in-
crease.

The arte of Logike.

The scripture forbiddeth superstition, in the obseruation of daies.
The prohibition hath respect to the state of mannes bodie.

The fourth rule.

The argument is good when substances are set, according to their proper differences. But when they are set the one against the other, according to their accidentes, which are agreeing to bothe, the argument is not good, as thus.

It is lawfull for you, not to drinke wine,
Ergo, to drinke wine is unlawfull.

Whereas this woorde (lawfull) is common to bothe, as well to drinke, as not to drinke. The argument whiche the Sophiste made to Diogenes, made by this rule be confuted.

The fifth rule.

Euery thing the more that other things are through it, the same is alwaies the more it self. As thus.

Water is hott through fire,
Ergo, fire is more hott.

Some loue to make for goodes.

Therefore thei loue goodes better than.

Where it
hath place,
and where
not.

Some argumes made according to this rule, are nothing true, and therefore it is good to giue warning of them.

It is well said, and truly, this rule holdeth in causes that are next adjoining, and the which doolie compass a matter not in those causes, that are fetten farre off, and being but halfe causes, partly and by the waie giue onely the occasion. As thus.

Onide came to be a poete by his maister.

Therefore his maister is the greater poete.

The argument is not good in those causes that are but halfe causes, for Onide is not a poete, nor by the cause he learned preceptes of his maister, but also because he had a greater aptnesse by Nature, and a wonderfull wit, so doe better than an other.

Sainte Iu-
gustines say-
ing vpon the
Churches.

Some hold fast vpon the saying of saint Augustine, and build wonders vpon that text. I would not beleue the Gospell, saith Augustine, except the Catholike Church did perswade me. And

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1111

?

The

The Gospell is beleueu for the Churches sake.
Ergo, the Church is of more authoritie.

And here thei beape a number of mischtiues. Therefore (saie thei) the Church may make Lawe, and appointe Traditions, whatsoeuer thei be. But I aunswere thus, the antecedent is false. For I cheefly beleue the Gospell, considering God is the author: and seing the wonders that he hath don. I giue credite to it for his sake. I graunt we doe beleue the Gospell for the churches sake, but yet principally, for that God is the cheef author, that parswadeth vs to receiue his woorde, and after the Church (as the seconde cause) telleth vs that the Gospell is the truthe of God. Therefore if thei will make this suche an argument, as thei seeme to saie it is, then this that followeth, is of as good force for in all thynges it is like.

How should
 I knowe the
 Church, or
 whiche were
 it had not the
 Gospell afore
 instructed me

This child is a good hope, gramercie rod.

Ergo, the rod is better then the hoie.

The cheefest cause of the hoies goodnesse is God hymself, whiche sendeth his grace vnto hym, the second cause is, his good frendes, whiche chasten hym for his offence, and lastlie the rodde as an instrument, whereby the feate is don, helpeth for ward to hyng the hope to some goodnesse.



The arte of Logike.

Of the second part of Logike, called *Inuentio*, that is to saie, the fin- dyng out of an argument.



Invention.

In similitude.

Hereto wee haue treated of the former parte of *Logike*, called in Latine *Iudicium*, that is to saie Iudgement, or skill to declare the nature of euery word, & seueralles; to set the same wordes in a perfecte sence, and to knit them vp in arguments; so that hereby wee might with ease eutie the right frame in matters how they agree, be-
yng lapped vp in order. Now therefore the other parte shall bee sette forth, whiche is called *Inuention*, whereby we maie finde argumentes and reasons meete to proue euery matter, where-
vpon question maie rise. This parte is the store house of places, wherein argumentes rest, vnto the whiche it is to conferre the matter whiche wee entende to proue. There will appeare diuerse argumentes to confirme the cause. Like vnto that therefore that digge for gold in ground, doe searche it out wille the vaines of the pearth, and by diligent markyng the Nature thereof, at length the finde out the Spine, whiche once bepng found, they straight bypng it to light, for the speedy behoue of maiue. So he that will reason wisely, as well for the common profit of other; as for his owne priuate gaine, must be a verie diligent labourer, and considering matters are put to the prooffe, wherein often resteth doubt, his parte must bee euermore to marke the nature of his cause, and to seeke confirmation thereof in euery parte. First by the definition, the cause, the effecte and proper office. Againe, to see what is contrarie, what is like, and what thynges be incident therevnto, the whiche all when he hath doen, he shall see at length that some one argument aboue all other, serue best to confirme his cause, the whiche when with trauell he hath founde out, he maie bypng to light, and vse accordyng to his will.

What

What a diuision is.



Place is the resting corner of an argumente, or els a marke whiche giueth warnyng to our memorie, what we maie speake probably, either in the one part or the other, vpo all causes that fall in question. Those that be good Hunters, will sone finde the Hare by her foyme. For whe thei se the ground beaten flat round about, and faire to the sight: thei haue a narrow gresse by all likelihoode, that the Hare was there a litle before. Like wise the huntsman in huntynge the Foxe, will sone espye whe thei seerch a hole, whether it be a Foxe borough or not. So he that will take profite in this part of *Logike*, must be like a hunter, and leaue by labor to knowe the boroughes. For these places be nothing els but conuertes or boroughes, wherein if any one seerch diligently, he maie finde game at pleasure. And although perhaps one place saile hym, yet shall he finde a dosen other places to accomplishe his purpose. Therefore if any one will doe good in this kinde, he muste goe from place to place, and by searchoyng every borough he shall haue his purpose vndoubtely, in moste parte of the, if not in al. We se that every proposition doeth either affirme a thyng to be true, or els denieth that it is true. Therefore when any thyng is constantly said, it nedeth somwhat euermore to confirme it, As for example. The Sacramentes are necessarie in the Church of God. I maie proue this sayyng true, by reasonyng from that place whiche is called the ende of every thyng, as thus.

A place.

**A similitude
or parable of
huntynge.**

**In all argu-
ments either
we affirme or
denie.**

To giue testimonie of our faith, and to nousell our self in the practise thereof is verie necessarie.

The Sacramentes giue testimony of our faith &c.

Ergo, the Sacramentes are verie necessarie.

**Argumente
vpon respect
of the ende.**

**Sacramen-
tes necessarie.**

When any proposition doeth deny, it is needfull to haue a third worde, whiche maie agree with one part of the proposition. As if one should thus saie. Paule is not iustified by his woorkes. The place of repugnant wordes that doeth altogether disagree, giueth iust matter. And therefore I maie saie: man is not iustified by his woorkes, because he is iustified by his faith onely. For if mercie come by grace, and that freely, then woorkes can not saue vs. Paule proueth the first, therefore the seconde is for euer true.

L. J.

The

The Arte of Logike.

¶ The diuision of places, which are xxiiij. in number.

	{ Particulaſſie in the very ſubſtance. As	{ The definition. The generall worde. The kinde. The propertie. The whole. The partes. The yoked wordes.	
{ Some are inwarde places, called Loci interni, & thei are	{ And partly incidente to the ſubſtance. As	{ VVorde adioyned. The maner of doynge. The thyng contained.	
		{ Some are cauſes. As	{ The efficient cauſe. The ende.
	{ Either kinde with any affinitie, called Cognata of the whiche	{ Some are ſubiecte whiche ſpyng of the cauſes, called Euentũ. As	{ The effecte The thyng appointed for ſome ende.
{ Some are outward places, called Externi, that is not in the ſubſtance, or nature of the thing but without it, & theſe are,	{ Either applied to the thyng, not beeyng the cauſe thereof, but onely giuing a name thereto called Applicita. As	{ The place. The tyme. Thynges annexed.	
	{ Or els thei be accidentes whereof there be ſiue.	{ Thynges chauncyng. Sentence of the ſage. The name of a thyng. Thynges compared. Thynges like.	
	{ Or els thei are repugnantes. As	{ Discordantes. Thynges diſſeruyng.	

¶ Of the Definition.

The definition.

Definition is a perſecte ſentence, whereby the verie Nature of the thyng it ſelf is ſette forth and expounded. You maie reaſon from this place, bothe affirmatiuely and negatiuely, as thus. Fortitude is a vertue, that fighteth in the queſt.

rell of right, I maie reason thus from the definition, to the thyng defined, if I will proue Fortitude praisse worthie.

From the definition to the defined.

- Da.* Whatsoeuer is vertue, fightyng in the querrell of right, the same is praisse worthie.
ri. Fortitude is vertue, fightyng is y querrell of right
j. Therefore, Fortitude is praisse worthie.

If I will define a good thyng, and proue that money is not good, I maie reason thus.

- Ce.* No lutch thing is good, as is desired for respect of any other ende.
sa. All money is desired, for respect of an other ende
re. Therefore, no money is good.

The generall rule.

To whom the definition dooeth agree, to the same also dooeth the thyng defined belong. And contrary wise, bothe affirmatiuely and negatiuely.

The maner of reasoning.

If *Socrates* bee a liuyng creature endued with reason, then is he a man, if he be a man, he is a liuyng creature endued with reason. If he bee not a liuyng creature, &c. Then he is not a manne. If he bee not a manne, then he is no liuyng creature endued with reason.

The vsa.

The Nature of euery thyng is knowne by the definition, and therefore, this place aboue all other is moste necessarie.

Of the generall woordes.

The Generall woorde is spoken of many, that differ either in kinde, or els differ in number, when the question is asked what it is, we maie reason negatiuely from this place, thus.

The generall worde.

- Co.* No vertue maie be called wastfulnesse.
la. Liberalitie is a vertue.
rent. Therefore, liberalitie maie not be called wastfulnesse.

The generall rule.

If the generall woorde be taken a waie, the kinde carieth not. If the generall woordes doe remaine, it shall not straitly followe,
l. ij. that

The arte of Logike.

that the kinde shall ensue. For it is no good argument, if I see a Tree a good waile from me, to saie thus: it is a Tree, therefore it is an Apple Tree. But I maie saie thus well negatiuely, it is no Tree: therfore, it is neither Apple Tree, nor yet any other tree.

The maner of reasoning.

Euery creature by Nature loue it self, then man doeth loue hym self. If euery vertue bee praise worthis, then in the administration of Justice, to giue euery manne his owne, it is praise worthis.

The vsa.

The generall worde declareth the largenesse of any thyng, so that where the generall taketh no place, the other that be inferiour can not bee. As if there bee no liuyng creature in some one house, then there must needs be no maner of manne in the same house.

Of the kinde.

The kinde beyng reckoned among the places, is taken to be any one thyng that is lesse generall then any other, and by this shift, euen proper Rounes or names of thynges shall serue for the kinde, and goe in steede thereof. Therefore, as we reason from the kinde to the generall, so maie we reason from Rounes proper to their kindes. From the kinde to the generall, an argumente is made onely affirmatiue, as thus: If Justice bee to be desired, then vertue is to be desired. Dutche a man is a slanderer: Ergo, he is a naughtie man.

The generall rule.

To whom the kinde doeth agree, to the same also the generall doeth agree.

The maner of reasoning.

If sobrietie bee praise worthis, then vertue is praise worthis. If dishonestie be deuilishe, then surfeiting is deuilishe.

The vsa.

The kinde is generall to euery proper name, and therefore in describyng the nature of euery Rounne proper, wee haue mutche neede of this place, to knowe vnder what kinde euery seuerall thyng is comprehended. Againe,

The necessariness of this place.

gain, whatsoeuer is defined, the same is the kind of some one thing so that hereby wee maie learne how farre this worde stretcheth, being ordeined to set forth the nature of euery proper name.

¶ Of the difference and proprietie.

From the proprietie and difference, argumentes are deriued bothe affirmatiue and negatiue. We can reason a matter artificially, therefore he is a good *Logicien*. *Esop*e could not better his mynde at large, but did stammer and staine mutche in his speeche, therefore he was an *Oratour*. By the proprietie ye maye reason thus. Suche a man feareth God, putteth his whole trust in God, and loueth his neighbour as hymself. *Ergo*, he is a right *Christian*. And likewise ye maie reason by conuersion. Suche a one is a *Christian*, *Ergo*, he feareth God, &c.

The difference and proprietie.

¶ The generall rule.



When the proprietie or difference is graunted, then the kind straight followeth, take awaie the same, and there remaineth no kind at all.

¶ The maner of reasoning.

Whosoever is endued with reason, the same is a man.

¶ The vse.

The difference and the proprietie declare natures working in all thinges liuyng, & therefore thei helpe well to shew what euery thing is by his proper gift. We spake before of a *Perthode*, or direct order to be vsed in all our doynge; and herein we maie well se the vse thereof. For herterto we handled those places, whiche doe nothyng els but compyrehende the nature of a perfect definition. Now whereas the place followeth of the whole and his partes, it is nothyng els but the right maner of a perfect diuision. The places that followe after declare the causes, the effectes, what be incident, what be disagreeing from the matter, shewing example and testimonies of the auncient.

Declarers of Natures working.

¶ Of the whole, and the partes.

The whole is that same whiche consisteth of his partes, and is diuided twon maner of waies. First, there is the whole in substance whiche standeth of suche partes, that if one be taken awaie, the whole becometh straight, neither can it afterward

The whole & the partes. The whole twoo waies to ben.

L. iiij.

keepe

The Arte of Logike.

keepe his name as it did before. For an example. A man is di-
 uided into a bodie and soule. Take awaie the bodie, who counteth
 the soule to be the man, which before had his bodie ioynd there-
 unto: We saie the soule liueth when the bodie is dedde, but no
 man saith the soule is the very man, euen as we call hym before
 when he was compact of bothe.

Againe, there is the whole absolute with his partes, which
 serueth to make the whole perfecte, aduoyng suche thynges, that
 although thei bee awaie, yet the whole notwithstanding remai-
 neth, and hath his name still, as when a man is made of bodie and
 soule (which are the partes of his substance, and can not bee a-
 waie) yet hath he other partes, which although thei bee awaie,
 the whole notwithstanding kepeth his name still. As if a manne
 lose his hande, his arme, or one of his feete, yet he is called man,
 and those bee called *partes integrales*, that is to saie, the partes
 which finish the whole and make it perfecte, after that it hath
 those partes which make the substance.

The generall rule.

If the whole be, the partes of the substance must needs be.
 As if a man be a liue, the bodie and soule bothe are a liue.

The manner of reasoning.

If Philosophie bee good, then it is good to knowe the
 Nature of thynges, the waie of orderpung mannes life,
 and the skill how to reason probable. For Philosophie
 it self, is diuided into these three partes.

The use.

Before we learne to examine the whole by the partes, that
 if we can not obtaine our purpose to haue the whole gra-
 tified, to examine it by the partes, and force our aduerlarie
 to assent to some member.

The integrall partes which make perfecte the whole, and
 cause the bignesse thereof, are diuided into partes like, or not like.

*Partes in-
 tegrales.*

Partes like.

Partes like are those which are alwaies like, and diuided e-
 uermore into like. As the fleshe, bones, sinewes, fire, water, gold
 Iron, Wine, Wood, Stone. Every parte of all these is called
 as much as the whole: as a peece of fleshe, is called fleshe, a peece
 of

of wood is called wood, a drop of water is called water, as well as a gallon of water is called water. That be called in Latine *similares partes*, because they are named like unto the whole, for a peece of flesh is as well called flesh, and as much the hart is the name of flesh as a whole. Of the hart. The partes which have not like names to the whole, are partly principall, and partly not principall. The principall partes are they which in nature may bee a waie, without losse of the whole it self: As the partes of a mans bodie which containe life, can not bee a waie without losse of the man. As the hedde, the he alle, the harte, and the intrayles. Per not withstanding, the partes of these can not be called like to the whole, for no man saith that a peece of the harte is the harte, or a peece of the hedde is the hedde, and so in the other. Those which are not principall partes maye be a waie, and the whole, not without any remaine still, as the bandes, the frenes, the legges and the armes.

Havinge
the partes not
like.

The generall rule.

When the chief partes are taken a waie, the whole needes necessarily the chief partes being brought altogether, the whole must needes followe.

The manner of reasoning, both negatively and affirmatively.

Suche a man hath learned Voyal Philosophie, Naturall, and Logike, therefore he is a philosopher. Some Iudges can neither write well, speake well, nor yet reade without a corresponding. Therefore they are no *Grammerians*. This manne is no

Rhetorician, because he can not place his thynges in good order. For whereas five thynges be required in an *Oratour*, first to invyne after to place thynges inuented thirdly to sette forth the thyng matter in good order, fourthly to remember all these, and lastly of all, to utter the same distinctly, and with a cleare voice. If one lacke any of these five, he cannot bee called an *Oratour*. Therefore I make saie: Suche a one hath an euill memorie: *Ergo*, he maye not be called an *Oratour*. In the negative part, it is enough to take one parte a waie, for the disallowing of any thyng. But if I will as-

Five thynges
required in
an *Oratour*.

firme

The arte of Logike.

A generall
partition of
an Orator.

firm any thing by the partes, I must take all the partes, and not one of two partes. For he is not an Orator that can inuence only, or place thynges in good order only, except he can doe the whole as it is required. Again, he is no good Orator that can teache only, or delite, but he is absolute that can bothe teache, delite, and also perswade.

The manner of reasoning.
Reason from the parte to the whole, affirmatiuely, and negatiuely, thus: Suche a one can neither iudge the knittng of woordes together, nor frame them in order according to the Arte, nor auoide any subtilties: Ergo, he is no Logician.

The use.
The partes sette foorth the whole, and are a greater beautifying of the same: being generally handled, and in their Natures set foorth at large.

Woordes
yoked.

Of woordes yoked together.
Yoked woordes, whiche being deriued of one, are chaunged in speaking: As of *Sapientia*, *sapientia*, *sapienter*. A wise man, wisdom, wisely. Here we see that of a wise man, is deriued wisdom. I may reason from this place bothe affirmatiuely, and negatiuely. If one be not wise, he hath no wisdom, if one be wise, he hath wisdom. If one doo euill perpetually, he is called a contemptible man. If it be no miserie to die, then Death is not miserable. Suche a one is a Philosopher, therefore he hath studied Philosophie. Argumentes deriued from hence haue greace soyce, if the onely yoked woordes bee ioyned together without addition of another, or els they are not strong. As thus. Preachers be euill liuers: Ergo, preaching is euill. This argument is not good because of the addition: For preachers and preaching are onely the yoked woordes, and therefore thus I should saie, There are preachers: Ergo, there is preaching.

The generall rule.
When one of the yoked woordes is added, or put awaie the other, also is added or put awaie,

The

The manner of reasoning hath the affirmatiue and negatiue.

Suche a one is a priestly minister. Ergo he is a priest. Suche a man hath serued the kyng nobly. Ergo he is an noble man. The preacher handleth his matter learnedly. Ergo the preacher hath learning. How cail ye hym wisie that hath no witte at all? Is there no honestie in suche a manne? I maruell then why thei call hym honest.

The vse.

We maie learne by this place, to knowe what thynges are, bying considered in other. For if I would knowe, whether it bee good or no, to be a man of honoꝝ, and to haue rule in the common weale: I maie learne by them that doe rule, what it is to be a ruler, or a man of honoꝝ, and how dangerous a calling thei haue, that are placed in high estate. If I would knowe what wisdom is, he it were for me to marke thei doynge that are wisemen.

Of wordes adioyned to the substance, and yet not of the substance.

Wordes adioyned are called those accidentes, whereby the singular word or proper name, hath an other name the of the very substance, as vnto *Cato* (which of his substance is a man) wisdom doeth happen, whereby he is called wise. Vnto *Cicero* also (which by his substance is a man) there happeneth eloquence, whereby he is called eloquente. So that he hath an other name then his substance giueth, which is to be eloquent, and this is the woorde adioyned. All quantities, qualities, and those that are comprehended in the Predicament of relation, are referred to this place, when thei are considered to be comprehended in a substance. Vertue referred to the minde, which conceiue it, is a woode adioyned: compared with vice, it is a contrary referred to iustice, it is a generall woode. All wordes adioyned are perceived, either by the senses (as those which are subiect to senses) or els by vnderstandyng. As swiftnesse maie bee considered to bee in a man, although we see him be a long, and so we saie, suche a lackie runneth well, although we doe not then presently see hym runne, but wee remember that he hath runne, sayng now, say we haue

Wordes adioyned.

Vertue being universally considered, diversely placed. Wordes adioyned, perceived either by sense, or els by vnderstandyng.

The Arte of Logike.

seen before in water. Again, some wordes adioyned are by nature in the thyng whiche containe them, as heate is naturally in fire. And because we see that the same heate, although it neuer goe a waie, yet at all tymes it is not of like strength: but as sometyme lesse hott then at another: we iudge the same heate to bee an accident. Some wordes adioyned are not naturally cleaving, but by some other waie are ioyned to the thyng containing them, as heat in water sette vpon the fire.

The generall rule.

If one of the wordes adioyned bee in the subiecte, or thyng containing, the other also is like to be there whiche followeth vpon the first. As thus, *Cato* is a man worthy praise, because he is wary, sober, full of experience: praise followeth vertue, as the shadowe dooth the bodie. Therefore whosoever hath vertue and greace knowledg of thinges, the same man of necessity winneth praise and fame that can not dye. Again, if the wordes adioyned be the subiect, that containeth them must needs be also, as thus. If God be all goodnesse, then there is a God.

The manner of saying.

Christe came into the world being gentle and milde. Ergo Christe came not to destroye the losse sheepe, but to save them. Scholers be godlie, vertuous, and occupied in learning. Ergo it is a gracious neede to helpe suche of them as haue neede.

The use.

The maie by this place either praise or dispraise, setting forth the nature of men, and iudging them by their wordes.

The manner of doying or suffering, called *Aelius*.

The manner
of doying or
suffering.



The manner of doying or suffering, is when we are supposed to bee occupied or affected any manner of waie, either in doying or in suffering.

There bee as many manner of doyinges, as there be adiacentes of wordes adioyned. And of these adiacentes, feare, sorrow, trouble, heate, cold, are deuised these: to feare, to be sorie, to trouble, to rest, to be hott, to be cold. And generally of those wordes that are referred vnto the twoo predicamentes, called the manner of doying and the suffering, are compassed within this place, if the same wordes bee considered as adiacentes,

as thus, Cato is a man worthy praise, because he is wary, sober, full of experience: praise followeth vertue, as the shadowe dooth the bodie. Therefore whosoever hath vertue and greace knowledg of thinges, the same man of necessity winneth praise and fame that can not dye.

Again, if the wordes adioyned be the subiect, that containeth them must needs be also, as thus. If God be all goodnesse, then there is a God.

identes; which stand to the substance, and make both to be present, and also be a waile without losse of the substance. For if they ges doem but righte according to their proper manner of doynge, they are referred to the two places above, called the difference, and the propriety. For where as we said, Suche doem speaking: *Ergo* he is a man (for sooth maye in a syncke naturally, but in himselfe) although in this case (so he is) be withered of doynge; yet it is not referred to this, but rather to the propriety, because it becometh to man alone, and alwaies to man.

The general rule. If the matter of doynge or suffering be the thing containing it also, and the thing be not doynge also, whereof doynge and suffering have been doynge. Followe upon the same.

If one breath, become man hath life in hym. If *Julius Caesar* came into Englande, then there was suche a name called *Julius Caesar*. If *Richard* the third poyed the tyrant heere in Englande, then there was suche a man in Englande. This place muche helpeth, either for praise by disparage. Some officers by the poore, robbe their payster, and waste their owne; *Ergo* suche are worthy this death.

The subject of the thing containing is a substance, being the **T**he subject of the thing containing is a substance, being the stonehouse of accidentes, and the verie proper hold by degrees downe for neither wisdom, strength, health, nor politesse can be at all, excepte they be contained within some one body.

The general rule. Take aduaile the thing containing, and there remaineth neither accident, nor yet beere downe. There is fire, *Ergo* it is hotte. *Christe* was a depe man, *Ergo* *Christe* died, and suffered the panges at his deparcyng.

Why dost thou seie, that I am a thet accourne, who I know was neuer yet wey the a groce? *There is a thet* *There is a thet*

Sp.ij.

Therefore

whereof it is
containing

whereof it is
containing
The thing
containing.

whereof it is
containing

whereof it is
containing

Therefore there is a greater learning to be had where he is.

By naming of a worthy person, his praise is sufficiently set forth, even when his name is once uttered. For what learned man hearyng the name of Cicero, doth not remember thereby the full practise, and the absolute skill of all eloquence? These places therefore help aswell for amplifying of matters, either in praise or in dispraise, as they doe for the steadfast proving of any cause.

Of outward places being not in the substance, but onely touching the substance, and without the nature of it.

The causes of thynges.



They first are called the causes of thynges, and the thynges containing of causes, whiche ones are ioyned to the thyng necessarily, where as the other places following are not coupled necessarily, but are onely ioyned together, by a certaine alliance to the present matter.

The division of causes.

Some causes are called the verie causes of thynges, even by their owne nature: other causes are happening causes, the which make perhaps bying forth the effect. Lastly there be causes without the which thynges can not be doen, and yet are they not any cause so farre as the effect.

The verie cause of thynges.

As the cause of fire.

The verie cause of thynges is such a one, as if it be practised in verie deepe, and set forth with other naturall causes, the effect must needs followe: and again if it be not put in practise, although the other be put, yet the effect shall not followe. As for example, although one have clothe, yet can he not haue the use of it, except he take it out. And although the miller grinde, yet we are like to dine without bread, except the Baker doe his parte also in the batche.

The happening cause.

The happening cause is such a one as although to be put in practise in verie deepe, yet it shall not of it selfe cause the effect must needs followe. As an Arrow while be the happening cause, that some one may keep it from fire, and yet not any for-eyng cause: for the most like folks might be burnt or for sooth say. The cause without the which thynges can not be doen, as thus. The Baker cannot haue a wheate, unless he doe soe as he be cut out. The wheeler shall not of verie hardy wille, as thus.

The cause without the which thynges can not be doen.

As the cause of fire.

As the cause of fire.

As the cause of fire.

neyes ende, excepte he haue some money in his purse. In tyme of warre it is euill traauailing without a passport: and this is called in Latine, *causa sine qua non*, that is to saie, the cause without the whiche we can not, and yet it is not the cause of our iourneyng.

The definition of the verie cause.

A cause in verie deede is a meane, by whose force some thyng doeth followe.

There be foure such causes.

The efficient cause.

The end.

The matter.

The hape.

The efficient cause is the woorkyng cause, by whose meanes thynges are brought to passe.

Of those that are woorkyng causes, some by Nature byng thynges to passe, some by aduise-ment, and by a fore purposed choice. Thynges worke by Nature (and that nere hardly) whiche

lacke knowledge to chuse this or that, and haue no iudgement to discerne thynges. As the Sunne, the Fire, Herbes, precious stones. The Sunne euen by Nature giueth light to the Daie, and can not other wise doe: the Fire burneth naturally. Herbes keepe their vertue of necessity. The Adamant brayeth Iron euen by Nature.

And so the Bloudstone stoppeth bloud. Some of these causes worke by the force and violence of Nature, some by an outward power beyng assigned thereunto.

That worke by the force and violence of Nature, whose beginning is within themselves: beyng ayded by none other outward thing. As Fire burneth, euen by the Nature all force of heat, whiche is the substance thereof.

That worke by an outward power, whiche are assigned to worke by an other meane. As water set vpon the fire waxeth hotte, and yet is it not hotte by her owne Nature: but is made hotte by the Nature and might of fire, of whom the water taketh heat. In like maner bullettes of Lead shotte out of a gunne, an Arrow out of a Bowe, a Stone out of a Sling, all these be not

The efficient cause.

Efficient woorkyng causes woorkes considered.

Causes woorkyng by the force of nature.

Causes woorkyng by an outward power.

into the fire by their owne power and might, but by force and violence of fire that vnto them without willing or stirring.

The generally rule.
From the naturall too thyng cause, the effect must needs followe, as thus. If the Sunne shyne, the day must needs be which is the effect of woorkmanship of the Sunne. Suche a man hath eaten Hemlocke: Ergo he is poisoned and in danger of death. Fire is in the Chimnie, or in the top of the house, therefore it must needs burne. Take awaye the cause, and the effect can not be at all, for if there be no fire, there can be no flame nor burning neither.

The seconde woorkyng cause, is when thynges are dooen by aduise ment and by choise, not be any necessity at all, for thynges maie as well not be doen, as be doen. As if there be a Shoemaker there maie be Shoen fadde, and contrariwise, if there be no Shoemaker, there can be no Shoone at all.

The generally rule.
Then the voluntarie cause is put, the woorkmanship of the thyng dooen maie followe. As if there be a Carpenter, a house maie be made. If one read good authours, and hearken to the reading of learned men, he maie come to good learning.

The manner of reasoning.
Suche a one hath dronke poison, Ergo he will dye shortly. Christ hath reconciled mankinde to his Father, by suffering death vpon the crosse: Ergo suche as beleeue in this sayyng heath, shall liue for euer.

A further division of causes efficient.
Commādyng causes. Some efficient causes are commaundyng causes. As the king is the commaundyng cause to his subiect, to doe this or that. The Master of workes is the commaundyng cause to all the labourers. The other efficiente causes are obedience causes, when the seruant woorketh at his Masters commaundement.

Obediente causes. *An other division of causes efficient.*
Of suche efficient causes as doe obeye, some doe their woork, as the Mason woorketh vpon the stone, the Carpenter vpon wood. Other efficient causes that are obedient, are but instrumentes of dooing, as Hatchettes, Hammers, &c. the axes, such other. In bar

taill the Capitaine is the efficient commaunders the souldiour the efficient obseruantes, darters, lowes and buies, the instrumentes of doyng. Good heede ought to bee had, that in all causes wee make a difference, not confounding one with another, that the nye causes and the farthe causes, be not taken al for one. A cause farre fetched is this. Suche a one fell out with his neighbor, Ergo he killed hym. Fallyng out bynggeth chiding, chiding bynggeth hatred, hatred causeth fightyng, fightyng giueth blowes, blowes sone dispatch, sone dispatchyng is ready death. Eherfore I mighte moze probable and merto the purpose reason thus. Suche a one gaue his neighbor a deadly wounde: Ergo he hath killed hym. And thus the argument is made from the med cause.

Examples of causes.

An other diuision.

Some causes are principall causes, as the holie ghoste wooyng all goodlie motions, and stirryng our Nature euermoze to the best. Other causes are the inclinations in man, that are either good or euill. Thirdly, there are helpyng causes, whiche are meannes the rather to further vs in a vertue. As learyng, practisyng of honest behauiour, acquaintyng our Nature euermoze with the best. The principall cause, that Ioseph forbore to companie with an other mannes wife: was the holie ghost that stirred his minde with the feare of God. The seconde cause was his owne mynde, that remembred the woorde of God, and the punishment due for synne. The thirde cause was, that he accustomed hymselfeuer to liue uprightly, and not onely to auoide synne, but also to auoide the occasion of synne. There bee othe diuisions, but I leaue to rehearse them, for feare I should be ouer long.

Causes be-
yng the incli-
nation in m.
Helpyng
causes.

Ioseph.
The holie
ghost is prin-
cipall cause.

The ende called Finis.



The Ende is, for whole cause any thyng is dooen, and is two waies considered. For there is an absolute ende, whereunto all other are referred, beeyng called the per-

The ende.
The ende
absolute.

fection, and cheef propercie in any thyng: as the cheefest ende in a ny man, is to be perfectly endued with reason, and to attain euery lasting felicitie. The cheefest propercie in a horse is to be of a very good courage, and to want no stomacher: the cheefest perfectiō in fire is to be very hote and very drye. There is an other ende called

The cheefest
ende in man.

The Arte of Logike.

a helping ende, whiche serueth to an higher ende, and is onely ordeined for this purpose, that we might attaine thereby the perfect ende of all. As meate, drinke, apparell, and other necessarie thynges, are helping endes for man to attaine the cheefest ende. For without these endes man could not liue. To liue honestly in this life, to be vpright in dealing with all persones is an helping ende (as the Philosophers take it) and a testimonie to the woorde of our faith (as the Christians take it) for man to liue, worlde without ende. To marie a wife, is a helping ende for manne to auoide fornication. The poore man labourereth, and wherefore? To gette his liuing. Wherefore getteth he his liuing? That he maie the better be able to serue God. The Souldiour fighteth at his Princes commaundement, cheefly because God commaundeth hym, next after for loue of the kyng and his countrie: thirdly and laste of all, that he might liue the rather in quiet at home, with his wife and children. So that of one and the same thyng, there maie be many endes being ouerly considered.

The generall rule.

Whose ende is good or euill, the same thyng is good or euill. A sworde is good, because it is good for a man to defende himself. Faith in Christ Iesus is good, for by faith we are saued. To vndoe my neighbour with lending for gaine is moste vngodly: therefore to be an Alurer is moste vngodlie. To desire an other mans wife is vngodlie, because adulterie is vngodlie. Battaille is good, because it bringeth peace. For all men should fight for this ende, that we might liue in quiet with our neighbours. If thou wilt be esteemed for a godlie person, accompanie thy self with folke of honest fame, and thou shalt be well reported, especially of the honest. It is good to learne, because learning it self encreaseth good knowledge, whiche is the ende of our studie.

Of the matter or substance, called Materia.

The substance called *Materia*, is readie to be framed of the workeman, as hym liketh, by the whiche substance either thynges naturall, or els thynges artificiall are made. As first a man whiche is a naturall thing is made of bodie and soule. An Image whiche is an artificiall thyng, is made by the handie worke

The maner
of reasoning
A Sworde.

The matter
or substance.
Euery forme
is either na-
turall, or ar-
tificiall.

work of man, and is grauen out of a stone, or molten in gold, or in brasse. From this place are made arguments, that bothe do affirm and also deny. As thus, if a man haue clothe, he maie haue a garment made if ic like him. But if a man haue no cloth at all, nor yet any suche like stuffe that serueth for apparel, how can he haue a gowne or a coate? If the Baker lacke Wheale, how can he make bread. The matters considered twoo waies. First it is a substance that carieth still, as when a house is made of stone, wood, and plaister, or an Image of gold, brasse, or silver: here y substance carieth still, although the forme be altered. Likewise when a house is taken downe, the stone and timber remain still, and kepe their substance, and serue as they did before, either for erection of the same house againe, or els other wise as it shall please him that is the owner. Again, the substance is that whiche changeth into an other nature, and can not be the same that it was before: as of meale and water Bakers make their bread: now they cannot resolve the same bread againe into meale and water, whiche was the former substance.

The generall rule.

When the substance is at hande, the workmanship maie followe, and the effecte maie appeare: but when the substance is taken awaye, there can be nothing made at all. As if a manne lacke silver, how can he make an Image of silver? There is no stone, wood, nor plaister: Ergo there is no house. But if I reason thus by the substance, that changeth into an other nature, it can not be the same that it was before: I reason then amisse as thus. There is no meale or flower, Ergo there is no bread: but I should saie rather, there was no meale nor flower. Ergo there is no bread.

The manner of reasoning.

He Shoemaker hath no Leather, how can he then make a Shoe? The Printer hath no Paper at all, Ergo he can not set his men on worke to print any thing.

The shape called Forms.

The shape or fashion of any thing, is a cause whereby the thing that is made hath his name, as Leather when it is made or fashioned for the foot, is called a Shoe. Suche

The shape.

The arte of Logike.

a man weareth a liverie coate garded with Almette, and all the yeomen seruantes haue but plaine coates. *Ergo* he is one of the gentlemen. He hath a siluer pot gilt, and wroughte with Goldsmithes woorkes: *Ergo* he is better then a potte wroughte with plaine siluer, beyng of the same quantitie or bignesse.

The generall rule.



When the shape or forme is made: the effect of thyng doene more followe, take awaie the shape, and the vse also is taken awaie. A cuppe is made, *Ergo* a man maie drinke in it: break the cuppe, and how shall you drinke of the same cuppe. The Element goeth compasswise because it is round. As a son is called the shape of manne. Therefore I maie saie, suche a one lacketh the gift of reason: *Ergo* he is a foole.

Things commyng after the causes called Euentia.

The effectes
of causes.



Those whiche come of causes are twoo waies considered, for either they are called changes, that in due tyme followe the causes that went before, or els thynges ordeined to some certayne ende.

Those thynges whiche come after the cause, and are made of the same, are called *effecta*, that is to saie, thynges doene. And euery argument is either deriued from the effecte of the matter, of the forme, or of the efficient cause.

From the effecte of the matter or substance.

called Materia abus ye minus rationis.

He hath a sworde made of Iron: *Ergo* he hath Iron. Here is a house. *Ergo* here is stone and wood.

From the effect of the forme.

A Boule beyng tourned rolleth, *Ergo* it is round.

From the effect of the efficient cause.

It is bright daie: *Ergo* the Sunne is up.

The generall rule.

When the effect is come forthe, it must needes be that either his proper cause is then, or els that it hath been before.

The manner of reasoning.

If slaughter be not to be done in a common weale, then these querephikers, these roisters and lighters are not to be suffered to

god unpunished that is due, against man our wicked god is due
This thing appointed for some ende.



That whiche is appointed for some certain ende and
use, is called a *finis*, as a house is builded to
dwell in. Armour is provided for man to defende
himself. Medicines are meane appointed for man
to recouer health. If we see before that there was
an ende, whiche was an helping ende, and a meane to come to the
perfecte and moste absolute ende, for without this appointed
meane and provision of God, manne could neuer live, muche lesse
could he come to any perfection in this life, as touching the acci-
ons and worthy feates required of man. Thus wee make reason
from this place. Seing it is lawfull for man to defende himself,
it is lawfull for manne to weare a weapon. If warre be lawfull,
then money is necessarie, without whiche no manne can goe for-
ward or set forthe an grail.

The thing
appointed for
some ende.

The general rule.

Those thinges that agree to that, whiche is appointed to the
ende, agree also to the ende it self.

The manner of reasoning.

If a man make lawfully buy the greene Bible in Englands, he
make then also even without as any leane, read it at his pleasure.

The use of syllogismes.

THE commoditie of these syllogismes is so greace, that in ser-
tyng forthe the use of them, a man might rather lacke wor-
des, then want matter. First, we knowe that nothing is
doen without a cause, and therefore seing this word is franted as
it is, every thing proportioned in this due order: wee make fructu-
gathe that there is one above all that ruleth all, whom the Chri-
stian calleth God. In proving or disproving, how can a manne
better proceede, then by reherching the cause of every thing. A
gaine, in examining and searching out the matter of dispute,
by the ende we knowe what is goodfull: by the efficient cause we
know what maye be doen. For whatsoever is profitable, the same
is profitable for some ende, and whatsoever was unprofitable, then
we make some good by the efficient it should have been, &c.

22.ij,

causes

The knowe
ledge of cau-
ses right
needfull.

Showing
the cause

scripture
Cna 2ndy 54
307

The arte of Logike.

causes of iudgement we maie iudge, what will some one manne had to doe this or that, when we consider to what ende he did this or that. Laste of all we knowe hereby, that God hath ordeined nothing in vain, and that euery thing is ordeined for some one ende. The ende of Christes death, was to merite mannes redemption. The ende of mannes life, is to trust wholie in Christes passion, and to liue thereby for ever.

Of thynges outwardly applied, called Applicita.

Thei are called thynges outwardly applied to a matter, whiche are not the cause of the same matter, and yet giue a certaine denomination to it. There be thre of this soyte.

The tyme.

The place.

Thynges annexed, or knit together.

And these thre are nothing els then the thre Medicamentes, or mozte generall places whiche I rehearsed before.

Ubi.

Quando.

Habitus.

Ubi.

Quando.

Ubi.

The manner of doynge.

The place.

The tyme.



For one like to reason from the place, called in Latin *Locus*, he maie thus saie: suche a one is in the countrie: *Ergo* he is not in the citie. If I will proue that a manne beyng accused of murder vniuersally, did not offende: I maie reason both from the tyme and the place. The man was killed in the feldes; about thre of the clocke in the after noone, all whiche tyme this other manne cawne not a-broade. No, he looked nat out of his house all that date: *Ergo* this man did not kill hym. *Clodius* was accused at Rome, that he had made a spoile of the reliques in the Temple of *Bona Dea*, whereas he at the same tyme, when this deede was thought to be don, was at *Interamnus* a village in the countrie beside Rome. *Quintilian* saith thus: Thou hast killed an auenturer, whiche the lawe doeth permit; but because thou hast killed the same man in a *Prothels* house, thou art worthy to dyeth thy self: yea the nature of the place and tyme, maketh much to generall of faultes committed.

A patronelle of haudyte.

The nature of the place and tyme.

ced.

ted. As when one is not afrayed euen in the Church, and that at seruice tyme, to thrust his enemye through like wile to kill a man priuely by the high waie, is thought worthy greater punishment, then if he should kill hym manfully in the open streete, and that in the sight of other. Also to murder one in the darke night is counted moze heinous, then to kill hym in the bright daie. Notwithstanding these twoo places are rather vsed of the *Rhetoriciens*, then among the *Logiciens*: For when a manne is taken of suspicion, wee goe about to proue hym faultie by diuerse coniectures. As if he were aboute the same place at the self same tyme when a man was slain, and also had his sword about him: we coniecture that he might haue killed hym. Againe, if we perceiue one to be a riotous fellowe, readie to fight with euery bodie, accompaniing with naughtie packes, and euermoze at one ende of all fraies, waiping pale when he is apprehended, shakying for feare, or runnyng awaie when he should bee taken: we suspect suche a one that he is not altogether cleare. Therefore *Orators* doe vse to marke thynges that goe before the facte, as whether he hated the man or no, or what gaine he might haue by his death, and also obserue thynges ioyned with the fault, and chaunging of hewe when he is apprehended, or his sword to bee bloude, or any parte of his apparell, and thirdly, thei note what followeth. That is, if he ranne awaie, if he could not tell his tale plainly, and so thei conclude, as thei are ledd by suspicion. Some argumentes are necessarie, some probable, as thus, from the consequent, Suche a woman is brought in bedde with a child: Ergo she hath had the companie of man. Suche a man had a bloude sword in his hand, straight after the death of his neighbour, euen in the same felde where his neighbour was slaine: Ergo it is like this man hath slaine hym. All whiche argumentes are deriued from the place called *Coiniunctio*, as I will shewe it hereafter.

Of wordes annexed, or knit to the substance, called *Connexa*.

W touching woordes knitte ye maiue vnderstande, that thei are ioyned outwardlie to the subiecte, and giue a name vnto hym accordyng as thei are. As riches

Rich.

are

Coniectures

Argumentes necessarie.

Argumentes probable.

Woordes annexed.

The arte of Logike.

Diuision of
a knitt worde

are ioyned to a ritche man, For where as *Crasus* is called a man by his owne substance, yet notwithstanding by his ritcheffe, he is called a ritche man. So is he that hath a wife, is called a housbande. He that hath a maister, is called a seruante. He that hath a father, is called a sonne. Woordes knitte are diuided diuersly, for some are called suche as are nigh, and touching the substance. As to be full of fish, is agreying to the water, to be full of grasse, is annexed or agreying to the earth, to be clondie is annexed or agreying to the ayre. And againe woordes knitte, are called those thynges that a manne weareth, as to weare a Coate, a Jerke, a Harneis, to haue Shoen, to be merie, to be durie, and all suche as are casual to manne. Some are called annexed or agreying, whiche are knitte to manne, and yet not thynges worn vpon his backe, but farther of, and rather perceiued by vnderstandyng, then knowne by eye sight. As Nobilitie, power, fame, authoritie. To be an Officer, a Maior, a Sherief, a Lorde Chancelour Comptroller, or any other officer in the commonweale; all these are annexed to their inferiour, ouer whom they haue authoritie. In this point differ woordes knitte called annexed, from woordes adioyned called *Adiacentia*, that all adiacentes or woordes adioyned, can not bee without the subiecte, as heate, cold, whitenesse, or any other like can not be, excepte they bee comprehended within some subiecte. For it is proper to euery accident, to bee in some one thing containyng him. If there be nothing containyng then the accident can not be. Notwithstanding, woordes knitt are so placed that one is without the other, and maie bee either of the feuerally if the one happen to perishe: as a housbande is without the substance of his wife, and although his wife dye, yet the housbande maie bee on liue still, sauyng that he looleth his name to be called housbande, but if a wiseman dye, wisdomie must decaye also, because it muste needes bee in some one subiecte, or els it can not bee.

Of Accidentes.



Those are here called accidentes, whiche bothe themselves, and the thing also maie be together, the one with an other, and also maie be awaie the one from the other.

There

Thynges chauncyng.
 The name of a thyng.
 There be v. of this sort. Sentences of the Sage.
 The likenesse.
 Thynges compared together.

Thynges chauncyng called Contingentia.
Those accidentes are called thynges chauncyng, which chauce about a thyng, so that whether these thynges chauce or no, the thyng it self mai be, or though the thyng be not, these mai so chauce to be. As for example, paleneſſe mai chance be fore sickneſſe, and the same also mai chance though a manne be not sicke, and a man mai be also sicke, and yet nothyng pale at all. Like wise loue and feare. A man mai loue, although he feare not, a man mai againe feare although he loue not.

Thynges
chauncyng.

The deuorſitie of three diuers places.

Wordes adioyned, wordes knitt to an other, and wordes chauncyng to a thyng differ thus, that in wordes adioyned called *Adiacentia*, the cause why thynges are so framed is euer in the subiect, neither can the wordes adioyned continue, except thei be comprehended within some one subſtaunce. Wordes knitt are of ſuche ſorte, that by meanyng one the other is ſtraight knowne. As when I name a Schoolemaſter, I ſignifie Scholers alſo, although I dooe not expreſſy name them. But in thynges chauncyng called *Contingentia*, we muſt at the leaſt compare two together, that wee mai better knowe them to be of this place. Therefore if I name this worde (craft) by it ſelf, without any further conſideration, then it is an *Adiacent*, or a worde adioyned. If I name this worde (ſeruant) craſtie is referred to the place, called woordes knitted or knitt, conſideryng craſtie is mentioned in reſpect of the ſeruant. If I ſaie thus (a craſtie ſeruant) then theſe two are conſidered to be in this place called *Contingentia*, which is a place of wordes chauncyng to a thyng, ſo that whether thei chaunce or no, the thyng it ſelf mai be or not withſtandyng. As a ſeruant mai be, and yet not craſtie. Again one mai be craſtie, and yet not a ſeruant.

The Names
of wo-
des adioyned

Wordes
knitt.

Woordes
chauncyng.

The diſſon of thynges chauncyng.

Some

The arte of Logike.



Some goe before the thyng, some are ioyned with the thyng, some followe after the thyng.

Thynges chauncyng before. As thus. The skie was redde this moornyng. *Ergo* we are like to haue raine ere night. Thynges ioyned with the matter at the very instant. As thus. Anger is in old men. After fetchyng of winde, declares sicknesse of the Lungen. If the bequeather of maker of any will be on liue, the will taketh no place, and maie be voide. Suche a one goeth gaie in his apparell, spendeth with the best and yet hath nothing to maintain his charges. *Ergo* it is like that he commeth by his goodes naughtily.

Thynges happenyng after. Suche a one is well learned. *Ergo*, he hath gone well to his booke heretofore.

The name of a thyng, or the interpretation of a worde.

Same of a
thyng.
The inter-
pretation of
a worde.



The interpretation of name of a thyng, is a woorde made by the agreement of men, to signifie this or that. As *Philosophus* is that manne whatsoeuer he be, that hath a desire and a loue to the knowledge of wisdom. Therefore if ye well expoune what a philosopher is, you maie reason thus: from the interpretation of the worde. Whosoever he be that hath an earnest loue to philosophie, and seeketh knowledge thereof, that man is a philosopher.

Cato hath an earnest loue to philosophie, and seeketh knowledge thereof.

Ergo, *Cato* is a philosopher.



Any wittie men take occasion to reason pleasantly vpon the interpretation of a worde. As I remember a wittie man, and a worthie man also did, who enuetyng at a tyme against Cardinall Boole, and beyng brehement in the cause of his countrie, laied thus in the midst of his heate, a Boole, a hurle Boole, as though his name declared his ill nature. The telling of this makes me to remember an other. I knew one whose name was called Pope, & beyng occasioned to folowe the lawe, concerning a matter of lande at the first suppressio of the Popes whole power, at what time in deede straight commaundement was given, not to call hym by that name

name: this name being of the same name, and partly of kindred also concerning opinion (as the Deuill would haue it) durst not once for his life shewe his hedde, for feare his name should betray his whole nature, and in deede hauing a more fearfull hart, then neede was, thought that it might iustly be compted offence great enough in hym, that it was his euill hap, to haue suche an odious and euill name; the whiche all men as then did, euery where almoste, with out ward looke vtterly detest. And in deede (the pro- uerbe saith) he is halfe hanged, that hath an euill name. The whiche sentence, this man I thinke, not well vnderstandyng, remembred it ouer wel and was rather content to lose all, then that this painfull name should lose hym, and cast his bodie quite a waie for ever.

Againe, the interpretation of a thyng, is then thought to be, when a Metaphore or translation is vsed, & the meaning thereof taken. As when this worde *Ignis* (fire) betokeneth loue. As there as of the diuin nature it signifyeth fire, as we reade in *Onid*, thus.

Quis enim celeratuit ignem;

Luminis qui semper proditur ipse suo.

Who can keepe close the fire, or hide the burning heate

That doth betraie it self alwaie with light of flame so great

Wherein is nothing els signified but loue, whiche is so hotte of it self, that it must needs breake out into flames, and shewe it self, at one tyme, or other.

The generall rule.

To whom the interpretation of a Rhoine doeth agre, to the same also the Rhoine it self agreeth.

The manner of reasoning.

Suche a child is called Dawson, and he may well be so called, for his father is but a Dawie.

Of the places called authorities, or borrowes named sentences of the Sage.

Suche testimonies may bee called sentences of the sage, whiche are brought to confirme any thyng, either taken out of old authorities, or els such as haue been p- in this common life. As the sentences of noble men, the lawes

Authorities
speache or
metaphore.

Authorities
or sentences
of the Sage.

The Arte of Logike.

Testimonies
waies vied:

Aristotles
mende, as
touching the
worlde.

Sentences
grafted in vs
by nature.

In any realme, quicke saynges, proverbes, that either haue been
vled heretofore, or be now vled. Histories of wise Philosophers,
the iudgements of learned men, the common opinion of the mul-
titude, olde custome, auncient fashions, or any suche like. Testi-
monies are twoo waies considered. For either they are suche as
partaune to God, or els to man. Those auctorities whiche come
from God, and are spoken by the holle ghoste, are undoubtedlye
true, neither can they bee false: therefore, wee ought moste reue-
rentlie so receiue the worde of God, and agree to suche textes, as
are written and spoken, euen as though we heard God hymself
speake, with liuely voyce vnto vs. Hannes auctoritie hath no
suche greate force, althoughe noble men, learned Philosophers,
and stoute Capitaines, haue pronounced many thinges moste
wisely. For although *Aristotles* saith, that the worlde neither
had beginning, nor yet at any tyme shall haue ending: I mai-
reiecte this sayng (if any man bring me it for his confirmation)
although this greate Philosopher did pronounce the same. For,
excepte I be perswaded by reason, it is in my choise rather to ad-
mit, or refuse suche auctorities. Notwithstanding, we should
not forsake wise mens wordes rashely, but with a modest au-
swere, desire the aduertisie, not so muche to sticke to his auctho-
ritie, as to moue the same by good reason. In prophane thinges,
ye maie reason affirmatiuely very well, as thus. The best thin-
ges are first to bee learned, for, so doeth *Quintilian* teach, *Nus-
quam in a fides*. It is hard trusting any body. For, so saith *Vir-
gil*. But I can not reason negatiuely, when I bring mine auctho-
ritie out of prophane auctours. For, I reason amisse if I say.
There is no suche disease, called the *Frenche Porceus*, because
Galenus the chiefe of Physicians, neuer maketh mention in all his
bookes of any suche disease. For, this euill hath crept in since his
tyme, through the naughty melle of men. And although it were
then, yet maie it bee that he neuer heard of it. Whereunto might be
added all such sentences, as by the lawe of Nature are grafted in
man. As these following. Doe as thou wouldest be doen vnto.
Be thankfull to hym that doeth thee a pleasure. Honour thy fa-
ther and thy mother. Knowe there is a GOD. Doe that hurteth
thee

these opinions, naturally fastened in his harte, he maie lustily be thought rather a beaste, then man endued with reason.

In matters of Scripture, I maie reason both affirmatiuely, and negatiuely. Christe saith to his Disciples, *Reges Gentium dominantur, vos autem non sic*. Kynge beare rule ouer countreies, but you must not doe so. Therefore, no Priesters should haue any Temporal powet, because Christe saith so. We maie reason negatiuely thus, we reade not in all the scripture, from Genesis, to the Reuelation of sainte Ihon, that euer there was Frier, Ponke, Rumm or Chanon, *Ergo*, lette them goe from whence they came. We reade not in the Scripture, that worshyping of Images, was euer allowed to be Lay mennes Bookes: therefore, take doune suche Idollcs, and let them serue for other vses.

The generall rule for prophane authoritties. That whiche is allowed of all wise men, or at the least by the better parte: no man ought rashly to gaine saie it, or thus. Euery cunning man must be beleued in his owne arte.

The manner of reasoning.

A Reasonable thought better, that vnkardes should haue double punishment: Therefore, they deserue it. By verses of the Scripture, wee maie reason the matter, as thus. Cursed bee he that doeth the wooke of the Loyde guilefully, saith the Prophete. *Ergo* euill Bishoppes, loyterpug Pastours, are accursed of God.

Of the similitude, or likenesse.

Similitude is, when two thynges or more, are so compared together, that euen as in the first, there is one propertie: So in the other there is a like propertie, according to boche their natures seuerally obserued. For like as water by continuance, weareth a Stone, so there nothing so hard, but by tynie it maie bee compassed, or brought to passe. As Spiders make their owne Cobwebbes without any other helpe: so some good fellows say bying by newes, and tell straunge tales, without any hearing, when there is not one woorde true. As the Palme tree being ouerlaid with weightes, riseth higher and buddeth bywarde more freashely: so a noble stomacke vered

D. is.

with

No Friers
ne any other
suche mentio-
ned in Scrip-
ture.
Images.

Similitude;

The Arte of Logike.

with muche aduerſitie, is euermore the ſlower. And this ought diligentlie to bee obſerued, that the thyng whiche is brought to make the ſimilitude, be like vnto that, whiche is proued.

The maner of finding out a ſimilitude.

The maner
of finding out
a ſimilitude.

In euery cauſe, that we do purpoſe to handle at large, we muſt obſerue diligently, what thinges are ſpoken by tranſlations, that is, from the proper ſignification, to a meanyng that is not proper. As ſpeaking in the praiſe of a thing, and calling by hym the bright Sunne of the yearth. I maie gather a ſimilitude by this woorde (Sunne) and make it thus. Euen as the Sunne onely geueth light to all the whole yearth: ſo there ought to be in a common weale, one kyng that ſhould be ruler ouer all.

The generall rule.

Of ſimilitudes there is like iudgement, that is, euen as wee thinke of the one, ſo maie we thinke of the other.

The maner of reaſonyng.

As a Dog ſtandynge at the table ſide, eateth that by by and by, whiche his maſter hath caſt to hym, and euer looketh for more and more: ſo ſome when they haue receiued a liuyng, for whiche they hoped before, by and by they are ready to take an other, and although they be full, yet ſtill they are hungrye.

Of thinges compared.

Thyngeſ
compared.

Compariſons are compared together in one third woord, wherunto they bothe doe agree, as thus. If theſe bee worthe death, then murder is worthe no leſſe. Here ye ſee, that theſe and murder are compared together, in one thirde woorde, whiche is death. Comparatiſons are deuided twon maner of wayes, for, either they bee equall, or not equall. They are equall in this wiſe: if the father haue auctoritie ouer his ſonne, he hath alſo auctoritie ouer his daughter.

Comparatiſ
ons two way
es deuided.

The generall rule.

Where thinges are equall, there muſt nedes be equal iudgement. Comparatiſons are vnequall, when I reaſon either from the greater to the leſſe, or els from the leſſe, to the greater. Fro the greater, to the leſſe, ye may reaſon thus. If a capitaine with his whole cōpantie, be not able to ſicke a town much

muche lesse one base souldier, can be able to doe it. The Schole-
maister can not vnderstande the Greeke, or the Hebrue tongue,
muche lesse can the scholler, whiche neuer learned either of them.

From the lesse to the greater, ye maie reason affirmatiuely,
as thus. Children can suffer muche colde, and can not yong men
beare a frost: Custome beareth swinge, and shall reason take no
place: Women haue died for their countrie, therefore, maie not
men be ashamed to feare death: Noble men are desirous to haue
a good hoxsekeeper, that can keepe their hoxses well, and thei spare
not, to geue greate stipendes to suche: and shall thei not muche
moye be desirous, to haue a good scholemaister, that might god-
lie byng vp their children, in vertue and wisdom? If a hoxse
be not well broken, the owner will see that he maie be made gen-
tle and shall not a man, seying his naturall child euill brought vp,
take paines and see hym brought to some good order? We can
see a Spaulian, a syent, a rymboane, or sutche other diseale in a
hoxse, and shall we not be as readie to looke, that there be no faul-
tes in our children, or in the teacher, to whom we giue the charge
to byng them vp in learnyng, and good maners?

Hoxses faul-
tes are sone
seen, but chil-
dres maners
are neuer
marked.

¶ The generall rule.

If that, whiche semeth to be greater, bee not added, neither
shall that be added, whiche is the lesse. Againe if that, whiche is
lesse be added, that whiche is greater shall be added also.

¶ The maner of reasoning.

The scholer vnderstandeth Latine, Ergo his scholemaister
also hath knowledg in the same tongue. Negatiuely thus, If
GOD will not allowe a bowe, made by the daughter, without
the knowledg of the father, although the bowe bee but for one
dole: how muche lesse, shall that mariage take place, when yong
folke make yfaine contractes, without the good will, either ob-
tained, or yet once sought for of their parentes.

I bowe.

¶ An obseruation for thinges compared.

This one thyng would bee learned: when thinges are com-
pared together: to knowe whether thei be in that point, either
equall, or vnequall. As for example, Suche a Loyde is not lear-
ned, no; nor with neither: therefore, none of his meyns are either

Dis.

learned

The Arte of Logike.

**A rule for
things com-
pared.**

learned or wise. In this point there should be made no compar-
yng betwixt the lord and his seruant. For, all wittie men be
not therefore Lordes, no, nor yet all Lordes, bee therefore wittie
men. No, no, euen the greatest lacke sometimes, as well as o-
ther poore men doe. Some by inheritance are honourable, some
by faithfull seruice towarde the King, and their countie, are
highly promoted: some againe, by bolde enablings themselves,
and some by chusing on, choope in as a windowe, when the
dore is shutte vp. Therefore, thus I might reason better. Such
a lord hath small landes, and little substances, therefore his men
being more in number, then his landes can well maintaine, and
hangyng onely one his fleue, liuing without any other trade, but
onely their bare wages, are better able to borrowe, then to lende.
and must needs bee very needie, and yet perhaps maye be more
learned, yea, and wittier also then is their Lord and master.

An other argument.

Poore subiectes get boyes, and shall not mightie Kinges be
able to get children: Herein is no comparing at all; such
as is requyred. For, a kyng is not therefore so called, because
he can get children, but because he is a main of power, and orde-
ned of God to rule, for the punishment of vice, and maintenance
of vertue. Therefore, thus I maye reason right well: The King
ruleth: Ergo the subiectes must obeye.

The use.

This place helpeth muche to exhorte, especially when wee
reason from the lesse, to the greater, or contrary. Neither
can any one that teacheth, want the vse hereof, if the pur-
pose, that their saynges shall take place.

Of repugnancie.

Repugnancie.

Repugnancie is suche a discrep-
yng that no one thing can bee the same, that the other is, by
one nature or substance, as thus. Man, and vertue, the
one can not be the same, that the other is.

The diuision.

**Repugnanc-
ies, two way-
es diuided.**

Things repugnancie, are diuided into discordantes, and in-
to wordes differing one from an other, by any manner of meanes.

Of

Of discordantes, called opposita.



Discordantes are, when onely one worde or sentence, is contrary to an other, so that the one can not be the same, that the other is, nor yet both at one tyme, and in one place, and in one respecte can be in one, and the same subiecte, as hotte and colde, the father and the sonne, light and blindnesse, light and darkenesse, cannot be at one and the same time, in one and the same place, of any one substance. For, though one bee blinde of one eye, and see with the other, yet wee can not saie, that thinges discordant, are in one and the same substance, For, the subiecte or substance of light or blindnesse, is not properly the man, but the very place self, where the light or blindnesse is. So that blindnesse and light, are not bothe in one place, and therefore, not bothe in one substance together. For, the brasse, the bealle, the legges or armes, are not the substance of the eye, but the place onely, where the eye hath his naturall beyng.

Discordantes,

There be foure of this sorte.

Contraries.

Relatiues.

Privation.

Contradiction.



Contraries, are suche discordantes, as can not be, at one and the same tyme, in one substance: nor withstanding, they maye bothe seuerally bee, in two subiectes, or substances, at one and the same tyme. As whitenesse, blackenesse, vertue, and vice, wisdom, and foolishnesse. Contraries, are twoo waies considered, for, some bee suche, that if the one be not the other must needs followe, and they are called in Latine contraria immediata, that is to saie, contraries where nothing cometh betwene. As thus, A wise man, a foole. Vertue, vice, Faith, unbelief. All these are suche, that if the one be not in a man, the other must needs be. As thus, Suche a one is wise, Ergo, he is no foole. If a man be not wise, it must needs be that he is foolish. These are saide by sayles. Ergo, we are condemned by unbelief.

Contraries.

Contraries
two waies
taken.

Againe, other contraries be so, that though the one be a waie, yet the other followeth not therefore necessarily. For, blacke and

white

The Arte of Logike.

white bee contrary, and yet they bee not so contrary, that if the white colour be not, the other must needs bee. For, a man maie be high coloured, or fallowe coloured, and yet not blacke. Therefore in suche contraries, where some thing maie be put betweene the extremes, it is no good reason to saie, that if the one bee not the other must needs be, and the reason is, that vnto euery singular and seuerall contraries of suche sorte, there be diuers other contrary vnto theim, as the white come betwixt in the absence of other. As if a cloth be not white, it is no reason to call it blacke. For, it maie be blew, greene, redde, russette, tawnie, yellowe, or any other colour els, as it shall best please the Dier. Note further, that all discordances are not contrary, accordyng to their generall woorde, or common accidentes, but accordyng to their proper difference. For, if we reason thus,

Fire is an element.

Ergo water is none.

The argumente is not good, for fire and water are not contrary, accordyng to their generall woorde, whiche agreeth to them bothe, but accordyng to their proper differences, as in that fire is hotte and drye, it is contrary to water, whiche is colde and moist. Thus some that maineined counterfected chastitie, were wont to reason against marriage, takyng an occasion vpon that place of S. Paule, where he saith: it is not good to touche a woman, where he meaneth nothing els, but considering the Gospell then requyred speedie preachers, and that it were a clogge to bee married, and some what an hinderaunce to those that should trauaile; he thought it expedient to forbear. Not that he condemned marriage, or yet thought women to be detrailes.

Chastitie is good like this.

Therefore marriage is not good.

Where as Chastitie and Marriage, are not contrary accordyng to their generall woorde, whiche is (good) but accordyng to their proper difference: As thus.

Chastitie is a single life, without knowledge of carnall acte.

Therefore, marriage is not so.

Therefore

Therefore this worde (good) in the aboue rehearsed argument doeth signifie a thing graunted of God, and allowed by his will, whiche doeth a goodly comprehend marriage, as it doeth virginittie therefore this argument is of no more force, then if I should saie.

Justice is good. Ergo, temperance is not good.

And yet there is no man but will saie, that bothe these twoo verbes are good. So thus.

Gentlemen haue soules. Ergo, poore men haue none.

Whereas GOD hath giuen bothe high and lowe, riche and poore, the spirite that shall liue ever. But this I speake, to sette for the more at large the soundnesse of the other argument, concerning marriage.

The general rule.

But awaie one of these contraries, where nothing cometh betweene, called *immediata contraria*, and the other must needs followe, whiche in nature is in these contraries, where something cometh betweene them called *contraria mediantia*.

Relatiues are those whiche are comparing themselfe to some other. As a Father, a Sonne, a Brother, a Seruant, a King, a Subject.

The great axiome.

If one of the Relatiues bee, the other must haue beene if the one be not, the other cannot be neither.

The manner of reasoning.

Thou art my seruant, why doest thou not knowe me to be thy Master? Thou art a subject, and wilt thou take in hand to rule.

Distinction is the absence of that thing in a substance, whiche by nature ought to haue beene there.

The habit is the wanting of that thing in the substance, whiche Nature hath graunted to be there.

The general rule.

Every distinction is the destruction of that, whiche by nature was.

The manner of reasoning.

The arte of Logike.

As Augustine saith, If I saie a man is blind, I mean not that he cannot see, but that he hath no sight. **Impossibility** is called a supposition, because it is the absence of that thing, which either by nature was, or might haue been in the substance. Neither doeth any man call a stone blind, because nature hath utterly denied the gift of seeing to all stones.

Deane,

Supposition is false supposition, because it is the destruction of that greates goodnesse which God powred into mannes. And therefore God iustly punisheth those that haue forsaken his grace.

¶ Sentences gainisaying otherwise

called contradiction.

Sentences
gainisaying.

Sentences gainisaying are two Propositions, the one denying that which the other affirmeth, as thus. Christ is in the Sacrament really: Christ is not in the Sacramente really. It can not bee, but one of these two Propositions must needs be false.

The general rule. If one of these two Propositions bee granted to be true, the other must needs be granted to be false. For they can not be by any means possible, that bothe of them should either bee true or false, at one and the same tyme. It waies moueth that there be no doubtfullnesse in the wordes: for if one word signifie diuersly, then maie bothe Propositions bee either true or false, at one and the same tyme. As thus, I haue a stone, and I haue a stone.

Christen
fleshe.

¶ The fleshe of Christ profiteth greatly.

¶ The fleshe of Christ profiteth nothing at all.

In these two Propositions there is no contradiction or gainisaying, but that they bothe maie be true, at one and the same tyme considering they are bothe thusly spoken: Christes fleshe eaten and chewed with our teethe profiteth nothing: Christes fleshe toyme vpon the Crosse profiteth much, as she which purchaseth to all beleeuers life for euer.

¶ The manner of freisaying.

If we bee iustified freely through the onely merites of Iesus Christ, then this is false, that we are not iustified onely through the merites of Iesus Christ: for he is true: Ergo this is false.

The

Of p[ro]p[ri]ation, contradiction, and of contraries that immediat-
ly followe, conditionall argumentes are made, with the addition
of some one condition, of the which when the one is true, the o-
ther must nedes be false, as thus Either the soule is immortall, or
els it is not immortall, but the first is true: Ergo, the second is false.

Of wordes differing.

When haue we the vse of this place when we reason,
and p[ro]oue that one thing is not the same that the o-
ther is, as King *Lud* is not the same that *Iulius*
Cesar or *Brutus* was: King *Lud* builded London,
of whom the citie hath his name, being called *Lud*-
des towne, and after ward by alteration of letters called London.
Ergo neither *Cesar*, nor *Brutus* builded the same. Discrepantes
called *opposita*, are not the same that wordes differing are, called
differentia. As much as where discrepantes be one thing onely,
is set against an other one. As for example, Nothing can be set
against brightnesse as discrepant; but darkenesse, nothing
can be set against heate but onely cold, and so in other. But in this
place there maie many thynges differ from soine one thyng, and
whatsoever is not the same that an other is, maie be called a word
differing, in Latine *differeus*, or *disparatus*. *Sacerdos* is a man,
Ergo, he is not an ore, a stone, a houle, or any other thyng els.

Wordes
differing.

King *Lud*.

Thynges differ fouer waies; either by innuoying. As euery
lingular man differeth one from an other: *Iames* is one, and *Iohn*
is an other. Other differ in their kinde; when they are comprehen-
ded under diuers kinde, *Francis* of *Hampton*, and *Arundell* his
hoise; Or els *Alexander* and *Bucephalus*, or *Brutus* with *A-*
lexander, are comprehended under man as their kinde and speci-
all, but *Arundell* and *Bucephalus*, are comprehended vnder
this worde hoise, which is kinde or speciall vnto them bothe. O-
ther differ by the generall worde, when they are comprehended
vnder diuers generall wordes, as this worde Baptisme, and
Baptisme, the one comprehendynge vnder a Sacrament of God,
the other vnder a certaine ordinance of God. Lastly, wordes
differ by their moode, generation, when they are placed in diuers

Thynges
differ fouer
waies.

The arte of Logike.

Predicamentes. A kyng, and manhood, the one is placed among the Relatiues, the seconde is in qualitie.

The generall ryle.
Wee can not make thynges that dooe muche differ, to bee of one nature.

The manner of reasoning.
Wee reason from wordes differyng negatively altogether, From suche as differ in number, we reason thus,

Suche a one is called Thomas, therefore he is not the same that Iohn is. Peter is not Paule, nor yet Paule is Peter. Faith is not woothes, nor yet woothes are faithe.

From suche as differ in kinde, thus, I am a man, therefore I should not be bled like a brute beast.

From suche as differ by the generall woorde.

I did borrowe plain clothe of thee, and why dost thou require raised Velvet of me?

From suche as differ in Predicament.

Vertue is a qualitie of the minde, therefore it is no substance.

Alse maketh
maistries.



After knowledge attained, exercise is moste necessary. And happie shall he be that vnto skill addeth practise, for then learnyng is beste confirmed, when knowlege is put in vze.

Therefore, consideryng I haue set forth the places, I thinke it necessary after knowlege of the same, to describe matter by euery one of them as they lye in order: that other maie likewise, whē any question commeth in controuersie, go through the places the selues with it, and examine euery woode by euery seuerall place.

And to make this thyng moze plaine, I will goe through the places with one certaine woode; and looke what helpe I shall finde there for knowlege of the same. The woode shall be (a Kyng) or (a Pagistrate.)

A kyng declared by the
places of
Logike.

The definition.
The definition of a Pagistrate. Every Kyng or Pagistrate is the minister of God for a good ende, to the punishing of naughty persones, and to the comfortyng of goodlie men.

The

¶ The general rule.

The Minister of God.

¶ The kinde.

Either a tyrant or a goodlie King, the one ruleth accordyng to his luste, the other accordyng to right and iustice.

¶ Wordes yoked.

The Officer, the Office, to beate an Office, if the Officer can not be spared, the Officer can not be spared.

Adiacentes necessarilie ioyned.

Wisedome, earnest labour, cunning in sciences, skilfull boche of warre and peace, these all must nedes be in every Magistrate

Adiacentes adioyned casually.

To be liberall, to be frugall, to be of a temperate life, all these happen to be in good Magistrates.

¶ Deedes necessarie.

To defende Religion, to enacte goodlie Lawes, to punishe offenders, to defende the oppressed: all these are necessarie in a King, and are neuer founde in a tyrant.

¶ The thyng containyng.

Boyses, David, Salomon, Ezechias, Iosias, Charles the Emperour, Edward the sixt of that name kyng of Englande.

¶ The efficient cause.

God hymself, or els the ordinaunce of God.

¶ The seconde efficient cause.

Unquiet Subiectes, Rebelles, Disobedient people, are the cause why Magistrates are ordeined, that the rather they maie be ruled and kept in good order.

The ends of a Magistrate.

This ende he muste nedes obserue, that alwaies the people liue in quietnes, and in honest conuersation passe their whole life.

The effect, or els the thyngs doen by a Magistrate.

Peace is made, the Realme enriched, all thynges plenteous, but where a tyrant ruleth, all thynges are contrarie.

¶ The authoritie.

The rule to the Romaines, lette every soule be subiecte to the powers. *¶ Peter. ij. Be subiecte to the kyng.*

¶ Is. ij.

Thynges

The arte of Logike.

Thynges incident.

The Scepter is a token of Justice, even as a Swoorde is a signe of reuengement or wrathe, payng of Subsidies, Taxes, Tributes, Rente, or any suche like, promyn of the Garde, and all other waiters, Soldiours in warre, the obedience of the subiectes, the honour giuen to hym, triumphes made, running at the Call, fightyng at the Barriers, fightyng at the tourney. All these are *contingencia* to a Kyng, that is, although these thynges be not in a commonwealthe, yet maie there be a Kyng, yea; and although there be no Kyng in some Commonweale, yet these thynges maie be euery one of them, as it was in *Athens* where the people had the rule of the Commonweale, and all was referred to their iudgement.

Similitudo.

Gouernance.

That whiche is the Shepherde is to the Sheepe, the same is the Magistrat to his Subiectes. That whiche the master of the Shippe is to the Shippe, or the Pastor of an householde to his house, or the hedde to the whole bodye the same is the Magistrat to his Subiectes.

Thynges comparyng.

Obedience.

Seruantes must be obedient, and subiect to their Masters with all reuerence, as we read in the Scripture: how much more then should the Subiectes bee obedient to their Kyng and soueraigne Lorde, whiche by the ordinaunce of God is appointed to rule, and to haue the gouernance ouer them.

Gatheryng
of argumentes.

Ye maie see by this one example, that the searching of places ministereth argumentes plentifully. For, if we will proue a Magistrat necessarie, ye maie reason from the definition, from the causes, from the authoritie, from the thyng contaynyng, from the aduerentes, from the similitude, and make good reasons for the purpose. Notwithstandyng, I thinke it not necessarie, that ye searche all the places at euery tyme, and for euery matter. But that ye searche moste parte of them. And although wee can not finde a good argumente in euery one of them, yet it is well if wee maie gather but three or foure good argumentes. As when we goe into a garden, we shall not finde all beedes growyng there.

although

although we searche every corner, so when we looke in all the places of invention for the prooffe of our matter, wee shall not finde in every place a good argumente for our purpose. Notwithstanding it is moste necessarie, either when we will proue a matter our self, or els trie an others labour, whiche is set for the at large moste eloquently: Cobyng the whole sonning of his long tale to these places, and make an argument in three lines of that, which he videreth into three theates.

The vse of
Logike.

And for our self, if wee will reason a water carretty, it shall bee profitable to see our owne argumentes before hande, deriued out of the places, the whiche shall make vs moze bolde to speake, when we shall euidently perceiue our owne reasons surely grounded. And the better able wee shalbe to confirme our owne cause, and to auoide all objections, when wee knowe surely by this arte wherunto we maie leane. For although other shall imperbe our doynge, and wrest our wordes, yet we shall bee able euermoze to keepe our owne, when we plainly perceiue whereof our argumente hath his grounde. Thus speake wisely whiche neuer trade Logike, but to speake wisely with iudgement, and to knowe the better foundation of thynges: that can none dooe, excepte they haue some skill in this arte.

Therefore, what difference there is betwixt a blinde manne, and hym that seeth, the same difference is betwixt a wiseman vnlearned, and a wiseman learned. We haue set the commoditie of this arte by this one word (Illustrate) whiche I doo apply to every place, that might giue any light for the making of an argument. Now ye shall haue a question sette forthe, and dothe the partes of a Proposition, referred to the places of Invention, that thereby ye maie knowe wherein the places doe agree, and wherein they doe not. For whereas the places agree (that is to saie, all thynges are referred to the one, that are referred to the other) there the Proposition is good, and the latter parte of the Proposition is truly spoken of the firste. But where the places doe not agree (that is to saie) some thynges are referred to the one, and some that are not referred to the other: there the thynges them selues can not agree. I will vse this question for an example, whether it

bee

The arte of Logike.

The Charge of priests, proued by Logike.

bee lawfull for a Priest to marrie a wife, or no. And firste of all I will examine a Priest, and applie hym to all the places. Next after that, wee will referre a wife to all the places, and see when wee haue doen, wherein these twoo dooe agree, and wherein they doe not agree.

From the definition.

A Preacher is a Clerke or Shepheard, whiche will giue his life for his Shepe, instructed to set forth the kpngdome of God, and desirous to liue vertuouly: a faithfull and a wise Steward, whom the Lorde doeth sette ouer his house, that he maie giue the houtholde seruantes meate in due tyme.

From the generall words.

A Minister, a seruant of God, a holie man, a Gospeller, the Minister of God, should bee byright in liuyng, faithfully be shewing the woordes of truth.

From the kinde.

Peter, Paule, Iohn Baptist, Claie, Eloyas, and Stephen, Ambrose beeyng a temporall man, was after that a minister of the church. Chrysostome became of a lawier, an earnest preacher of Gods woorde. Yea, Peter and Androwe bothe were fishers, therefore temporall men maie be called if they be worthy, and desire the spirituall function.

Chrysostome.

From the properie.

To be meeke to teach, to be godlie wise, to doe, and to teach all thynges that they are commaunded by Gods booke. Saincte Hierome in his Epistle to Nepotianus, as touchyng the life of Preachers saith thus, I will not haue thee pleade causes, and to be a tynnyng tangle without all reason, but I will haue thee to be a faithfull Minister of the Sacramentes, and verie skilfull in the Lawes of the Lorde.

S. Hierome.

The whole.

To be brought vp in the scriptures euen from his yowth, to be godlie in conuersation, and wholie to be instructed with all thynges necessarie for a Preacher, whosoener is thus armed, is worthy to bee a Minister in the Church of God. This argument is deriued from the whole.

The

The partes.

To inuent matter out of the scripture, according to the aptnesse of his hearers, to decke his dopages handsomely, to place his sentences in order, to remember what he speaketh, and to vtter his wordes distinctly, plainly, and with loude voice.

Thynget yoked together.

A preaching, a preacher, to doe the woork of a preacher, 1. Timothe. iiii. He that by his preaching edifieth, the same man is a preacher.

1. Timothe. iiii.

Thynget cleaunyng or adiayned to the substance.

Labour, diligence, witte, knowledge, schietie, gentlenesse, vertue, Mariage, an earnest desire to byng by his children well with other suche. A Bishoppe must be without fault, the husband of one wife, watchfull, sober, modest, herberous, apte to teache, no greate drinker of wine, no fighter, not giuen to filthie lucre, but vpright, voide from brawling, from coueteousnesse. &c. 1. Timothe. ii.

1. Timothe. ii.

The manner of dayng.

To feede Chyistes flocke, to putte his life in daunger for the flocke committed to his charge, to byng by his flocke and familie in the feare of God, in the knowledge of his worde, and in due obseruation of the same.

The thyng containyng.

Hierome in the firste booke of the commentaries, whiche he made vpon the Galathians. 1. Let vs not thinke, that the Gospell resteth in wordes of Scripture, but in sense, not in the outward rounde, but in the very harte, not in the leaues, but in the very roote of reason. Let the woordes of Chyiste dwell plenteously in you, with all wisdom. Col. iii.

Hierome.

The matter.

The worde of God, the olde Testament, and the new. Act. 1. Beholde, I haue giuen my wordes into thy mouthe.

The shape or forme.

The shape maie be taken of the conuersation, speache, spirite, & the manner of preachers liuyng.

The efficien cause.

Q. 1.

God

1. Corin. ii. GOD hymself, the Scripture, good Preachers, Euangeli-
 stes, the Loyde will giue his worde to those that preache plenti-
 fully. Psalm. lxxvi. I haue planted, Apollo hath watered, but
 God giueth increase.

The ende.

The ende of Preachyng is, that the wicked might be conuer-
 ted to repentance, and the iuste man kepte in his vppryght liuyng
 Ezech. lii.

Thynge done by vertue of the cause.

Acts. iii. To winne men to Christ, to make mens consciences quete,
 to moue them to praier. When Peter made a Sermon out of
 hande, there was aboute three thousande conueried to the faith of
 the Gospell, that self same daie.

*What is appointed to hym, and
 proper to this reasoning.*

To studie earnestly, and searche the scriptures, that he maie
 proue a true minister of God, to liue a good life, and seke to kepe
 a householde, that he maie be herberous.

The place.

1 Ion. xviii. The Church, the pulpite, the vestiarte, the chauncell. I spake
 openly in the Synagoge, saith Christe, and in the Church to all
 the Jewes that came thether, and I spake nothyng in coyners.

The tyme.

A yong man, an elderly man, an olde man, to preache early
 and late. 1 Timoth. iii. Let no man contemne thy youth.

Thynge annexed.

To haue some stypende for his Preachyng. Moyses is the
 labourer to haue his wages. Math. x.

The other places folowynge, because they are not absolutely
 considered, but referred to some other, and ever haue respecte to
 the nexte worde, whiche is rehearsed in the question of that
 whiche went before, they can not seuerally bee handled in one
 worde: and therfore, ye must marke the whole question, and in
 one argumente comprehend aswell the wise, as the minister.
 Now therfore, ye shall haue this worde *wor* (a wife) described
 throughout the places.

The

The definition.

A wife, is a woman that is lawfullie receiued into the fellowship of life, for the encrease, or getting of children, and so to auoide fornication.

A wife.

The generall rule.

A wife, is a woman.

The kinde.

A chaste wife, a learned wife, a manerlie wife, or els ye maie vse the proper names of women, for the kinde it self. As *Lucrétia, Cornelia, Portia, Hippocrata, &c.*

The properties.

To hyng for the children.

The whole.

The whole woman her self altogether.

The partes.

The hedde, the breast, the armes, the backe, the thigh, the harte, the vaines, bloud, and fleshe.

Words asked.

Housewife, like to doe the woork of a wife. She doeth the dutie of a good wife: Ergo she is a wife. She handleth all thinges housewifely: Ergo she is a good housewife.

Words aduyned.

The loue in marriage, care ouer the familie, keeping of her self to one housebando, to bee obedient vnto hym, loue of her children, losse of her children.

The manner of doynge.

To be obedient, to be shyewshaken, to be knappethe, to hyng vp her children well, to liue in marriage with her housebando, both at bedde, and at honye, according to the will of God.

The thing answered.

The woman her self.

The matter and forme.

The bodie, and soule, or the woman, and the manne, are the matter of marriage, the coniunction it self, is the forme of it.

The efficient cause.

D. J.

God

The Arte of Logike.

1. Tim. iii.
Genesis. i.

God hymself, the scripture, let a manne be the housebnde of one wife. Thei shall be two in one fleshe. The cause that one woman is married to a seuerall person, and liketh hym before all other, and the man her in like wise: is God hymself firste, that kindeleth suche affections, next after, their consente, and full agreement, doeth make by all the matter.

The ends.

To byng for the chyldren, and to keepe them saufe, and to a uoide tyme.

The effects.

Chyldren Godly instructed, the house well ordered.

Thynge appointed for some ends.

To please her housebnde, to liue a good life, to prouide thynges necessarie for the furniture of her housholde.

The place.

The house, the chamber of wedlocke, the hall, or parlour.

The tyme.

Aristotles.
mynde, what
tyme menne
and maidens
should mary.

Boreas begett
hopes.

A yongewoman, or an olde. *Aristotles* saith, it is meette for men to marie at fye & thirtie, for maidens to marie at eightene, but then was then, and now is now, all thynges in this worlde, are ripe before their tyme. I meane, not that honestie it self is so, for I neuer knewe it ripe as yet, but neuer rawe. But thus ye see the tyme of marriage, was not so hastily looked for, as it is now. In this worlde a chyld shall scant be out of his shell, but he shall be sure to one, or other, the whiche I doubt, whether it maie bee called a marriage, or no: for, those that be of ripe yeares, no man doubteth, but if thei can agree bothe, and haue their frendes good will (for, that ought to be sought for, and also obtayned) the marriage is allowed before God.

Wendes annexed, or knytte together.

Marriage is referred to this place, for a wife is so called, because she hath a housebnde, neither can any woman be called a wife, except she haue a housebnde, therefore, she is placed among the wordes annexed, that is, whert one thyng is knytte to an other, so that the one can not be, except the other be also.

Now, that we haue diuided these wordes, the preacher, and the

the wife after this sort, throughout the places, so farre as wee coulde: we should compare them together, and see wherein they doe agree, and wherein they varie. Let vs compare the definitions together, and wee shall finde somewhat euen there, where these wordes be (desiring to liue vertuously) which shall giue light for an argument, as thus.

From the
definition.

Who soeuer desireth to liue vertuously, must
marrie a wife.

Every true preacher of Gods word, desireth to liue vertuously.

Ergo every true preacher must marrie a wife.

Now, if myne aduersarie will denie the proposition at large, called the *Maior*, then can I doe no good with it, excepte I finde somewhat in the definition of a wife, which is agreyng to this aboue rehearsed proposition. I finde in this worde (wife) that she is married for the increase of children, and to auoide fornication. Then I reason thus, for the confirmation of my purpose by the argument, called *Sorites*.

Who soeuer desireth to liue vertuously, desireth to auoide fornication.

Who soeuer desireth to auoide fornication, and cannot obtaine it by prayer, or otherwise (as to all men it is not giuen) the same person desireth marriage.

Ergo, who soeuer desireth to liue vertuously, desireth marriage.

Again, the generall worde of bothe these definitions, geueth light for an argument. Every wife is a woman, every preacher is a man, and nature hath ordeined, that man and woman maie liue in marriage (if they be so disposed) of what degree, condition, or state, so euer they be, nothing in all the scriptures to the contrary. Therefore, I maie reason thus.

Whatsoeuer is man, that same maie marrie a woman by Gods ordinance.

Every preacher is a man.

Ergo, every preacher maie marrie a woman by Gods ordinance.

Q. 115.

Euē

The Arte of Logike.

Euen as I haue doen in these places, comparpng one to an other, so ye maie doe in the residue, and where ye see any thyng serueth for your purpose, that thei agree together on bothe parties, ye maie vse the same: if thei doe not agree in some places, ye maie refuse theim, or els so mollifie the thyng, that suche repugnancies, maie not harme your cause at all. As where it is in the wordes adioyned, that a woman is oftentimes overthwart, frowarde, disobedient, carelesse ouer her children, for as muche as these be no causes of marriage, thei shall not hinder marriage, for a Godly manne will beare all aduersitie, and suffer suche euill hap, and not therefore eschue marriage, because these incommodities rhounce in marriage. Now, I will enter into the other places, whiche doe not seuerally handle one word, but haue respecte euermoze to an other, and so by the knittynge together of two thynges, or settynge the one against the other, the truth of our purpose is espyed, and the cause confirmed.

From the similitude.

Incommo-
dities of mar-
riage miti-
ged.

Similitude
of marriage.

As he is not to be coumpted a good Gardiner, or a good Orchard keper, that is content with suche fruite as he hath already, onely cherisshyng his olde trees, and hath no care, neither to cutte doune the olde, nor yet to sette newe grasses, so that man is to be coumpted no diligente member in the common weale, whiche being content with the presente companie of men, hath no minde to encrease the number of people.

From multhoritie.

God the an-
cestrour of mar-
riage.

If the greates woorkman of thynges, God almightie hym self, after the flood, bepng reconciled to man, made this lawe (as we reade in scriptures) that men shoulde not liue single, but encrease and multiplie, that the yearth might be filled: and sepng also that Chyiste hymself since that tyme, hath allowed marriage by a miracle, chaungyng of Water into Wine, whiche miracle was the firste he did vpon the yearth: and sepng Paule also bidde every manne that can not liue chaste, to marrie and that it is better to marrie, then to burne in filthie desires, and besides this, willeth a Bischoppe shoulde be the housebande of one wyfe: it must needs bee, that the Preachers maie lawfully marrie, as well as any

any other ttempozall men.

From comparison of the lesse, to the greater.

It is a shame to see brute beastes, obeye the lawe of Nature, and man, especially a learned man, and a preacher, like a skoute Chaut to striue with Nature, & to doe contrary to her bidding;

From the greater, to the lesse.

If the daughters of Lot doubted nothing at the matter, to lie with their owne father, when he was dronke, thinking it better to prouide for encrease by filthie lust, then that mankinde should decaie: shall not then a Preacher, whiche should haue regarde for the encrease of mankinde, and also a desire to auoide fornication, marrie, if he be disposed, or other wise can not liue chaste?

Lottes daughters.

Of discordantes.

We maie reason from the contrary, thus: If virginittie bee a thyng giuen to Angelles, and almoste aboue mannes reach, then mariage is a thyng proper to man.

From the primation.

If the lacke of children, bee a thyng hatefull to man, then the hauyng of children, is a thyng ioyfull to man,

From the relation.

If a Bisshope be allowed by the Scriptures, to bee a householder, then is he allowed to haue a wife, and by the Scriptures we reade, that he is allowed to be a housebando, for Paule saith: Let a Bisshope be the housebando of one wife. Ergo, he is allowed to haue a wife.

From wordes differyng.

That worde is called a differyng worde, whatsoever it is, whiche is not the same, that an other is. As thus: A Preacher is a man. Ergo he is no God: Priestes be men, as other men be, and that some maried men ere now, haue well knownen. Therefore, he maie marie a woman, if he can not liue chaste, considering there is nothyng in all the scriptures, to the contrary.

As I haue doon for the office of a Prince, and the mariage of a Prieste, so maie I also goe throughout the places, with any other matter, that is now in controuersie.

As I haue, too, doo, Denounce, the Sacrifice of the Masse, Baptisme,

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Faith is defined.

Baptisme, the Lawe, the Gospell, Synne, flaunder, rule, Preaching, and euery other thyng, that man is bounde to knowe.

What is faith? Faith is a trust and full perswasion, where by onely wee doe assure vs, that our synnes bee forgiven vs, and we accepted as iuste before God, through the merites of Christ.

Or thus.

Paul in the Epistle to the Hebrewes. Faith is a sure confidence of thynges whiche are hoped for, and a certaintie of thynges, whiche are not seen.

The generall words.

A sure confidence, and a certaintie of thynges.

The kinde.

A faith whiche is occupied aboute thynges, bothe corporall, and also spirituall, beleuyng that Christe was bothe GOD and man, by whom saluation is attained.

The difference.

Thynges whiche are hoped for, and the whiche are seen.

The properties.

To beleue assuredly, and trust the promises of God.

The partes of faith.

Faith is diuersly taken in scripture.

The true faith hath no partes. Albeit faith is diuersly taken in the scripture, for, there is an historycall faith. As I doe beleue that William Conquerour was kyng of Englande.

There is also a iustifying faith, whereby I looke assuredly to be saued. There is a faith, when one man faithfully promyseth an other, to doe this, or that, and will stande to his worde. There is also a faith of miracles, whereby the Apostles did cast out Demilles, and helped the diseased persones.

Thynges adioynnyng to faith, and also thynges annexed to faith.

Hope, Charitie, to be good to the poore, to forbeare from wicked attemptes, to speake well of all, and to eschue exceſſe.

The thyng containyng.

The minde of man, or the soule of man.

The efficient cause.

The worde of God, or the holie ghoste, stirryng the parte of man,

man, and comfortyng hym in the merites of Christes passion.

The ende of faith.

Life eueraſtyng, whiche is giuen freely to every beleuer, that confeſſeth in his harte Jeſus to be Chriſt, and aſſuredly truſteth to be ſaued by the onely merites of his paſſion.

Contraries.

Unbeleef, Deſperation, whereby a man falleth from God to his vtter damnation for euer.

Thus we ſee how large the uſe is of theſe places, for not onely ſhall any one be able to ſpeake right aply, and verie well to the purpoſe, whenſoever he ſhall ſeek out the truthe of any cauſe, by diligēt ſearch, and rāungyng in theſe comers, but alſo he ſhall largely ſet out his matter with muche delight, and orderly tell his tale with ſingular proſite, and paſſyng gain. And therefore I would wiſhe that *Logike* were alwaies the ſquare to rule our talke, and made the verie touche ſtone to trie our reaſons, ſuche as in weightie matters full ofte are alledged, and then I would not doubt, but that ſolie ſhould the ſoner be eſpyed, and wiſe mens ſaynges the better eſtimated.

Of diſputation or reaſonyng, what it is.



What is called a diſputation or reaſonyng of matters, when certayne perſones debate a cauſe together, and one taketh parte contrary vnto another, the one aſſweriſyng and denyiſyng, and the other ſtill appoſyng, and confirmyng the cauſe ſo earnestly as he can, whereby after harde holde and ſtryng debating, the truthe either appeareth, or els ther reſte bothe vpon one point, leauiſyng the matter to bee adiudged of the hearers, vpon the knowledge of bothe their mindes fullie had and perceiued. In all whiche matchyng and touggyng together, this would bee obſerued, that every of the keepe their owne ſtandyng, that is to ſaie, the aſſwerer muſt ſtill uſe ſtill ſtate denyiſyng, and ſhake of ſuche light reaſons as are alledged by the helpe of iudgemente, whiche is the firſt parte of *Logike*, wherein are diuerſe rules and leſſons ſet for the, eſpecially for that purpoſe: the appoſer muſt fight with weapon of his witte, and ſtill abide

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by

The arte of Logike.

by that whiche the aunswerer doeth onerithowe, neuer leaving to folowe and confirme his cause, till he haue brought the other to some suche pointe, as he shall not well be able to auoide. And the rather to excell in this behalfe, he muste vse the seconde parte of Logike, whiche is called Inuention, where he maie haue argumentes at will, if he serche the places, which are none other thing but the store house of reason, and the fountaine of all wisdom.

The office and duetie of the opposer.

All debating of causes warines is euer thoughte greate wisdom. And therfore he that will shewe witt and learning, must vse good aduiselement, and take greate deliberation with hym, and euermore haue some cheef grounde in his head, wherunto he mindeth to leaue all his reasons before hande, that upon the graunt of them, a weightier matter maie euermore be obtained. And whereas the aunswerer perhaps shall smell where aboutes he goeth, and therefore will seeke startyng holes to escape and flee suche danger: the disputer must alwaies keepe hym in, and suffer hym at no hande to slippe awaie, but force hym still to aunswere the propounded argument directly, that either he graunt the argument to bee true, or deniegh it to bee good, or els shewe wherein the fault is, by either opening the doubtfullnesse of some worde, or declaring plainly the wrong knyttyng and lappynge up of the whole reason. And because where many wordes are spoken, greate aduantage maie bee taken, the opposer shall in as fewe wordes as he can possible, comprehend his whole reason, & framing it in good order, shall force the aduersarie to take aunswere vnto the partes plainely, and without cloke or doubtfull dealing in any wise; and vpon his open and manifest aunswere, as easie the reason maie out of hande be framed, and so one vpon another, gathering reasons from place to place; so long and so often, till at length he be brought to some one thing, whiche he shall not bee able by reason to conte. And this would alwaies be knowne, that the same reason whiche proueth, should alwaies bee either more large then or than shynge whiche is propounded, or els of lesse weight and largenesse with it. And so aduersary from the gene-

roll

roll to that, whiche is inferior to it : and also from the effectes of thynges to the causes: from the definition to the thyng that is defined, and likewise from all other partes of Inuention after the same sort.

The office or due tie of the answerer.

T

he answerer also must be as ware and as wittie as the opposer is; seck yng by all subtile meanes, to escape suche trappes and ginses, as the craftynesse of the opposer hath laied for hym. And therefore, vpon rehearsall of the argumente, it is needefull and expedient for hym to repeat it vnto hymselfe, in the self same order as is set forth and spoken by the opposer, and after a little pause to make suche an answer, that the opposer shal take little aduantage thereby, and at no hande to graunte any such thing, that maie afterwards turne to his owne harme, the whiche full ofte doeth happen, when wee graunt that as a truthe, whiche is plaine falsehood, or deny that to be true whiche is moste true, or allowe thinges absurd to be comperd as lawfull. And yet where as thynges in out ward apparence maie seeme true, whiche are nothyng so, but haue onely the outward shape and colour of certaintie: the answerer must earnestly take heede, that then he bee not deceived. For if one inconuenience be graunted, a thousande mishappes doe followe vpon the same, and a wide gappe is made open to enter into all errors. Therefore the answerer must at the first hearing of his argument, marke whether it be made accordyng to rules of Logike, or other wise. For the matter, and euery parte of the argumente maie be true in sense, when the faying of it together is full badde. And therefore in suche cases the argument must bee refused, because it is not well proportioned, neither yet shaped in order, accordyng as the rules of making argumentes doen euertyme require. But if the argument haue his due forme and shape, then muste the answerer marke the truthe of his argumente, and if the allegations been either doubtfull, or vnttrue in sense or vnderstandyng: the same must be refused out of hande as vnlawfull, and of no force to confirme the cause. And for the better auoyd yng of euill argumentes, the one of these twoo

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waies

The arte of Logike.

waies must alwaies bee vsed, that either wee deny some parte of the argument, if the matter be altogether false and vnttrue: or els that we open the doubtfullnesse, or euill knittynge of some woordes or sentence, by makynge a distinction (as the *Logicians* terme it) and seuerally sojynge suche thynges, as then were thought to be euill set together. And thus the answerer beynge ware in his doynge, maie giue his iudgemente without greate daunger, and force the apposer to giue ouer his tacklynge, without any aduantage gotten. But for this whole matter of answerynge to an argument, I dooe shewe my minde at large, next and immediately before the rehearsall of false conclusions, or deceiptfull argumentes, whiche doe followe in the next page, where I speake of confutation, and therefore I surcease to talke any further in this matter, leasse that with double inuocation of one thyng, I maie byynge tediousnesse vnto all mine.

The



*The place of false conclusions,
or deceitfull reasons.*



Now that I haue declared what an argument is, what the places of Inuention bee, how thei serue for the confirmation of any matter, how euery thing is made in his due Mode and Figure, and also shewed the obseruation of many thynges, whereby any one shal bothe be assured that his argument is true (if it be made according to the rules) and also maie knowe that it is false, if it bee not made accordyng to the same rules: I will from henceforth set out the maner of deceitfull argumentes called in Latine *Reprehensiones*, or *fallaces conclusionum*, euen as Aristotle hath set them forth. Albeit there is no argumente so deceitfull, but thei maie easily be auoided, if the rules be marked that are rehearsed before, concernyng the true making of an argument. For accordyng to the old sayng: *Cōtrariorum eadem est doctrina*. That is to saie, of contraries there is one maner of doctrine, for he whiche can handsomely sette forth a Lyon in his shape and portraiture, maie iudge with reason a Lionewill fauorably painted, and can with little difficultie shewe the faultes in euery place: So like maner if one can make an argument, accordyng to the rules aboue rehearsed in his due forme and Mode, he can tell also when an argument is otherwise made then the rules can beare. To some men these places of craftie that followe, maie seeme strange, and yet euen in weightie matters, the wicked haue deriued their subtile defences from these deceitfull corners. Therefore, because suche places maie the rather be auoyded, and better knowne, I will bothe set forth at large, and also teach as well as I am able how to confute them. And firste to confute, is nothyng els but to iudge false packyng, and to vnloose by reason thynges knytte together by craftie. Therefore the Logicien if he will do his part, must not onely fence hymself for confirmation of his owne cause, but muste therewithall overthrowe the assertion of other, and also by reason proue their saynges to bee false, whiche by deceipt woulde enuiegle the weaker,

Deceitfull
argumentes,
or false conclusions.

The arte of Logike.

Confutation
ii. waies vsed
In answer
made to sa-
tisfie the per-
son three
waies.



The maner of confutation, two waies considered.

Do the firste, either wee purpose by disputation to answer fully to the matter, or els secondly (if power want to compass that) we seke some other meanes to satisfie the man, and that three maner of waies. either by making the objection seme lesse then it is, or by bying yng some other examples against it, or els by taking some meanes to goe from the matter. Wee make the argument appeare slender, when wee receiue it laughingly, and declare by wordes euen at the first, that it is nothing to the purpose, and so abashe the opponent.

Again, wee tourne an other argumente in our aduersaries necke, when we bying an other example against him. Or els wee charge hym with a like fault, and laye some greater matter in his dish. Lastly, wee shifte awaie from the violence of our aduersarie by making some digression, or giuing occasion of some other talke, whereby the aduersarie either is diuerted to forget his argument, or els being blinded with too much matter, is forced either to goe no further, or els to thinke hymself contente. In all whiche maner of confutation, when wee purpose to put a man to silence, I would wishe greate moderation to be vsed, and as little aduantage taken by suche meanes as maie bee possible. For although it be a poore helpe (as in deede it is none other) yet many a man loseth his estimation by much vsing of suche fashions. It is a woyle to see the subtilt braine of many bragging bodies, whiche with bold countenance bare an outward shadowe of wisdom, hauing onely the masking visage, and lacking the naturall face. They will stande stoutly in maintenaunce of an vnturthe, and with countenance seme to shewe it pea, and by their bearing it out, almost perswade the hearers, that they onely haue the true parte, and that the other are altogether deceived. They will saie, that no wiseman would once thinke that for shame, whiche the aduersarie vttereth without all shame: yea, they will saie, he speaketh too rashly, and so dash hym out of countenance, that he shall not well knowe what to saie, and last of all, they will trifle and tope merrily, and so with impudent laughing, make the other past speaking. I will not put any in this manner

re, as though they were gyltye: but their owne doyngees shall purge in the selues on Gods name for me. For withstanding, I would gladly wishe (as I saied before) that there were a measure bled, and then suche doyngees might better be for me.

We answere to the matter twos waies, either generally, or particularly. A generall answer is made the waies. First wher the faulte is in the matter, that is to say, in the wordes of either Proposition, when they signifie diuers thinges, or be diuersly applied to the we it plainly: and either denie it as foolish, or els disolue it as doubtfull. As thus, the Libertines reason.

What forer is naturall, that same is not euill.
To synne is a thynge naturall.
Ergo to synne it is not euill.

The seuerall or seconde Proposition is not true. And therefore the argument is false in the matter it self. For God did create the Nature of manne pure and cleane, and saied, that all was good whiche he had made at the first creation. Neither was it Gods will that manne should alter his commundemente, and swarie from the pathe of his appointed Lawes, but rather the suggestion of the deuill, and the weakenesse of our fleshe brought man to hell, death, and damnation.

Againe, when the faulte appeareth in the forme and manner of making an argument, wee must declare that it is not framed according to the rules, whiche require that euery argument should bothe be in Mode and Figure, as I haue before sufficiently declared. As thus.

All Pagistrates doe reuenge.
Euery bolde hardie man doeth reuenge.
Ergo euery bolde hardie man is a Pagistrat.

This argument being made in the seconde figure, is of no force, considering it is no Mode of the same figure. For in this figure all the propositions do not affirme altogether, but one of them doeth denie, as it appeareth plainly to him that like to see.

Therefore, when the faulte is bothe in the matter, and in the manner of making, wee must refuse the argumentes, and shewe the faultes plainly. As thus.

Euery

Answers, made to the matter twos waies.

A generall answer, made to the matter, twos waies.

Libertines error.

The fault in the forme, by making an argument.

Fault bothe in the matter & forme also,

The arte of Logike.

Every slaughter is synne.
 Every adulterie is synne..
 Ergo every adulterie is slaughter.

First the fault is, that slaughter is not well defined. For in warre
 tyme it is lawfull to kill, and every man maie stande in his owne
 defence againste violente robbers, and rather kill then bee killed.
 Thirdlie, the argumente is in no Mode, although it bee in the se-
 conde figure. The particular auoyding of an argumente, is five
 waies vsed, either by declaring in what deceitfull subtiltie it is
 contained. Or from whiche of the places it is wrongfully deriued
 Or to shewe the wrong framing in euery Mode and Figure. Or
 to make an argumente with a like reason, and so to anothe the
 cause. Or last of all, to vse the strange deceitfull places, whiche
 shalbe laste rehearsed.

And now will I tell perticularly euery deceitfull argument
 that when suche a subtile argument shalbe vsed, either in disputa-
 tion, or priuate talke; any one maie espie the fault out of hande, and
 shewe in whiche of these capcious reasons the subiect resteth.

And first a false conclusion is a deceit vsed in an argument,
 whereby one vnder the colour of truthe, goeth adoute to enueigle
 the hearer, or thus, a false conclusion is an argument appearing
 to the ignorant as though it were true, and yet is nothing true at
 all. Aristotle doeth diuide them into twoo partes. Some be called
 deceitfull arguments when a doubtfull worde is vsed, or the kind
 of speeche is strange, and maie be taken twoo waies, and that the
 fault is rather in the kind & maner of speaking, then in the matter
 or very thing it self. Therefore those that be good Grammarians
 and knowe the proprietie of wordes, and are skilfull in the tonges,
 can easily well solute suche errors as be made by the mistaking of
 wordes, or by false vnderstanding of phrases, wherof in very perde
 many heresies, and muche false doctrine haue had their first begin-
 ning. There be againe some craftie subtilties which are not in the
 worde, but rather spring either of the euill knitting together of the
 Propositions, or els of the confusion of the thinges, that is to saie,
 when one thing is falsly appointed for an other, as in this proposi-
 tion a man maie easily espie false packing, which is in the 1. figure.

Concupiscence.

A particular
 answering
 the waies.

1.
 2.
 3.
 4.
 5.

A false con-
 clusion.

False con-
 clusions,
 twoo waies
 diuided.

Whales not
 knowe, haue
 caused errors

caused errors
 caused errors
 caused errors

Fe. No Sinne doeth beget a man. **Co.** Concupiscence doeth beget a man. **Ex.** Concupiscence is no Sinne.

The seconde proposition, although it maie deceiue a man that is not ware, yet it is altogether false, because nature which is a thing ordeined of God, doeth beget manne, not the wicked impotencie, as raibet the destruction of nature, which after warre followed. Here it is plaine, that mingling manie is made of things, when generation, which should be attributed to nature, is referred to concupiscence, because it is in Nature, and nexte abiding vnto it.

Now, for the nonber and diuision of these deceptiull argumentes, it is to vnderstande, that there be 13. whereof 6. are called subtilties in the word or manner of speaking, and the other 7. are called subtilties without the word, when things are confounded, when the knittynge is altered, and one taken for an other.

¶ Deceptiull argumentes.

In the woordes are these following.

- i. The doubtfullnesse of wordes.
- ii. The double meaning of a sentence.
- iii. The ioynnyng of wordes that should be parted.
- iiii. The parting of wordes that should be ioynned.
- v. The manner of speech.
- vi. The accent.



These names be comprehended vnder this one word (doubtfull) notwithstanding Aristotle setteth forth diuers waies, that he maie shewe the difference of these doubtfull thynges. For, some argumentes haue the doubt in a woorde, signifying diuersly, some in the propertie of the phrase, some in the ioynnyng together of wordes, and some other in the diuision, and displacing of the same, as it shall appeare more plainly, in the handling of these places severally.

¶ The doubtfullnesse of a word.

Homonymia, which maie be called in Englyshe, the doubtfullnesse of one woorde, when it signifieth diuersly, is a manner of a subtiltie, when the deceipt is in a woorde, that

The number of false conclusions, or the diuision of deceptiull argumentes.

Diuersitie of subtilties.

The doubtfullnesse of a word.

The arte of Logike.

Every slaughter is synne.
Every adulterie is synne.
Ergo every adulterie is slaughter.

First the fault is, that slaughter is not well defined. For in warre tyme it is lawfull to kill, and every man maie stande in his owne defence againste violence robbers, and rather kill then bee killed. Thirdlie, the argumente is in no Mode, although it bee in the seconde figure. The particular auoyding of an argumente, is five waies vfed, either by declaring in what deceytfull subtiltie it is contained. Or from whiche of the places it is wryngfully deriued. Or to shewe the wryng framyng in euery Mode and Figure. Or to make an argumente with a like reason, and so to auoide the cause. Or last of all, to vse the straunge deceytfull places, whiche shalbe laste rehearsed.

I particular
auoyding
five waies.

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.

And now will I tell perticularly euery deceytfull argument that when suche a subtile argument shalbe vfed, either in disputati- on, or priuate talke; any one maie espie the fault out of hande, and shewe in whiche of these capcious reasons the subiect resteth.

I false con-
clusion.

And first a false conclusion is a deceipt vfed in an argument, whereby one vnder the colour of truth, goeth aboute to enueigle the hearer, or thus, a false conclusion is an argument appearyng to the ignorant as though it were true, and yet is nothing true at all. Aristotle doeth diuide them into twoo partes. Some be called deceytfull arguments when a doubtfull worde is vfed, or the kind of speeche is strange, and maie be taken twoo waies, and that the fault is rather in the kind & maner of speaking, then in the matter or very thing it self. Therfore those that be good Grammarians and knowe the proprietie of wordes, and are skilfull in the tonges, can easily well solute suche errors as be made by the mistaking of wordes, or by false vnderstanding of phrases, wherof in very perde many heresies, and muche false doctrine haue had their first begin- ning. There be againe some craftie subtilties which are not in the worde, but rather spring either of the euill knitting together of the Propositions, or els of the confusion of the thinges, that is to saie, when one thing is falsely appointed for an other, as in this proposi- tion a man maie easily espie false packing, which is in the 4. figure.

I false con-
clusions,
twoo waies
diuided.

I phrases not
knowe, haue
caused errors

I errors that
are caused by
the confusion
of the thinges

Concupiscence.

Concupiscence. *For no Sinne doeth beget a man.*
Concupiscence doeth beget a man.
For no Sinne doeth beget a man.

The seconde proposition, although it maie be true a man that is not ware, yet it is altogether false, because nature which is a thing ordeined of God, doeth beget manne, not the wicked impotencie, or rather the destruction of nature, which after warre followed. Here it is plaine, that mingle mingle is made of things, when generation, which should be attributed to nature, is referred to concupiscence, because it is in nature, and nexte adioyn-
 gapng onto it.

Now, for the number and diuision of these deceitfull argu-
 mentes, it is to vnderstande, that there be 13. whereof 6. are cal-
 led subtilties in the word or manner of speaking, and the other 7.
 are called subtilties without the word, when things are confou-
 ded, when the knittynge is altered, and one taken for an other.

Of Deceitfull argumentes.

In the woorde are these following

- i. The doubtfulness of wordes.
- ii. The double meaning of a sentence.
- iii. The ioyning of wordes that should be parted.
- iiii. The parting of wordes that should be ioyned.
- v. The manner of speache.
- vi. The accident.



These names be comprehended vnder this one word
 (doubtfull) notwithstanding Aristotle setteth forth di-
 uers waies, that he maie shewe the difference of these
 doubtfull thynges. For, some argumentes haue the doubt in a
 woorde, signifying diuersly, some in the proprietie of the phrase,
 some in the ioyning together of wordes, and some other in the
 diuision, and displacing of the same, as it shall appeare more
 plainly, in the handling of these places severally.

Of The doubtfulness of a worde.

Homonymia, which maie be called in Englishe, the doubt-
 fulnesse of one woorde, when it signifieth diuersly, is a
 manner of a subtiltie, when the deceit is in a woorde, that

The number
 of false con-
 clusions, or the
 diuision of de-
 ceitful argu-
 mentes.

Diuersitie of
 subtilties.

The doubt-
 fulnesse of a
 worde.

The Arte of Logike.

hath more significations then one. And the reason is, that suche argumentes are not good, because there are foure termes in the twoo Propositions, for the double repete, significeth one thing in the firste proposition, and an other in the seconde proposition. Therefore, nothing is proved in the conclusion, when suche doubtful woordes are placed in a proposition. And therefore, when suche a subtiltie is espied, a man maye denie the consequence, giuing this reason, that it is a subtiltie, & taken from this place of doubtfulness.

An example.

Trme of doubt
ble vnder
standing.

and: the
ad: the
ad: the
ad: the

Da. Every arme is a substance made of flesh,
blood, bones, sinewes, and veines.
Et. God the father hath an arme.
Ergo. God the father is one that both a substance
of flesh, blood, bones, sinewes, and veines.

I answer this knitting is not good, and therefore, I deny the whole. The reason is, because it is a subtiltie, of a doubtful worde, for in the firste proposition, the arme is considered to bee suche a one, as man hath, but in the seconde proposition, it is not so ment, for it significeth by a metaphore, the power, strength, or might of God.

Another example.

Euill twoo
wayes taken.

Pr. There is none euill in the Citie, saith the prophete,
whiche the Lorde hath not born.
Et. There bee many synnes, and horrible euilles in
the citie.
Ergo. God is the authour of sinne.

I deny the consequence. Because there is doubtfulness in this worde euill: for in the firste proposition, euill doeth signifie the euill of punishment, as we call commonlie all calamitie euill, and all punishment euill, whiche are not sinne, and in the seconde proposition, euill doeth signifie offence, and all naughtineſſe that is committed. Therefore, the seconde proposition is not agreeing with the first, and therefore, the argumente is not good. Of no one thing riseth so muche controuersie, as of the doubtfulness, and double taking of a worde. Scholars dispute, wise men fall

The mistes
of woordes
haue blinded
our blisse.

out,

out, Lawyers agree not, Preachers were hoſte, Gentlemen ſtrive, the people miſtake, good men give counſaile, women haue their wordes, this man affirmeth, the other denieth, and yet at length, the double meaning beyng once knowne (when all thinges are quiete) endes the whole matter. Therefore, it is good, firſt to be well grounded, and ſurely to ſtate our ſeues, vpon ſome one aſſured knowledge, before wee talke of thinges doubtfull, wherein feſteth error. Beſt learned of all other is that man onely in my minde, whiche ſeeyng repugnant ſentences, can by reaſon iudge the truth. Salomon ſaith in his Proverbs.

God the father from the beginning created wiſedome. The wicked, or the ſeditious libertine miſte take here an occaſion to proue that Chriſt was man onely, and reaſon that

God the father, from the beginning created wiſedome.

Chriſte the ſonne of God, is the wiſedome of his father.

Chriſte the ſonne of God, was created from the beginning.

Therefore, it muche availeth to knowe the double meaning of euery doubtfull worde. In the firſt propoſition, wiſedome ſignifieth the worde reueled, or preached by the mouth of man. In the ſecond propoſition, wiſedome is taken for the ſecond perſone in Trinitie, accordyng to S. Iohns Goſpell. In the beginning was the worde, and the worde was with God, and God was the worde. Euery one knoweth, that euery worde is not God, and yet this worde (which paſſeth all wordes) is God the ſonne which other wiſe is called the wiſedome of his father. A certain perſone that is no ſmall ſoole, as all menne ſhall well knowe, that knowe leaſt of all, ſeeyng earneſtly at a tyme, in commendyng a biſhop of his acquaintance, deuoted to a noble perſonage, that this biſhop had a goodly baſe voice, and made at one tyme (ſhe) as baſe a ſermon, as he neuer hard the like in all his life before, and therefore, wouche to be compen a greate ſerke in his ſooliſhe iudgement. Who will not ſaie, that this Biſhop was baſely praiſed.

William
Domes.

God by will.

Q.ij.

The

The Arte of Logike.

The ambiguitie,



The ambiguitie is, when the construction bringeth error, hauing diuerse vnderstandings in it, as when the wordes be placed doubtfully, as thus. *Crasus Halim penetrant magnam peruenit ad opum vim.* *Crasus* going ouer the flood *Halim*, shall ouerthrowe a greate Empire. Here is not mentioned, whether he shall ouerthrowe his owne, or an other mannes, By the whiche *Dante* in deede, he beinge deceiued, lost his owne kyngdome, when he thought to subdue his enemies, and bying them vnder subiection. Therefore, when sentences bee spoken doubtfully, that thei maie be construed two maner of waies, and the partes diuersly pointed, make contrary vnderstandyng: they are referred to this place. And the rather to make it more open, I haue made two Englishe verses, which being diuersly read haue two contrary meanynges.

A robberie doe not feare: thy God, thy maker
Will punish not one: God spareth, be thou sur.
Otherwise.

A robberie doe not: feare thy God, thy maker
Will punish, not one God spareth, be thou sur.

These are two verses also in Latine, whiche because they be very pretie, and maie be two waies taken, I thinke it not amisse, to set them forthe here among the other.

Laus tua, non tua fraus, virtus, non copia rerum.

Seandere te fecit, hoc decus eximium.

In Englishe thus.

Worthinesse, not wiliness, Godlinesse, not goods,
brought thee therewith.

Richesse great, and much auctoritie, with worldly
honour to come to.

These sent
to the Pope.

These verses being read back wards, either in Englishe, or in Latine, beginning at the last worde, haue a cleane contrary vnderstandyng, as thus.

To come to honor worldly, with auctoritie much,
and greates riches.

Herewith, brought thee, goodnes, not Godlinesse,
wiliness, not worthinesse.

These

These two verses were written to the Pope, as worthie such
a one, and sette upon Pasquillus in Rosome, euen for very loue,
as I take it: not of the Pope, but of Gods holy worde.

*An example of suche doubtfull writting, whiche by reason of
pointing, maie haue double sense, and contrary meaning,
taken out of an enterlude, made by Nicolas V dall.*



Mete maistrresse, whereas I loue you nothing at all,
Regarding your richesse and substance chiefe of all,
For your personage, beautie, demeanour, and witte,
I commend me vnto you neuer a whitte.

Soyle to heare reposte of your good welfare.

For (as I heare saie) suche your conditions are,

That ye be worthie fauour of no liuyng man.

To be abhored of every honest man.

To be take for a woman enclined to vice,

Nothing at all to vertue giuyng her due price.

Wherefore concerning marriage, ye are thought

Suche a fine peragon as nere honest man bought.

And now by these presentes I doe you aduertise,

That I am minded to marie you in no wise,

For your goodden and substance I could be content

To take you as ye are. If ye will be my wife,

Ye shall be assured for the tyme of my life

I will kepe you right well from good raiment and fare.

Ye shall not be kept but in sorowe and care.

Ye shall in no wise liue at your owne libertie:

Doe and saie what ye lust ye shall neuer please me.

But when ye are merie I will be all sad,

When ye are soyle I will be very glad.

When ye seke your hartes ease, I will be unkinde,

At no tyme sume shall you muche gentlenesse finde,

But all thinges contrary to your will and minde.

Shall be doen, other wise I will not be behinde,

To speake and as for all them, that would doe you wrong,

I will so helpe and mainteine, ye shall not liue long.

For any foolish doles shall comber you but I.

The Arte of Logike.

I (who ere saie naie) will sticke by you, till I die.
Thus good maistrisse Custaunce the lord you saue and keepe,
From Roisterdoister whether I wake or sleepe,
Who sauaureth you no lesse, ye maie be bolde,
Then this letter purpoiseth whiche ye haue vnfolde.

The contrary sense of the same, in the same wordes.



Mete maistrisse, whereas I loue you, nothng at all
Regarding your richesse and substance, chit of all
For your personage, beantie, demaour, and witte,
I commend me vnto you, neuer a whitte
Doye to heare repute of your good wellfare,
For (as I heare saie) such your conditions are,
That ye be woorthie fauour of no liuing man
To be abhoyred of euery honest man
To be take for a woman enclined to vice
Nothng at all to vertue giuing her due price
Wherefore concernng marriage, ye are thoughte
Suche a fine peragon, as neuer honest man boughte,
And now by these presentes, I doe you aduertise,
That I am minded to marrie you in no wise
For your gooddes and substance: I coulde be content
To take you as ye are. If ye will be my wife,
Ye shall be assured for the tyme of my life
I will keepe you tight well from good ratment and care
Ye shall not be kept but in sorowe and care
Ye shall in no wise lue: at your owne libertie
Doe and saie what ye lust: ye shall neuer please me
But when ye are merie: I will be all sad
When ye are lozie: I will be very glad
When ye seke your hartes ease, I will be vnkinde
At no tyme in me shall you muche gentlenesse finde
But all thinges contrary to your will and minde,
Shall be doen other wise: I will not be behinde
To speake, and as for all them, that would doe you wrong,
I will so helpe and mainteine, ye shall not lue long,
Nor any foolishhe volte shall comber you but I.

Who ere saie naie) will sticke by you till I die.
Thus good maistresse Custaunce, the lord you saue and keepe,
From me Rosserdoster, whether I wake or sleepe.
Who fauoureth you no lesse, ye maie be holde,
Then this letter purporth which ye haue vnfolde.

¶ The three deceptiull argumentes.



Oninnisio distrahendarum, a toigning together of those
thynges, whiche should bee disseuered, and are either to
be applied to the thynges that goe before, or to the thin-
ges, that followe after.

The toignig
of wordes
that should
be parted.

Da. Whosoener knoweth letters, now hath lear-
ned them.

ri. A Grammarian knoweth letters.

Ergo. A Grammarian now hath learned them.

Here this Auerbe (now) if it had been referred to the first
pointe, whiche is as ye see in this worde (letters) and the point
afterwarde made, when this worde (now) had been put to it, all
had been well: but because the worde (now) is other wise placed,
and referred to the nexte sentence, whiche is (now hath learned
them) (it is a false argument, because this worde (now) should be
referred to the first pointe, as thus.

Whosoener knoweth letters now, hath learned the
A Grammarian knoweth letters now.

Ergo, a Grammarian hath learned them.

And so this argument is good, being thus placed, but though
this subtiltie seeme childishe, yet olde babes haue vsed it, euen in
the weightiest cause of our redemption, and thought therein to
foile the Godly, reasonyng in ieste after this sorte, and yet mea-
nyng good earnest.

Faith without workes doeth Iustifie.

Faith without workes, is a dedde faith.

Ergo, a dedde faith doeth iustifie.

Here one maye see a false pockyng, for, in the first Propo-
sition, faith standyng a lone, is seuerally referred to the laste
woorde, of the same Proposition, whiche is (doeth Iusti-
fie) in the seconde Proposition, faith is referred to the twoo
wordes

Faith with-
out workes,

The Arte of Logike.

wordes (without woordes) so that the same faith, is not ment in the seconde proposition, that is mente in the firste, and the reason is, that wordes are ioygned together, whiche should not be so ioygned, for now there are fower termes, whereas by the rulers of *Logike*, there should be but three (faith) is one (doeth iustifie) is the seconde (faith without woordes) is the thirde (a dedde faith) is the fowerth terme. And the reason that there be fower, is, that faith is firste seuerally considered, whiche neuer wanteth woordes followyng her, as fruite declaring what the tree is: not that the fruite doeth purchase iustification, but rather giueth a token, that by faith it self, whereof such woordes doe spyng, iustification is attained. In the seconde proposition there is mentioned a dedde faith, a faith without woordes, whiche faith the Deuill hymself hath, whereas if the argument were true, there should bee none other faith, considered in the seconde proposition, then was rehearsed and mentioned in the firste proposition. I haue laboured the rather at large, to make this matter more plain to the ignorant, not that it so muche needed (for the euasion is easie of it self) but to shewe that this vnlearned argument is of no greater weight, then the other aboue rehearsed were.

Of parting wordes that should be ioygned together.

The parting
of wordes
that should
be ioygned.



Disiunctio coniuictorum, is a diuidyng of thynges, whiche should be ioygned together, and a makynge of wordes seuerall, or els a disseuering of twoo partes, whiche should bee but one, for, like as by the other place, wordes are ioygned together, whiche should bee deuided, so now by this place, that thyng is deuided, whiche should bee all one.

The lawe and
the Gospell.

The lawe and the Gospell, are two diuers thynges.
The worde of God, is the Lawe and the Gospell.
Ergo the worde of God, is two diuers thynges.

In this argument (the worde of God) beyng a whole thing of it self, is diuided, and where respect should bee had, to the twoo partes iunctly considered together, whiche are nothyng els but the whole: partes are seuerally vnderstanden, and referred to the whole, not bothe together as they should bee, but seuerally
with

with their properties as they should not be. For the worde of God is not the Lawe onely, or the Gospell onely, although it stande in these twoo, but is the Lawe and the Gospell bothe ioyned together. For whereas manne is made of bodie and soule, the bodie is not manne, nor yet the soule neither, and yet they bothe ioyned together, make vp a perfecte manne. Againe, not therefore are the Lawe and the Gospell Gods woorde, because they are twoo diuers thynges, but because they dooe bothe properly belong vnto Gods woorde. And therefore the Lawe and the Gospell, are otherwise taken in the first Proposition, then they are in the second Proposition, whereupon there are fower termes, contrary to the rules aboue rehearsed.

¶ Another example.

The Articles of our faith are twelue in number.

To beleue in God the father, and Iesus Christe his onely sonne, are in the Articles of our faith.

Ergo to beleue in God the father, and in Iesus

Christe his onely sonne, are twelue in number.

The articles of our faith.

This argument is to be denied, because the doubtfullnesse riseth of division; for, to beleue in God the father, and in Iesus Christe his onely sonne, are the Articles of our faith, and yet they twoo are not the whole twelue in number. Therefore, they twoo being of the twelue are wrongly placed, if they bee diuided into twelue. Againe, there be fower partes or termes, for in the first Proposition, this part (the Articles of our faith) comprehendeth the twelue in number, but in the second Proposition the double repeate, that is (the Articles of our faith) doe not comprehend all the Articles, but twoo onely, therefore it is an euill argument.

This kinde of argument is vsed oftentimes of those, which by reportyng an others laboure and his well dooing, be pained the same, either by addyng or diminishing the same, as by taking a peece of a sentence out of some Doctour, and applying it for their purpose, or by addyng more then they finde, as bothe Diuines and Lawyers oftentimes haue vngodly haue doen, not regardyng the whole course and order of the thyng, but taking out patches and peeces to serue their vngodly purposes; whiche

C. s.

in

in the

The arte of Logike.

In deede made nothyng for them: neither thei themselves doe vnderstande what thei sayng; when thei dooe not marke the whole course of the matter. The Romishe reason thus.

A Romishe
reason for this
dissection.

If thou wilt enter to heauen, keepe the commaundementes.
Therefore, keeppe the commaundementes, purchase heauen.

Wozkes are
good, not be-
cause menne
dooeth them,
but because
god alloweth
them.

This argumente is false by leauyng the beste out, for the doctrine of the Gospell must firste bee had, our faith must bee fastned, and Christ must sanctifie our dooynges before thei can bee good. Neither is any thing good because we doo it, but because it pleaseth God to accept it. It is true, he that doeth well shall haue well, but who is he? Euen the same bodie whiche first beleueth in Christ, and apprehendeth mercie by faith, whose woorkes God accepteth for good, other wise he shall neuer come wherre God is, Therefore espie the subtilties of the vngodly, and flee their fraude.

The fish place.

The maner
of sprache,



Figura dictionis, called other wise in good Latine, *forma orationis*, the maner of speeche is when the phrase breedeth error, and the proprietie of the tongue not well knowne engendereth ambiguity, as the eight Chapter of Matthew. When Christ

Confession.

had those whiche were healed of the Leprosie: goe and shewe thei selues to the Priest, our Fathers applied this sayng to Confession, thinkyng that euery one was bounde in conscience; vnder paine of damnation, to confesse his synnes to the Priest: euer yere once, where as Christes meaning was nothyng so; and therefore thei were muche deceiued in the maner of speaking. This order was in the olde Lawe, as wee maie reade in Leuiticus, that Lepers came not into the towne, but if any happened to be whole and amended, he was first commaunded to shewe hym self to the Priest, that the Priest sayng his bodie cleane, might be a witnesse to the Congregation of his amendemente; and so the man after that might the rather be suffered to goe abroad, and be in companie with other men.

But euen as thei haue fondly weast this place to Confession,

tion, even so mighte light women, and euill disposed wiues, abuse their hous bandes fondlie, expounding saint Pauls wordes in the seventh of the first to the Corinthians, where he saith. The wife is bounde to the Lawe, as long as her housebande liueth, but if her housbande slepe, she is at libertie to marie with whom she will. But God forbid that women should take this advantage of their housebandes sleepe, as the Romishe folke haue abused all menne wakyng. Slepe in this texte, signifyeth nothyng but death: and yet might women aswell abuse this texte, as other men haue abused Christes sayng for the mainetainance of Confession. Therefore, the proprietie of euery speeche, and the manner of speakyng ought alwaies to bee obserued; wee saie in English some tyme to some one, with whom wee are offended, oh sirrha, ye are an honest manne in deede, and yet we doe not meane that he is honest in deede, but thinke that he is a naughtie fellowe. So likewise, Christe when he should bee taken of the Jewes, said to his Apostles, *dormite & requiescite*, slepe on sirs, and take your reste, not that he would they should so doo, but to their rebuke and shame he spake it, because they wer careless and toke their reste. So Paul rebuked the Corinthians, because they made heathen men their Iudges, and pleaded their causes vnder them, saied, if there be no bodie among you to heare your owne causes; make vile persons and abieties to be Iudges among you. Not that he would it should bee so, but to their shame he spake it, as he saith hymself. Also to this place might be referred the kinde of phrase, proper to euery tongue. As where it is in the Gospell. Agree with thine aduersarie quickly, whyles thou art in the waie with him, leaue it not to thy aduersarie to bring thee to the Iudge, and the Iudge deliuer thee to the Spittell, and then thou bee caste into prison. Verely I saie vnto thee, thou shalt not come out thence, till thou haue paid the uttermost farthing. The which mattee saint Luke hath also sayng but these wordes in the last ende. I tell thee thou shalt not see thine eye, till thou haue made good the uttermost pence. Who doeth not see, that this last sentence doeth not signifie a condicio, but rather doeth, that he shall neuer come at all. For (the Spirituall meaning considered) how can manne

Slepe, what it signifyeth.

Christ taken of the Jewes

Paul rebuketh the Corinthians.

Debes phasew Mat. v.

Luke. xii.
John. viii.

E.ij.

through

The arte of Logike.

through synne condemned to the fire of hell, deliuered hymself, of his ransome to God for his saluation. Againe, I read this in the firste of Matth. Ioseph as long as he awooke out of slepe, did as the Angell of the Lorde hadde hym, and tooke his wife vnto him, and knewe her not, till she had brought forth her first sonne, and called his name Iesus. Now then, did Ioseph knowe her afterwards, that is, did he the acte of Nature with her? No verely, he did not companie with her carnally at all, but she liued still a virgine, he bare the name onely of an housebando, or married manne. As we reade also that James and Ihon were called the brethren of Christe, and yet were thei not in blood his naturall brethren. But some not expert in tongues, maie wonder muche at this exposition, notwithstanding if thei would wepe other places, that are in like maner wyitten, thei should haue no neede to maruaile at all. We read in the eight Chapter of Genes. When Noe had sent a Crowe out of the Arke, to hyng tidynge againe, he said that the Crow came not till the pearch was drie, and yet we read not in the scripture, that the Crowe came to the Arke againe at all, but did rather flie cleane awaie. And yet the text saith, vntill the pearch was drie, the Crowe came not. The Prophet saith of God: Thou art from worlde to worlde, and yet there is no determinate tyme mentioned, for God is a liuing substance for euer. Yea, I thinke wee haue the like phrase also, euen in our English tongue. The stiffe necked saie thus: I will heare no preaching till all men be agreed. And when is that? Marie neuer I thinke. Therefore those that be ignoraunt in the tongues are easily decieued. Likewise we read in the twelue Chapter of S. Matth. *Qui dixerit verbum aduersus spiritum sanctum non remittetur ei, neque in hoc saeculo, neque in futuro.* He that speaketh a woorde against the holie Ghost shall not be forgiven, neither in this worlde, nor yet in the worlde to come, that is to saie, he shall neuer be forgiven: for prooffe whereof and full confirmation, that this meaning is true, and ought not other wise to be take. Saint Marke also speaking of the same matter, both these wordes. Verely I saie vnto you, all synnes shall bee forgiven vnto mennes children, and blasphemie wherewith thei blasphemie. But he that blasphemeth

Wha p'cincth the holie Ghoste, shall neuer haue forgiveness; but
 shall be giste of euerlast damnation. This word for the matter of
 speere used in Partheu, is plainly opened here in Marke. Saint
 Luke in like manner, whosoeuer speaketh a woode againste the
 sonne of man, it shall be forgiven him. But vnto him that blasphemeth
 the holie Ghoste, it shall not be forgiven. And yet notwithstanding
 all this, the weake learned refecte this place to Purgato-
 rie, moste vainly and without reason. The manner of speere
 causeth ambiguitie, by reason of the affinitie in woordes, and when
 one hath losse all his money in his purse, and for lacke of coine, is
 faine to holde the candle. An other manne when he seeth the same
 bodie, dooe his duetie with his Cappe as to his better, mighte saie
 merely by the wale of a sute to the worthiest persone; I praise you
 sir, let this good fellowe be couered, he is bare, where as bare si-
 gnifieth a bare purse, as well as a bare hedde: and is properlie so
 saied. Againe and moste aply this subiectie taketh place, when
 sentēces be euill pointed, and the sense thereby depraued, as some
 that maintaine Justification by woordes, haue straungely abused
 a text of saint Augustine, makynge the pointe plaine, where as it
 should be an interrogatiue, and hath been of late yerres so found in
 an old wyitten hande. The sentence is this. *Qui facit se sine te, nō
 potest seruare se sine te.* He that made thee without thee, can not
 be saue thee, without thee: Where as makynge it a plaine pointe
 in Latine, it hath a cleane contrary vnderstandynge, and maketh
 muche for the maintenance of false Religion. For it is as muche
 as who should saie: He that made thee, without thee, can not saue
 thee without thee. For soone, woordes spoken by imitation, chat
 is to saie, when one rehearseth that whiche an other man saiet, it
 must diligēty be obserued. Paule writeth to the Collos. Beweth
 the naughtynesse of some men, that will keepe simple folke in sub-
 iection with their Traditions, and trouble the conscience of the
 weake, sayng, doe not touche, doe not taste, doe not handle meate
 whiche Paule reiecteth, in rebuke to the hypocrites and obstinate
 Phariseis, and yet soine notwithstandinge fondly haue miscon-
 strued the same, perswadyng themselves that Paule gaue suche
 commaundemente. Therefore those thynges whiche are spoken

Luke. xij.

Bare, thus
waies taken.Augustine
sayng de-
prauced.Woordes
spoken by
imitation.

The arte of Logike.

by imitation, following an other mannes speeche, must evertwisse
he vnderstanden, then those wordes which a man speaketh of him
self, and giueth instruction certainly thereby. Thus farre haue I
handled these subtile argumentes whiche are in the wordes: now
will I rehearse all suche false conclusions as are in the matter.
And first this is to be noted, that the faulces of euery argumente,
are either in the wrong defining, and not well setting forth the
nature of any thing, or els in not aptly diuidyng, or lastly, not ad-
uisedly weying the causes of chynges, but heapyng them by with
out order or reason. The other subtilties aboue rehearsed, maie
either be auoided by well marking the true definition, or els ha-
uyng respecte to the diuision, by declaring severally how large
euery worde maie bee taken, and what error maie rise by the
false vnderstandyng of some one worde: the subtilties following,
containe suche absurdities, and rise not vpon the nature of some
one worde, but take the ground of the matter and thynge it self.

There be seuen in number.

i. From the accident.

ii. From that which is partly and after a sort
so, to be full and wholie so.

iii. The mistakyng of sentences gainsayng.

iiii. The consequent.

v. The cause that is not, put for the cause.

vi. The Cuckoes song, or chynges doubtfull,
to proue chynges that are as doubtfull.

vii. Many questions asked for one sayyng.

The first deceits.

The accident.

Accidens is the deceitfullnesse of the accident,
is when diuers thynge are ioyned together in one
substance, that is to saie, when one and the same
thing is referred both to the substance, and also to
the accidents, or els whē the accidents (whiche are not of the ve-
rie substance of man, but maie be a waie the man sayyng still) are
not well ioyned together, or els when we make our argumente,
ab inuenit, that is to saie, by that thynge whiche happened to a
manne casually, and pronounce the same to bee the verie proper
cause

cause, why and wherefore this or that is so. Of the first, this maie be an example.

What soue whiche fische is, fische is not. It ouer
Fleshe is food. And wherewith
The fische fische is foule.

Fische is fische.

In the first Proposition I vnderstande the substance of fische, and in the second Proposition I meane the accident or propertie whiche is in them bothe, and therefore myne argument is not lawfully, because I referred bothe the substances and the accident, to one and the same subiect. For although fische and fische be not all one in substance, because fische is one thing, and fische is another, and either of them hath their proper being and distincte substance, yet they agree bothe in their accidents, that is to say, in being to serue for the sustentance of man.

As hymne maie be committed. And wherewith
Whiche meane, even when the executor
Justice doe hymne. And wherewith
Therefore wicked men maie doe no Justice,
being set in authoritie.

Wicked men
doe, even
in executing
Justice.

The first Proposition is true, and the seconde also, for whatsoeuer is not of faith, the same is hymne. Neither can any thing bee well, how soeuer it seemeth in our eyes, except our faith bee firste fastned vpon the free merite of Christe. Therefore the Jewes how soeuer they keepe order, obstryping lawes, fische-ryng riots, yet all these doynges are nothyng but hymne, wharther we thei doe, since it neuer is done by godde to the sight of man. And yet this argumente is not truly lapt up. For in the first Proposition (hymne) is considered by hymne self, and therefore it is truly sayed, that no hymne maie be committed. In the seconde Proposition, where execution of Justice is reported in hymne, it is not so of it self, but because the person is full hymne self which executeth the Lawe, and therefore the offence commeth casually, and as the Logicians saye per accidens, whereas hymne before was considered according to the substance. And therefore though the officer being naughty is, otherwise when he doeth Justice, because faith maketh all workes good, yet must he doe Justice, because

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because it is so commaunded, euen as he must assuredly beleue that Iesus is the Messias, and the promised Sauiour sent of God. And though the doing be euill to hym, yet it is good to other. A. gaine, thus reason some.

Faith is a
woorke.

By faith we are iustified.

Faith is a woorke.

Ergo by workes we are iustified.

This Proposition is false, considering that faith in the first Proposition is the same, through which we are iustified, not by the worthinesse of our beleuyng, but through the free mercie of Christe, the which we apprehend through faith. And therefore we must in this saying consider that faith is referred by relation to Christe, through whom onely all mercie is attained, and that grace cometh not because faith is a worke, but because mercie goeth before, & receiveth freely all beleuvers, without worthinesse either of beleuyng, or els of doing any other woorke. Therefore in the first Proposition, faith beeyng not so taken as in the second, we maie saie well it springeth from this deceitfull place, and is therefore not lawfull.

Another argument against this

This man is a twice fellowe.

This man is lame.

Ergo this same man hath a lame wit.

This is euidently false, because the accidents of the bodie are referred to the substance of the minde, as by this last argument ye maie see the lameesse which is of the bodie, is attributed to the minde, whereby the reason is baine.

The third deceit is, when many thynges are referred to one subject, we make that to be the verie next and cheef cause, which is a small thyng, and cometh by hap unto any bodie, as thus.

David is a blessed man.

David is an adulterer.

Ergo adulterers are blessed men.

This is the consequent, because it is a deceitfull argument by that which is the accident. For when many thynges chance so the same, we must see what the verie causes are of the thyng which

whiche we attribute to the subiect, Dauid is a blessed man. And wherefore? Not because he was an adulterer, for, that happened to him casually, but because he was chosen of God, and had the feare of God before his eyes, and although this happened by the instinct of the Deuill, yet he called for grace, repented for, and trusted in Gods mercie, as the Psalmes plentifully beare witness, and this was the cause why he was blessed, so that in the first proposition, Dauid is other wise considered, then he is in the seconde proposition, saying an accident casually happenyng, is mentioned in the seconde parte, whereas in the first proposition a naturall power of God, and his especiall grace are bothe together rehearsed and comprehended. And therefore, ye must obserue that in suche deceiptfull argumentes, although many thynges are referred to one subiect, yet are they not after oyle sorte comprehended in the same subiecte, but diuersly considered, as when I saygne accidentes, both of bodie and minde together, as thus.

This fellowe is a Gospeller.

This fellowe is blinde.

Ergo, this fellowe is a blinde Gospeller.

Here ye may see the accidentes of the minde and bodie, ioygned together, whiche should not be so. And as for men blinde by nature, I haue knowne suche, that might more worthely haue been Bishoppes, then other, with all the eyes they haue. For, though their sight failed, yet their tongue serued to set forth the glorie of God. But some of our pastors see ouer well for their owne profite, and ouer little for our saule conuite.

The Anabaptistes reason thus.

That whiche is nothing, deserueth no punishment.

Therefore nothing.

Ergo, herne deserueth no punishment.

In the first proposition, that thynge is meant, whiche is not at all, but is cleane gone from nature, or is neuer in nature the nature of thinges. In the seconde proposition (herne) is reported to be nothing, because it self being nothing worthy, to speake a man of his other vertues, and so ouerthroweth nature, as much as it can. For, to saye as a man blinde, we iudge that he hath loste

herne is nothing.

nothing is nothing.

U. I.

his

The Arte of Logike.

his sight, herein we esteeme the sight, to bee a gift giuen of God, and blindnesse to be the taker awaie of that whiche was giuen of God. In like case, sinne is the destruction of that whiche was being of it self nothing. And so in this case, to doe well, is a thing the wante whereof, is nothing, the whiche is sinne. And thus, we see that this worde (nothing) is two waies taken, first, when a thing is nothing at all, neither yet euer was, againe, when a thing is nothing, whiche before was some thing: As before sinne, was grace, whiche sinne is here called nothing, and yet before nothing, whiche is mentioned in the firste Proposition, was neuer yet any thing, the one is called in Latine, *Nil prius*, the other is named, *Nil negans*.

Posses lawe
encreaseth
sin.

¶ Answer.
That soeuer encreaseth sinne, is not to be taught.
The Lawe of Posses encreaseth sinne.
Ergo, the Lawe of Posses is not to be taught.

I answer, the lawe encreaseth not sinne, by the owne nature, but casually. For, when man himself is corrupted with vice, then the Lawe maketh his sinne appeare heinous, and encreaseth the knowledge of sinne in him. So that in the firste Proposition, the nature of encreasynge sinne, is considered in the seconde Proposition, the casuall happenynge is rehearsed, and the knowledge thereof mentioned, when thinges are made open vnto our eyes, and the feeling of sinne euident to our hartes, which before for wante of skill, was not seen, nor yet known at all. All suche argumentes must be auoided by distinction, that is, ye must declare the double meaning in the two Propositions, and then ye haue soluted the subtiltie.

as in the
question

¶ The second.

As the part
in the whole.

E Rom that whiche is partly, and after a sorte so, to bee fully, and whole so, and by valour of the part, to giue iudgement of the whole.
¶ Of this decreit, there be foure kinds.
When the sentence propounded, repugneth to that whiche followeth, as thus:
I doe not knowe the way to the City, and yet I knowe the way to the City.

Posses

horses were good to be let for hire, when men runne a wale with them. It is rather called the carton, or carcase of a horse. Also called a wooden man; such a one as he was before.

is. Again, when fantasie frameth some worder in a mans head, and a thing is conceived by imagination, whiche is not at all.

Antiques or gargoyles are deuised by painters.

Ergo, there are suche creatures in verbe.

Thirdly, when a thing maye be, and is all ready in power to saie it selfe, it is.

A ragged Colte maye proue a good horse.

Ergo, the Colte is already a good horse.

Even in weightie matters of religion, this reason hath been used, as ye shall see hereafter.

Fourthly, when the parte is taken for the whole.

Wine is euill for those that be sicke of an agewe.

Ergo, wine is euill for all men.

This argument is from the particular, to the vniuersall, the which is easie to be auoided. Therefore, errours doe often chace when we comprehend the whole, speaking onely of the parte, or when we make the signe, to bee the very selfe thing; and all though ye haue had childlike examples before, onely to make the matter plaine, ye shall see that in weightie matters, this deceitfull argument hath been used.

We heare many now a daies crye out; and saie the Lawiers are naught, they meane no truth, but onely seke for lucre, where as no man I thinke, condemneth all Lawiers; although he haue iust cause, to accuse some wicked Lawiers. Some saie againe that Priestes haue leste fornication gladly will, and are neuer suspected now a daies for adulterie, beinge poked in to full nakedness; but some spare not to saie againe, that they haue made an exchange, leaping up whoe pome, and followinge concupiscence; the Deuill and all: For as God forbidde, that all Priestes should so doe. And in verbe, if any one should so reason, I would reckon his argument to bee comprehended, within the compass of this false conclusion. Thus reason the Anatomistes.

Lawiers.

Priest.

U. is.

Unright.

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Unrighte-
ousnes in e-
uery kingdō.

Unrighteousnesse is altogether reproboued.
In euery kingdome is much unrighteousnesse bled.
Ergo, euery kingdome is altogether reproboued.

By this meanes wee shall haue no hyngdome, no lawe, no
politickall order, no trade, no discipline, no iudgement for offend-
ours. But this argument is to be reiected, because it is to be de-
rived from the parte, to the whole. For, although many thynges
be amisse in a politickall bodie, yet the whole therefore must not
be dissolued, the lawes must not bee abrogated, nor yet good or-
der abandoned: for the chief thyng that is in euery Empire, is a
thyng ordeined of God, and a righteous thyng, as for an exam-
ple: Politickall order, lawes, statutes, iudgement, execution, and
punishment of offendours, been altogether ordeined of God,
and therefore, they reason amisse, that saie there is an abuse in a
politickall order, therefore, wee shall haue no order at all, in any
common weale: and againe ye shall perceiue, that there is moze
in the conclusion, then was rehearsed in the twoo former Pro-
positions: for, in the seconde Proposition, the vices generally
are rehearsed, but in the conclusion, the realme self is altogether
named. Therefore, wee ought diligentlie to note the circum-
stance of the thyng, if wee will auoide this subtiltie, and when
a thyng is spoken in parte, we must not thereby iudge the whole:
as measure the vniuersall, by that whiche is comprehended vnder
the generall.

A man maie forsake an adulterous wife,

Ergo, he maie forsake his wife.

This is from the inferiour, to the vniuersall, whiche is not
well gathered, as it standeth here: for, although a man maie for-
sake his wife, being naught of her bodie, yet maie he not forsake
an honeste woman, when it lieth hym to chaunge. For, this
woorde (wife) in the first Proposition, is hedged with her cir-
cumstance, that is to saie, adultrie, which causeth diuorcement.
Neither is this argument good, the King maie put to death e-
uery euill man: Ergo, the King maie put to death euery man. A-
gain, if we will reason negatiuely, as we did before affirmatiue-
ly, we shall frame our argument amisse: as thus.

¶ No wife should be put a waile.

¶ Ergo, neither a naughty wife should be put a waile.

¶ Again.

¶ No wine is euill.

¶ Ergo, no mingled wine is euill.

This is from the vniuersall to that, whiche is inferiour, and as ye would saie, hedged with his circumstance, and compassed with that, whiche before was neither in wife, nor yet in Wine, for a wife so long as she keepeth her selfe to her housechaude onely, she is no adulteresse. Wine that drinkech of it selfe, is not mingled, and therefore, the argument is not good, because that thing is in the lesse, or inferiour, whiche was not in the generall. There is a figure in *Rhetorique*, called *Hypenbole*, that is to saie, when a thing is spoken beyonde measure incredible, and yet is not so largely mente. As when I will praise a man for his strength, I will saie, he passeth *Heracles* in manhoode, meaning that he excelleth in manhoode and valeauntnesse. If wee knowe one that runneth well, either dogge, man, or horse, wee use to saie, he is as swift as a Swallowe, he flicth like an arrowe out of a bowe, meaning onely that he is exceeding swift. Therefore, we must diligently take heed, when suche speeches are used, that we take not them as they bee spoken, but as they are mente, neither take the whole for the parte, when the whole is expressed in wordes, and the parte mente in understanding. And alwaies bee wise in our mounting, that ascendencyng ouer high, we be not counteraunded to come downe as fowles. A noble man had a childe, whiche was verye skilful in leauning, and partly for such worthinesse as was in the childe, and partly to get fauour of suche a pere, as the father was, diuery commended the childe wonderfully well, and one above all other, thinking to saie the moste, not content with right excellente, so morousous twaine, so forward, saied thus after other menues iudgement, and reporte given. Surely in my minde, the childe is euen a very monster. Which that the noble manne laughed, to heare his folly, and all the other likewise that were there. Therefore, it is good in sayinge suche passinge reportes, discretely to waigh them before hande aduaies.

Things spoken about measure.

monstr.

The Arte of Logike.

Jeremie saith,

Scio Domine quod non hominis est eius,

I knowe Lorde that man hath not his waie.

Free will.

Jeremie.

Sennacherib

Chrysostome
his sayng.

Plato's say-
ng of Gods
dyng.

Esop's fable
of a cart that
bucketh backe.

Therefore, man hath no free will at all, no aduise, no choise, to deliberate either this waie, or that waie.

This consequence is not good: for Jeremie saiyng must be vnderstande excludely: the waie of man that is to saie, the call- ing of man, is not doely ruled, or lesse by the power, strength, or force of man, neither can he dooe any thyng of hymself alone, without the helpe, or grace of GOD. *Sennacherib* that wicked kynge, thought by his owne power and wisdomme, to winne his forres against Ierusalem, but he trusted to haue to hymself, and his owne wisdomme, that he lost his bootes and all weapons.

The chief and principall cause of all Gods actions, pibde us from

GOD, without tohom all our dooings are thyn, but so not with- standing doe they procede, that man hath choise, will, and liber- tie to doo good thinges, being assisted with the grace of GOD. As

Chrysostome saith the labourer, and saith, To him that hath may be giuen. And *Chrysostome* saith very well, God draweth vnto

him, but he draweth the willing. For, God will haue our good will, to be togged with his calling. Therefore, *Plato* in his iiii.

booke, where he frameth his common weale, doeth wel mitigate this Diuerbole, in this sentence which is somewhat credibill (God

doeth all thinges, and ordereth every action) sayng, God doeth all lowe this sentence, that God ruleth all thinges; but so notwith-

standing, I allowe it, it shal be well vnderstande, for, it were best to ground it so, that mannes will, labour, and diligence, must be

assignd therunto. As we see in calling vpon the Sea, shipmen

call to God for helpe, and God will helpe them, but so notwith- standing, it shal helpe themselves. As *Esop* sayng, whereunto there

is in the fables of *Esop*, a tale of one whose cartt stode fast in the mire, whiche man seeing his cartt thus fast, cryed to *Heracles*

for helpe, and prayed that he might come from heauen: and were

was made, that he should first helpe hymself, who then call vpon *Heracles*, of els his cartt were like to sticke fast. Thus

Another argument, The

The Church doeth not erre.
The Pharisees are the Church.
Ergo, the Pharisees doe not erre.

The Church
doeth not er.

The deceipte is, from the particulare to the vniuersall. As
who should saie, Some doe not erre in the Church: Ergo, no ha-
die doeth erre at all; that is of the Church; whiche is false, for
the Church is as well of the euill, as of the good. The good men
that are trained in the truth of God, and taught the true loue of
God, by ofte reading and following his woorde, haue the true
light, and erre not. Other that be slothfull, careless, prouined in
ambition, and all supbly luste, both can erre, and doe erre, from
time to tyme. Therefore, whereas I saie, the Church doeth not
erre, it is called *Synecdoche*, that is to shie, when the parte is u-
sed for the whole.

An other argument made by the Anabaptistes.

To the iuste, there is no lawe set.
The riotous sonne after his conuersion, is iuste.
Ergo, to him there is lawe set.

The iuste is
free from the
Lawe.

This argument is from the parte to the whole: he is deliue-
red from the lawe, for so muche as pertaineth to his condemna-
tion, but he is not free, for so muche as belongeth to the due obe-
dience, whiche he oweth vnto God: for, this order standeth for e-
uer, muste stedfastly, that euery creature bee obedient to God the
creatour. Again, forasmuch as euery iuste man, that is conuer-
ted from his euill waies, there remaineth a wicked inclination,
the same must alwaies bee byrdered and kepte in, euen with the
terroure of the Lawe, as though it were a misserable.

The signe is often tymes turned, into the thing it selfe, as
I rehearsed before.

Here is saint George vpon the wynddore.
Ergo, it is saint George hymself.

This argument men haue vied, when they haue seen a man
painted on a wall, or grauen in a stone, but aswell they might
call the picture of the houre S. George, as the picture of the man.
This is S. Christopher, This is S. Iohn. This is the picture of
Christ.

Images too
hen for sains
city.

The Arte of Logike.

Christe: *Ergo*, it is Christ. This is an Image of our Ladie: *Ergo* it is our Ladie, and here she will worke wonders, more then in an other place, as she did at Wallingham, at Boston, at Lincolne, at Ipswich, and I can not tell where, when Priests gathered money, and poore folkes were mocked. Here ye must be hie the consequent, because the signe is not the thing signified, neither is GOD bounde to any place, to the whiche he hath not bounde hymself by his woorde, nor yet any sainte neither. This rule overthroweth all manner of Soles, whiche haue been in all ages, from tyme to tyme. In this kinde of subtiltie, ye must diligently obserue fower circumstances, the persons, the tyme, the place, and the manner of comparing changes together, all which are false, and deceyfull reasons.

The persone.

An Officer appointed by the King, maie sende an offeudour to warde, by authoritie.

Ergo, euery man maie.

The tyme.

It is not lawfull to walke in the streets of London after the watche is set.

Ergo, it is not lawfull to walke in London at all.

The place.

It is not lawfull to giue a blowe within the courtte: *Ergo*, it is not lawfull at all in myne owne defence.

The manner of reasoning.

It is an Image of a man.

Ergo, it is a man.

Compare these two together, and make the accident assigned to a man, and ye shall perceiue that it taketh awaie all substance, and leaueth onely the shadowe: for, this woide pointed, restraineth the other, and compasseth hym within his boundes, so that a painted man, can no more be called a man, then an adulterous wife, can be called a wife, for so long is a woman called a wife, as she keepeth her self within the boundes of matrimony, other wise she is no wife, although men vse to call chee vniuers.

The three descryptions.

Secundum

Some men say that a cause that is not able to prove the matter is brought in; as though it were of force and strength, but the ground being considered, the fault is easily espied.

A cause that is not put for a cause.

Some men say that a cause that is not able to prove the matter is brought in; as though it were of force and strength, but the ground being considered, the fault is easily espied. Some men say that a cause that is not able to prove the matter is brought in; as though it were of force and strength, but the ground being considered, the fault is easily espied. Some men say that a cause that is not able to prove the matter is brought in; as though it were of force and strength, but the ground being considered, the fault is easily espied.

Ergo riches are not good. Some men say that a cause that is not able to prove the matter is brought in; as though it were of force and strength, but the ground being considered, the fault is easily espied. Some men say that a cause that is not able to prove the matter is brought in; as though it were of force and strength, but the ground being considered, the fault is easily espied.

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Philosophie.

Ergo riches are not good. Some men say that a cause that is not able to prove the matter is brought in; as though it were of force and strength, but the ground being considered, the fault is easily espied.

Good things
cherish and
will live.

The arte of Logike.

conclusion, and hauing the Instrument of resolution by her, that
 is, a deuie good Bishop and rodder, charged her soonne after to tell
 her every whither that was debated in the parliament house, so
 els he should sinarte for it surely. And what with this threatning
 of the thing, and what with the silence of her sonne, she was won-
 derfully much child, till she had gotten some what of the boie. The
 boie hymself first were mbying his fathers commandemente,
 and considering how he should bee pried at his hande, if he tolde
 all thynges in drede, as they were: and againe on the other side,
 seeyng present paine before hym, therood at hande, his mother
 with child, till she were somewhat satisfied, thought it better pre-
 sently, and by the waye, to mocke his mother, and so in shypp her
 mouthe with some forged tale: then fullsey to betraye his father,
 his freendes, and all his countrie. And therefore thus he begaine
 craftely to shap his tale: Mother, if you will promise me to kepe
 that close, whiche I shall disclose vnto you, and tell it no bodie li-
 uing, you shall heare the whole matter, and was to be. She an-
 swered, she would not tell it anyging, whatseuer it were. Then
 saide he, mother, the matter whiche I haue to saye, is of a strange
 Counsaill haue long debated, whether it were better for one man
 to haue two wiues, or one woman to haue two husbandes,
 and as yet the matter hangeth in suspence. When she heard this,
 her harte burne, and her stomacke was much charged wonderfull-
 ly, that except she had laide it, in case of her new booke, she
 was like she would haue burst. But the good man with much
 speede with her tongue, as she doeth with her taler, and setteth
 immediately to her neere neighbour, and from one to another, till
 at length a number knewe it, whereupon the ingens whole to
 goe altogether to the parliament house, to entreate the Senators
 to seeke no longer in this matter, but rather to determine with
 one assent and consent, whiche is a more better and more
 euery woman to haue two husbandes, and no other wise for
 no woordes good, any thing better of the same, and not with
 standing. In this example of man, see the subtile of this de-
 ceit. For when the mother asked her sonne, what he would
 saye of this thing, he said, I would saye, that it were better
 whiche

Dauidus
 answered to
 his mother.

Women har
 dely keepe
 counsaill.

at a word
 might be won
 .xv.

not to be

.v.

whiche

thing many things, and put forth diuers questions before we come to the purpose. For the firste, this maie bee answered thus.

To water and wine hotte or no?

The question is in ke, To what he must answer to the Gothe, where he cannot doe at once yne, and yne one rethorick answer, but only answering to the remainders will. But this is a crafty and one that hath but a psonell of witte, maie answer to this question, saying a distinction, and generally the saying the qualities of bothe wine and water, other wile he can not be able to make a ny reasonable answer, as the question is propounded. (Howe shal I be wyllyng of answers, and saying to God hymself, shalbe among Christians or not)

Here ye see, that for two diuers things, one certaine question is directly required, whereas no man canind to answer at a word: and therefore the question saying (adone more to pnt), must necessarily be failed.

I will merly adde an other, to this agreed to the seconde manner of asking, and I will adde the same rather to give matter of laughing, then that there is any greace weight in it. A Lawyer took paines in a matter of Lawe for a certaine gentleman, that was sometime a Schoaler. The gentleman pleased hym a horse for his labour, the Lawyer after paines taken, requites his horse, the gentleman denies his be de, although the Lawyer had witness. And thus the gentleman refuses hure to the Lawyer. Sir ye see, all hortes bee not of one colour, but of diuers colours, some blacke, some white, some baye, some daple: If I owe you a ny by promise, I owe you no more of one colour, then I owe of another, considering I do promise you no more of one colour, then I do of an other, and I may be witness of my promise well in delivering one of my colours to you, as an other. Therefore, either I owe you hortes of all colours, or els I owe you none at all: but I do not owe you hortes of all colours (considering I promise you but one) therefore I owe you none. And, as the Lawyer sayd, the Lawyer, where this shode pnter made pnter in Lawe, and pnter, then in the world, you shal see in your pnter, when the gentleman saide hym to be reasonable,

A horse
promised by
a Lawyer.

sonable, and heard him: so also, he gaue him according to his promise, considering he referred the whole matter to gently, to his pleasure.

For this seconde manner of asking, when of one thing many are asked, one may easily bee enuicled and brought to an inconuenience, before he beware, and of this kinde of asking there is also another example in *Tallie*, where he speaketh in his booke *De inuersione*, of this figure *inductio*, which is by thynges not doubtfull, to proue that thyng true, which is doubtfull. *Socrates* theweth that *Alphisto* had this talke with *Zenophon* and his wife, in manner and forme following, after other communication had before.

Socrates.
Alphisto.

And tell me in faiche (*Alphisto*) if thy neighbour had more precious Jewelles then thou now hast, whether wouldest thou wishe to haue hers, or thine owne? So he answered, I would haue hers. What if he had more costly garmentes, more fine apparell, wouldest thou not haue it also? Yes *Socrates* would I (*Alphisto*). Howell I thinke, what if thy neighbour had a better house than thou now hast, whether haddest thou rather herge thine owne still, or haue hers? With that he blushed.

Socrates
Zenophon

Then *Alphisto*, when opportunity serued, spake to *Zenophon* like wife, and saide merrily vnto hym, he not knowing of this that was spoken before. I wote thou tellest me *Zenophon*, what if thy neighbour had a better horse then thine is, haddest thou rather haue thine owne, or thine neighbours? I would haue his saith he. What if he had better lands then thou hast, wouldest thou haue his or thine owne? I would haue his saith he. What if he had a better wife then thou hast, wouldest thou change or no? Dost thou haue saide neuer a worde, then spake *Alphisto*, for as much as he of you, onely hath not answered me in that point, which I wote he lieth to knowe. I my self will the me what he doth thinke. For you heying a woman, first desire a man, and desire to haue a right honest woman. Therefore excepte you both shall so be haue your desire, then there may bee faulte, as if he were not woman, more honeste woman than then you can bee, withoute if you both will euen more honeste earnestly

earnestly desire that, whiche you thinke principall and best of all, bothe that thou being a housebando, mightest haue a right honest wife, and you also being a woman, might bee married to a right honest housebando.

The sixte deceipte.

R *Epetitio principij*, the Cuckoes song, that is, repetyng of that wholy in the conclusion, whiche before was once ly spoken in the firste Proposition: as els by thynges doubtfull, to proue thinges that are as doubtfull.

The Cuckowes song.

Every slanderer must be banished the Courte.

Duche a man is a slanderer.

Ergo, every slanderer must be banished the court.

The conclusion is not well gathered, for it should not bee vniuersall, but particulare, and therefore, sayng the same is repeated that was spoken before, without any good probation: in my minde it maie bee called the Cuckowes song. Selfe willed folke that followe luste, and forsake reason, vse ofte the Cuckowes song. As being asked why they will doe this and that, they answer straight. Forie, because I will doe it, or because it pleaseth me best so to doe. The poore men being thus answered of the wealthie, shall hardely escape daunger. For, though it be a plaine deceipte, and by reason should bee ouerthrowen, yet so longe as might beareth rule, and right is set a side, reason is out of reason, and doeth but little helpe. Some women are subiect to this answer, whiche in witte doe excell, though in the right partes of reason, fewe scholers can hardly finde them. Well, God graunt all our willes, to stande euer with his will, and then I doubt not, but this harme shall with ease be auoided, and all deceipt for euer set a parte. Again, when an vknownen thyng, is proued by a thyng, that is a smuche vknownen as the other is.

A reason without reason.

In Purgatorie, sinnes be forgiven to the deuote.

Ergo, we must saie Masse still for the deuote.

Purgatorie.

This wise reason, sonde Preachers heretofore haue made, that therefore, we must haue Masse for the deuote, because in purgatorie sinnes be forgiven the deuote. And yet doubt I a smuche of this place Purgatorie, as I mistrust this foolish Massing, and

The Arte of Logike.

to false truthes, it is sinne to like either of the in booke, and as for Purgatorie, I thinke there was neuer any suche, but onely inuention to feare the simple, as children haue been made afraied with a visor, or els found out to picke menues purses. An other.

Praying to
Saintes.

Thus many hundred yeres haue men vsed to praye to saintes departed.

Ergo, they doe not amisse, that praye to the dead still. I answer, whoredome hath been vsed these many hundred yeres: *Ergo*, it is lawfull, bothe to haue Stewes, and to goe to the Stewes still.

Customs,
Purce vnto
naughtinesse.

Euery man maie see, how foolishly this argument is, and yet it is as good as the other euery yuche of it. For, although menne haue praied, men haue gone on pilgrimage thus long, and thus long yet it is not therefore true, that the people did well therein. For, wee Englishmen knowe (not onely by heare saie, but also by good experiance) that custome is the mother, and the sucke giuer vnto all erreure. And therefore, when suche arguments are made, we saie. *Dubium per id quod aque dubium est; confirmatur.* That whiche is doubtfull, is proued by that, whiche is as doubtfull, and so we doe not allowe the argument.

Thirdly, when that thynge is taken to proue, as though it were vndoubted, and euery bodie agreed thereunto, whereas yet it is in controuersie.

Anabaptist
Aye.

The Anabaptistes haue the holy Ghoste, the teacher of all thinges.

Ergo, they neede not to heare the Gospell, nor yet be bounde to followe it.

Who knoweth not, that hath any knowledge of the truthes, that the firste maie be lawfully doubted, and rather denied, then graunted.

Fourthly, this deceipt is then vsed, when that whiche followeth, proueth that, whiche goeth before, as though the Carte went before the horse, for, often tymes that thynge whiche is proued, is moe assured then that, whiche doeth proue, as thus.

Infantes.

Infantes haue saide.

Ergo, they must be Baptised.

The

The consequent is vndoubted true, forasmuche as wee finde it so in the Scripture, that in the Primitive Church, whole families were baptised; children and all: for, wee reade not that they were excepted, and yet some doubt, and that of the greatest Clerkes, whether children haue faith, or no.

¶ The sixth decepte.



Generatio leuistica that is the mistaking of contradictory propositions, is a deceptfull argument, which comprehendeth in it selfe, all o:her about rehearsed subtilties. The occasion of this erreure lieth, for not knowyng what is contradiction, Contradiction therefore, is a repugnancie of one and the same not substance onely, nor yet name onely, but of the substance, and name bothe together. *Aristotle* notwithstanding hath compassed this decept within his boundes: First, when respect is not made to one and the same thing, but differently applied.

¶ Mistaking of contradictione propositions.

To eate fleshe, is good for heath sake.
To eate fleshe is not good whē offence may folowe.
Ergo, to eate fleshe is good, and not good.

Truthe it is, and yet shall it not followe, that whosoever eateth, the same man doeth offence: considering to eate is lawfull, and is none offence to God at all, beying once allowed by the magistrate, in whose hand lieth the whole ordering of this matter. Again, this decept is vsed, when contradiction is made, according to diuers respectes, as thus.

The Lawe is to be followed in all preceptes, and not in Ceremonialles, nor yet alwaies in iudicialles neither.

Ergo, the lawe is to be followed, & not to be followed

It is euen so, and yet not true neither, that the lawe is alwayes to be reiected, & to be followed, as it pleaseth our phantasies.

Thirdly, this subtiltie is fastened, when a contradiction is vsed, and yet not vsed of like force, so that the latter parte, doeth not denie the former, in one manner of vnderstanding, as thus.

I knowe the worde of God.

And I doe not knowe it.

Those that liue licentiously, and feare not the generall retri-

ction,

rection,

The Arte of Logike.

rection, maie iustly bee here concluded, and the two sentences, whiche seeme to gainsaie, maie both be true in theinu for, some knowe that the scriptures are of God, or at least thei know, that the scriptures are commonly taken for the woorde of God, and yet thei themselves, knowe not one woorde of Gods will, nor yet passe a whitte for it. Or we maie saie, that those poore soules in the Pope's reigne, knewe the woorde of God onely be hearesaie, when they heard the Gospell reade in Latine, and could not tell one woorde what it ment.

Forwerthly, the tyme maie alter thynges, and make two diuers thynges to be bothe true, as thus.

To worke vpon the Sabbath is forbidden, and yet not to worke vpon other daies, is also forbidden.

Ergo, to worke, and not to worke, are both forbidden

It is an easie matter to auoide all suche deceiptes. Therefore, there is a rule in *Logike*, that two contradictions can neuer bee bothe, either false or true, at one and the same tyme, and that in one respect, as thus.

All true beleuers shall attaine saluation.

Some true beleuers shall not attaine saluation.

These two Propositions can neuer be bothe together, either true or false. Now the other, whiche were made before, might be bothe true, at one and the same tyme, and therefore, they are not contradictories, because thei are not considered in respect of one and the same thyng, at one and the same time, but diuersly applied and considered, as thus.

To preache in the congregation is mete for a man, and not for a woman.

Ergo to preache is mete, and not mete.

All this is true beyng diuersly considered, first a woman maie not preache, and yet a man maie, and so the sentence is true, and is maie well be saied, to preache is mete, and not mete, without any contradiction at all, because of the diuers respectes, whiche be had bothe to the man; and to the woman. If the rule of contradictory Propositions before rehearsed be well marked, all these deceiptes maie easely be auoied.

*Of particulare auoidyng false argumentes,
whiche are deriued from the places.*



When I see an argumente deriued, from these subtile places, or els from the places of inuention, whiche I haue before at large declared: I ought to obserue diligently, the generall rules and preceptes there giuen, for, if one reason thus from the generall worde, suche a man followeth naughtinesse: *Ergo*, he is a thiefe, the argument is not good, and the error appereth the rather, by this generall rule. From the general to the kinde, the argument is not good. For, though one bee naught other wise, yet maie he liue naughtely long enough, and yet be no thiefe at all, as he maie be an adulterer, a swerer, or suche like.

*Particulare
auoidyng
false argu-
mentes.*

*Of false reasons made through the
euill framing of an argument.*



Of wrong framing, maie with ease bee espied, if the rules be once learned, that are before sette forth for the same purpose. And againe, all other kinde of argumentes, haue rules especiall, and proper to them selues, where by the true ordering of an argument, is better knowne.

*False rea-
sons through
euill framing*

Of objections made to an argument.



Objections are then vsed, when we doe not dissolve the argumente, by the rules of *Logike*, or directly auoide the daunger, but bying an other thyng, as an example, to overthrowe that, whiche was spoken before, and this maner is former waies vsed.

Objections.

f. By taking occasion of the selfe same thyng, that is put forth and wrestyng it other wise.

ii. By vsyng the same example in an other matter.

iii. By making a cleane contrary example.

iiii. By standyng to auctoritie, or vsing sentences of the sage.

For the first, this example maie serue, riches are good, because they bying pleasure. The aunswere: Naie Paris, riches be euill, because they bying woe.

Of the seconde, thus. Suche a one is an honette man, for, I sawe hym once giue almes to the poore: I aunswere, suche a one

Quij.

is.

The Arte of Logike.

is no vponkarde, for, I sawe hym once sober.

Of the thirde, thus. Suche an honest man hath once receiued a greate displeasure of his friends and neighbour. Ergo, he maie hate hym deely for euer. Naie, not so, for the wicked man will sometymes forgiue, receiuyng displeasure, and therefore, the good man must muche moze forgiue.

Of the fowerth, thus. Forgiue hym, because he is a childe. Naie, not so, for Salomon biddeth that the rodde should not goe from the childe, therefore, it is good to beate hym when he offendeth.

I haue translated thus farre, to disclose vnttruthes, and to open cloked errors, wherein though sometymes, the examples be but slender, yet in greater matters, the same deceipte hath taken place. Therefore, though to the Englishe eare, they maie seeme straunge, yet I hope they will bee better taken, when this is knowen, and fully seen, that they giue light to greater matters, and that *Logike* by good order, and perfecte reason, dooeth rule all, and espyeth faultes, whiche other wise would hiede offence: for, looke what false argument is vsed, the same maie with ease bee founde in some one of these deceiptfull corners, or els where in the places of inuention, and therefore, maie by arte easily be auoided: especially, if the other rules aboue rehearsed, bee once well digested. For, the rules are touche stones, to trie vnttruthes, and to frame matters right. And generally good herde ought to be had, that the matter, and forme of euery argumente bee true, accordyng to the rules, for, by these twoo poyntes, all errors are espyed. The faulte is in the matter (called in Latine *Materia*) when wordes are doubtfull, and maie diuersly bee taken, and also when the pith or substance of the matter is confounded, and straungely vsen by wordes toygned together, and thynges not orderly placed: in all whiche kinde of argumentes, ye must vse either a flatte deniall of the proposition, or els vse a distinction, to shewe how the argument maie be true, and how it maie be false, accordyng as it is vnderstanden. We vse a deniall, when of two propositions in the argumente, we deny either the proposition at large, or the seuerall, by shewyng the faulte to

Faulte in the
matter.

bee in the definition, in the diuision, in the causes, or some other place, as thus.

I had good chere in suche a mannes house.

Ergo, he is an honest man.

Here the faulte is in the definition, for, if I would goe about to define an honest man, euery bodie would laugh me to scorn if I would thus define hym. That man, whosoever he be, that maketh me good there at his house, is a very honest mā: but I must rather saie thus. Whatsoeuer he is, that doeth as he would bee doen vnto, and wrongeth no bodie, but liueth still hyghly, godly, and continently, the same is an honest manne, or els not. For, vertue is gotten by long practise, and by well doing of many good thinges, not by making a good dinner, and therefore, the other aboue rehearsed definition, because it is not lawfull, nor agreeing with the rules of a definition, is utterly to be denied this reason applied therunto, that the definition is not lawfull. Note withstanding, in taking of honest men, euermore the wealthier are considered, and therefore, thus and suche like talkes is commonly vled. Of what opinion is suche a manne? An honest man surely, saith an other, for, he will eate his meate I warraunt you, he is none of these scrupulous consciences, he hath the Bible in his house &c more bee sure: talke with hym of the Sacrament when you will, and he is able to aunswere *ad omnia quæ*. As though whole religion stode in these pointes onely. I asked once a fellowe in a skene, if he could doe any thyng in the Scriptures, whose learning I was then commanded to examine. He answered me thus. *Etiā, possum fabulari de Sacramento, si placeat*. That is, yea sir, I can babble of the sacrament if it please you. Yea, & I, Harie then you haue enough, and I warraunt you against all men, and so bad him farewell, beyng well instructed of his great worthines. I remember of an other, and that no small bird, whiche was better learned then wise, and yet not so well learned in deede, as he thought hymself (in his own opinion) wise and vled an other more daungerous reason. For, whereas it chaunced by occasion of talke, that one in his companie crueld against the same mannes frende, speaking thinges nothing to the

Good chere.

Gospell preachers, taken for good man.

some

The Arte of Logike.

some, and other wise then he would gladly heare, although not greatly mislyng the quishen, in reportyng truthe, he tooke the matter very hotte, and like a frende speake earnestly, in his frendes cause, testifying for his honestie, with moste constant wordes, & to perswade hym the better, he vsed this soze reason. Thou art to blame (& he) to depaue suche a mauners estimation, for, by Gods mother, he is a very honeste manne, for, he is my speciall frende, I would thou shouddest knowe it, and therefore, cease thy railing: with that, other came to parte them, for, they fell to reasoning with argumentes, that were neither in figure, nor in moode, but stooode in plaine buffettes, which is a subcillie, that is not mentioned within the compasse of this booke, and therefore, dangerous, neither can it bee auoided, excepte one haue a hiepeece, or some weapon in his hande to beare of suche deceytes, and so saue hym selfe harmlesse. Some call suche rough dealing Carters Sophistrie, when the first reasoneth a matter by buffettes, whiche the tongue should proue by argumentes. Againe, for the diuision: when it is not well made, it is to be denied in like maner, the cause shewed why, and wherefore, as thus.

Wage ouer
chroweth
reason.

Carters
Sophistrie.

Every man is either wastfull or couetous,
Cicero is a man.

Ergo, Cicero is either wastfull or couetous.

This diuision is not good, for, many men offende in neither, but live moderately, content with their owne, bee it neuer so little. Howeuer, when no true cause is applyed, but a false reason forged, ye maye auoide the danger by denyng it, as thus.

Money maketh vnthiftes,

Ergo, money is naught.

Or thus.

Fire burneth houses.

Ergo, what shall we doe with it.

Or thus.

Water drowneth whole ciuities.

Ergo, water is nothing profitable.

In all suche argumentes, the true cause is omitted; and a counterfect cause vsed. For, neither money, nor fire, nor yet water

ter

ter doe harme of theim selues, but the naughtinesse of nature, whiche abuseth them, and the negligence of man, whiche forsaeth not to them, is the ver y true cause of their euill doyng: and yet in weightie matters, suche sonde reasons haue been vsed, as for the readpng of Gods worde, for women to belearned, for *Rhetorike* to be taught, or the tempozall law at this daie, in this our realme to be frequented, or occupied.

Gods worde
Rhetorike.
Temporal law

A distinction must be vsed, when any worde is doubtfull, and maie be taken diuersly. As thus.

*T*yme healeth sicke folke.

*E*rgo, it is very good.

Here a distinction must be vsed, for tyme as well signifieth an hearbe, as it signifieth the space, whiche is an houre, daie, or pere. A scende of myne was called Harris: one not well knowyng his name, called hym Harrissonne. I denigh the sonne (or he) not meanyng the second persone in Trinitie, but the addition of this worde (sonne.)

A learned man a Philition (some knowe whom I meane) haupng at a certayne tyme a coate of Cleuerre, that was muche woyn, and bare at the breast, bepyng then also poore withall, and haupng a chime purse, sittynge at a table, and layng his hande upon his breast, saied thus merely to his frende, Well (or he) for all this harde worlde, at the worste I am thus muche worthe, euen in bare Cleuet. The same manne afterwarde, sittynge at a table, not haupng elbowe roune, but bepyng troubled, and his coate some what araied, whiche was dyessed at the Whiermans, not past two or thre daies before, saied merely I praie you my waiters, be good to my coate, for I promise you, with in these two or thre daies, it hath scapte a scourpyng.

A Philition.

A young man of Cambridge, standyng in a galerte ouer the water, and lookyng on his booke, haupng the water on the one side, and a gardine on the other side, wherein (as it chaunced then) were diuers madens of the toun (for it was aboute Easter, at what tyme maides godden abowde; after they had taken their spakes, as they call it) bepyng thus besecte, one of his fellowes bepyng abowd, and sepyng hym there, bad hym come ouer to hym.

A young man
of Cambridge

He answered, I cannot come. Chether demanded why? Sparie (w^{ch} he) because I am compassed with fire and water. Meaning the maidens to be fire, and a p^{ro}uocation to lust, burning w^{om}en then fire: and so all good aucth^{ors} haue vsed this w^{or}de fire. As Terence. *Accede ad ignem hunc, iam calefas plus satis.* Come to this fire, saith Parmeno to Phedria, meaning I haue the harlot, and you shalbe as hote as coles by and by. Therefore where such speache is vsed, it is alwaies called in Latine, *Metaphora*. That is to saie, a tournyng from the proper signification to that whiche is not proper, wherein the olde Philosophers haue wonderfully excelled, as *Diogenes*, *Socrates*, and in our time sir Thomas More, a man for his witte, very singular.

Faults in the
making of an
argument.

The faulte that is in the forme, or maner of making, as we call it, maie be dissolued, when we shewe that the conclusion, is not well p^{ro}ued by the former Propositions, and that the argument is either not well made, in figure or in moode, or in bothe: for of true thynges, none other thyng can be concluded but truth, if the due forme of concluding be obserued, and the iust platyng or setting of the partes of termes, called in Latine, *termini*, as ye heard before, be truly kept; as the rules before haue taught. Notwithstandyng of false Propositions, an vndoubted true maie well enough be concluded, as thus.

Every synne, maie be suffred in a common weale.
Every execution doen by a lawe is synne.
Ergo every execution, doen by a lawe, maie be suffred in a common weale.

The two first propositions are manifestly false, and yet the conclusion is very true. So that ye maie see after two false propositions, a true conclusion maie followe, and not contrary wise; of two true Propositions, a false conclusion can be made. As we saie in Latine. *Ex veris non nisi verum sequitur*, that is to saie, of true thynges, nothyng doeth followe but truth. Therefore, when the conclusion seemeth not good, ye maie iustly suspect the other two Propositions, although they seme neuer so true, for vndoubtedly, the faulte is either in the iust handling, or in the argumente is not in his moode and figure accordyngly, or els in the

the

the confounding of wordes either euill placed, or not well applied, or els in the doubtfullnesse of some worde.

All riot is an offence.

No coueteousnesse is riot.

Ergo, no coueteousnesse is any offence.

Thus we see a false conclusion, made of two vndoubted true Propositions, and yet I saied before, of true saynges nothing doeth followe, but onely truthe. But abide, ye must examine this argument with the rules, and then ye shall see, that the faulce is in the forme, or maner of makyng an argument. For it is in no moode in the first figure, although it be an argument of the first figure.

Sometymes the faulce is onely in the matter, and not in the maner of making an argument, whereof there are diuers examples about rehearsed. Sometymes the faulce is both in the matter, and in the maner of making an argument, as this.

Faulce in the matter of an argument.

The pearth is profitable, and causeth muche plentye.
All men are in the pearth.

Ergo all men are profitable, & causeth muche plentye.

First, it is in no figure, because the double repeate in the first Proposition, is the substance of the pearth; and in the seconde Proposition, is the beeyng in the pearth, and so there bee sower termes in the twoo Propositions. Again, it is in no moode, because the first Proposition in the first figure, is not diuiversal. And this maie suffice, whiche hitherto I haue rehearsed for the solution of an argument, so much as he that can diuide, define, and make his arguments in order and figure, according to the rules before mentioned, and diligently marke doubtfull wordes: shall soon espie the faulce in any such argument, so much as it can not otherwise be, but that he whiche knoweth the best, shall easily iudge, and without difficultie see the worke.

And nowe the rather to delighte the reader, I will adde here certaine wittie questions and argumentes, whiche can hardlye be avoided, beeyng very pleasaunt, and therefore not vniuersally to be knowne.

3.4.

They

The Arte of Logike.

Trappes
argumentes.

They are called trappung argumentes, because fewe that answered vnto them, can auoide danger, and thus they are named in straunge wordes.

Crocodylites.

Antistrophe.

Ceraina.

Aphistan.

Cacosphistan.

Vris.

Pseudomenos.

Crocodylites, the Serpentes guile.



Crocodyle.

Crocodylites, is suche a kinde of subtiltie, that when we haue graunted a thyng to our aduersarie, being asked before what he will saie: the same turneth to our harme afterwarde; and causeth an inconuenientie, thereupon to ensue. Aucthours doe feigne, that the *Crocodyle* being a monster in Egypte, did take a womans childe from her, and spake with the mother in this wise: woman, I will giue thee thy childe againe, if thou wilt saie truth to me, and tell me assuredly, whether I will giue thee thy childe againe, or no: she answered, I know assuredly, thou wilt not giue me my childe againe, and therefore it is reason I haue my childe againe, because I haue saied true. Naie, saied the *Crocodyle*, I will not giue thee thy childe againe, because thou maist be seen to haue saied truth: lest that if I giue thee thy childe againe, thou shouldest haue made a lye: neither yet would I haue giuen thee thy childe againe, if thou haddest saied otherwile, because then thou haddest not saied true. And herof this argumente hath his name, called *Crocodylites*. Notwithstanding, *Lucian* telleth this tale after an other sorte; and maketh *Christippus* to aske an other man, what he would saie, in case he should be asked a question of the *Crocodyle*, as I haue before rehearsed.

Antistrophe.

The reboun-
ding or tour-
ning againe of
an argument

Antistrophe, is nothing els, then to tourne a mannes saying into his owne necke againe, and to make that which he bringeth

byngeth for his owne purpose, to serue for our purpose, in Latine it maie be called, *Inuersione Anali Galen* hath a notable example of *Pithagoras*, a noble Sophiste, and *Euasthus* Scholer to the same *Pithagoras*. This *Euasthus* was a very young man, and glad to learne Eloquence, and to please causes in the Common place. This young man therefore, considering *Pithagoras* to be a singulare man in this behalfe, and a maie Scholemaster for his purpose, desired to bee his Scholer, and promised to giue hym a greatesomme of money for his paines, euen as muche as he would aske, and gaue hym vpon a gremant halfe in hande before he learned, and covenanted therevpon, that he should haue the other halfe, euen at the first daie that he stood at barre, and by pleadynge, got the ouer hande in iudgement of his aduersarie. After this, when he had been a good while *Pithagoras* Scholer, and profited very muche in the Lawe, and yet notwithstanding, came not to the Barre; but still shifted hym of, and tracted the tyme (of like because he would not paye that residue of his money) *Pithagoras* taketh aduise ment, as he hymself thought, very subtilly, and charged hym with his promise, hauing an action of debte against hym, and therefore he called hym to the Lawe. Where, when he had hym before the Judges, he beginneth his tale in this wise.

Pithagoras
and his scho-
ler *Euasthus*

Here I haue thee now (saith *Pithagoras*) and learne there, for foolish fellowe as thou art, and make this pointe for thy learning: whether the iudgement be giuen with thee, or against thee, I shall haue my money euer y greates of it. If thou art cast in the Lawe, I haue wonne by vertue of the Lawe, if thou art not cast, but gettest the ouerhande, by iudgemente of these menne, yet muste I haue it neuerthelesse, because our bargaine was so made, when I first began to teache thee. *Euasthus* hearyng this answered as ye shall heare. I could easily auoide this your troked subtiltie, and bee without all danger, if I would not stande at the barre my selfe, but get some aduocate for me: for by suche meanes, you could not charge me with any debte, considering I my selfe pleased no cause. Notwithstanding I like it better a thou shalt saye, that I my selfe am here personally, and speake

Pithagoras
reason to his
scholer.

Euasthus
answers to
his master.

in myne owne cause saying that not onely, I will gette the over-
hande of you in this our matter, whereby I shall be discharged of
debte, but also euen in this argument I will tourne your owne
wordes, into your owne necke againe, and so triumphe bothe
waies. And therefore learne you againe, as wise as ye are, and
marke this pointe for your learning, whether the iudgement
be giuen with you, or against you; I shall saue my money euer
grote of it. For if you be call in the Laid. I haue wonne by Ver-
tue of the Laid, and so I owe you nothing. If you be not call, e
but gette the overhande of me, by the Iudgement of these men:
then accordyng to my bargaine, I shall paie you nothing; be-
cause I haue not gotten the overhand in Iudgement. The Iud-
ges saying the matter so doubtfull, and so harde to determine for
either partie: saying to boe amysse, left to the matter rather with
out Iudgement for that tyme, and deferred the same to an other
season. Thus percee that the young man being the Scholer, gaue
his maister a boane to graue, and bet hym with his owne rodde,
whiche the maister had made for his Scholers taile.

**Christoph-
us.**

There is in *Christophorus* a wonderfull pretie talke, betwixt
the father, and the sonne, whiche serueth well for this purpose.
For where as the sonne had beate his father, contrary to all
order and honestie, yet notwithstanding, the sonne thought he
had as good authoritie to beate his father if he did amysse, as the
father had to beate hym. And therefore he saied, wherefore should
my father beate me? His father made answer, Marie (q he)
because I loue thee, and wouldest thou shouldest doe well. Marie
therefore (q the sonne) will I beate thee to, because I loue thee
also good father, and wouldest thou shouldest doe well; and with
that laied on strokes surely, till he made his father graunt that it
was as lawfull for the sonne, to beate his father, as for the father
to beate his sonne.

**A good sonne
paine of shame**

**Horned ar-
gumentes.**



Eratic Argumentationes, are called horned argumen-
tes, the whiche are so dangerous to any wight that is
bothe parties propounded, that it will be harde to escape
a foile, Euen as when ye see a Bull, and wouldest catche him by the
horne

hoyes, ye see a smuche daunger in the one hoyle, as in the other
 and so you feare to take hym on either side. In like case, when
 these hoyned argumentes are propounded, a manne uneth can tell
 what to answer. As we reade in the Gospell of Mattheue, the
 xxi. Chap. when the Pharisees did sende their Disciples (whiche
 did ppretende holinesse, and beare a face of true Religion) to take
 Christe in a snare. And therefore first they came, gauiug him a
 name of auctoritie, & called him maister, flateringly, as though
 he might speake his mynde freely to them, because there was
 none but his scholars, and suche as thought vnfeignely to haue
 dyed in the truth: secondly, they praise hym for his goodnes, that
 he is true in all his saynges, and vsesh no dissimulation: and
 againe they saie, that not onely he is true, but also teacheth the
 waie of truth, and then thus they begin to question with hym,
 and to feele his minde, what he will saie (for truly they thought
 to take hym in a trappe, whether he held his peace, or spake) and
 therefore they saied, Sir, maie we lawfully paie tribute to Caesar
 or not? Or how thinke you, worthy it stand with Gods word, that
 we maie paie or not? Here Christe was besette two waies. First
 it was daungerous for hym to holde his peace: for then he might
 seme by so doyng, to haue respecte to the persone of manne, and
 for feare, not open the truth, in suche a weightie matter, and so
 staine the glorie of God. Of the other part, if he should answer
 it were a daungerous peece of wordes in like maner, for they
 thought, he would either spake on *Caesar*'s side, and allowe pay-
 yng of tribute, and so incurre the hatred of all the people, where
 by they might boldly afterwarde, porte hym to death: els they
 thought he would speake against *Caesar*, and so he should commit
 treason, and bee apprehended thereupon, as a traitour. But
 Iesus knowing their naughtie purpose, and plainly seing where
 about they went, disappointed them of their will, that they could
 take none advantage of hym at all. And therefore he saied, because
 he would publish their falshode, what tempte you me, ye hypo-
 crites? Shew me the coigne of the tribute. And then toke him a
 ponic, and he saied vnto them: whose is this Image & superscrip-
 tion? They saied vnto him, *Caesar*'s. Then saied he, giue therefore
 unto

Pharisees
 sought to
 take Christe
 in a trappe.

begin the
 first part
 of the
 first part
 of the first
 part of the

begin the
 first part
 of the first
 part of the

Christe
 answers.

begin the
 first part
 of the first
 part of the

The Arte of Logike.

unto *Cesar* the thynges whiche are *Casars*, and unto *God*, those thynges, which are *Gods*. *Christe* did not at the first, when they propounded their question unto hym, plainly saie, giue unto *Cesar* the thynges whiche are *Casars*, but when he had asked theim, whose cōyngne it was, and that they by their owne confession, had graunted it to be *Casars*; whereby they bare witnesse of theimselfes, that they were subiecte to *Cesar*: he saies, for as muche as you graunt your selues, by the vertue of this cōyngne, to be tributaries, paie on *Gods* name to *Cesar*, the thynges that pertaine to *Cesar*, and unto *God*, those thynges that are *Gods*.

g Cacosistata.

Caill argu-
mentes, that
make aswell
agaist one,
as with one,

Cacosistata are suche argumentes, that being propounded betwene twoo persones, they serue aswell for the one parte as the other, as thus. You must forgiue him, because he is but a childe; no *Parie*, therefore will I beate hym, because he is but a childe. Or thus. This man should not be iudged to dye, by any temporall law, because he is a *pierst*; yes *Parie*, therefore should he be adiudged to dye, because he is a *pierst*, and hath offended, whiche should haue giuen good example to other of well liuyng. Alas saith one, it is pittie suche a man should be hanged, considering he is a gentleman. And why not *Gentlemen*, aswell as other poore menne, if they deserue it? *Yea*, why not they rather then any other, if they moze deserue it then any other.

g Asistata.

Yf surde rea-
soning.

Asistata are suche argumentes, as are impossible to be true, as when a childe of twoo yeres olde, should be accused of adulterie, as though it were like, that he could offende in suche filthynesse: or els thus, if one saie, he holdeth his peace, and yet doeth speake still.

g Pin.

Uncertaine
reasoning.

This is nothyng els, but when one goeth aboute to proue a thyng, and maketh that whiche should proue, to bee as vncertaine, as a thyng which is proued, as thus. In purgatorie spynes are forgiuen, by vertue of the *Passe*, Ergo, we must saie *Passe* still. Whereas I thinke there is no *Goodly* wise man, but doubteth as muche that *Purgatorie* is, as he maie lustily saie,

saie, that the Masse sauerth no man.

Pseudomenos.



His is called a liyng argumente, for what soeuer ye shall saie, ye must needes saie amisse. *Epimenides* a manne bozne in *Crete*, saied that the people bozne in *Crete*, were liers, saied he true or no? If ye saie that he saied truthe, I maie well saie that can not bee well saied: for if the people in *Crete* be liers, then lied *Epimenides*, and so this sayng can not be true, because he was a man there bozne and one of *Crete*, and saied thei were liers. Againe, if ye iudge that the people there be not liers, then *Epimenides* saied truthe, euen when he saied, the people of *Crete* are liers, because he himself was a man of *Crete*. But this subtiltie is thus auoided if ye will saie, that where as mention is made of the people in *Crete*, yet all are not comprehended vnder the same, neither is the Proposition vniuer sall, but indefinite, that is to saie, not comprehending all but certaine, as thus. The people of *Crete* are liers, truthe it is, that many of them be liers, and yet *Epimenides* maie be excepted, and be a true manne of his word notwithstanding. Also he that was warned in his slepe, not to giue credite to any dreames, did not thinke that dreame vaine, although he iudged many other to bee litle esteemed, and small herde to bee giuen to them. For by this dreame he was warned not to beleue greatly other dreames, and yet notwithstanding, he was warned to beleue this dreame.

I leseng.

Epimenides

*One warned
not to beleue
dreames.*



That whiche I craued at the firste setting for the of this booke, the same request make I now in correctyng of the same. I desire of all men their fauourable helpe to supporte my weakenesse, or at the leaste to giue me none euill reporte for my well meaning; and then I shall thinke my self sufficiently rewarded. But if offence should breede through laboꝝ sustained, and no fauour gotten, when gentlenesse had been offered, it had been as good (in my minde) to please and lose nothing, as to take paines and lose all. But my trust being staied vpon

E. S.

the

The arte of Logike.

the honest and godlie affected, I haue traualled without feare, hoping well that my doynge shalbe taken without blame. And therefore this obtained, I shall desire all menne for the loue of God to embrace the trithe, and not to wedde themselves to any opinion, without some stait and sure foundation of Goddes trithe. And where as God is the author of peace and concord, and loue that that unfeinedly call vppon hym in trithe; I shall hartely praise to God, that all wee maie drawe after one line, and seeke one vnfoyme and sounde doctrine, to the praise of God, and the comforte of our soules. And because some heddes are verie bolde to enter farther then witte can reache, or els haue a minde vainly to question of thynges not needefull: I thought it not amisse to set forth *Aristotles* mynde, as touchyng thynges that should not bee brought in question. There bee foure thynges (saith he) whiche should not be examined by reason,

Foure thynges not to be examined by reason.

- i. And first, no man ought to argue of these thynges, wherein if any one put doubt, he deserueth punishment. As to reason whether there be a God or no. And therefore *Tullius* saith verie well, it is a wicked and an vngodly custome, to dispute or talke against God, either in earnest, or yet in sporte.
- ii. Againe, it is a fondnesse to reason of those thynges, whiche our sense iudge to bee true. As to knowe by reason, whether fire bee hotte or no. The whiche were madnesse to aske, and surely if any one should reason with me, I would bid hym put his finger in it.
- iii. Thirdlie, it is euill to reason of those thynges, whiche can not be knowne by mannes witte. As to knowe what God the Father is in person, what the holie Ghost is, how thei sitte and are placed in heauen, or of what making the soule of man is.
- iiii. Fourthlie, to talke and despise of those thynges, whiche are vndoubtedlie true. As in *Aristoteles* these and these are fire. In philosophy. The whole is greater then the parte. In whiche matters to moue any earnest question, or to doubt ouermuche in thynges nothyng doubtfull, were either starke madnesse, or plaine foolishnesse. Therefore I wishe of God, that all our reasoning might bee fastened vpon suche matters, as are necessarie for the hearer to learne, and also good for the godlie reasoner.

net.

ner to teache. Wherein though I haue doon nothing so well my
self, as my good will was thereunto, yet I trust all honest hartes
will testifie with me, that I haue moste earnestly minded the glo-
rie of God, and the setting forth of his holie name, throughout
the whole course of this my rude and simple booke, the whiche
once doen and knowne. I hope the gentle reader will beare with
me in other thynges, and rather helpe me then hate me, when I
seeke to helpe all, and hurte none. I aske in reward but louyng
repynte for incessant labour: the one is easie for all menne
to graunt, chocher was busie for me to compasse.

Thus I lye in hope, yea, I hope well,

for through hope, beholde I

trauaill. GOD be

praised.

FINIS.



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